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## IMMIGRATION AND RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM IN EUROPE

### Abstract

Previous research has established that the concept of difference is critical in national identity formation. This paper applies these broad understandings of identity formation to current immigration trends in Europe by looking at the relationship between immigration, nationalism, and religiosity in the European context. If theories about religious difference are accurate, then states with large and increasing numbers of Muslim immigrants should show stronger and increasing measures of religious (Christian) nationalism as Europeans fall back on religion as a key tool in self-identification. This hypothesis is tested by using OLS regression and Logit to calculate the strength of the relationship between religion and nationalism in central and western European states using data drawn from World Values and European Values Surveys. Additional controls, including age, sex, education, income, and political orientation are also included. The resulting measure of religious nationalism is then examined in relationship to immigration trends across the continent. The findings show an increased, albeit complicated, link between religion and nationalism in countries with higher levels of non-EU immigration, and therefore partially support the hypothesis. The findings also show that increased religious diversity undermines religious nationalism over time, therefore painting a mixed picture for the future of identity politics in Europe.

**Keywords:** Religion, Nationalism, Immigration, Europe, Identity

### Religious Nationalism in Europe<sup>2</sup>

For many years, scholars assumed that religion would fade as part of a pattern of long-term secularization around the world, and Europe served as an exemplar

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- 2 This article fits within the young, important, and growing field of the politology of religion. For further reading, see: Mirosljub Jevtic, Political Science and Religion, *Politics and Religion Journal*, Vol. 1, No.1, 2007, pp. 59-69.

of the inevitable effects of secularization. However, ample evidence has emerged that this is far too simple of an understanding of religion in the modern world. In fact, religiously based nationalism has historically occurred in locations where religious frontiers (or borders) acted as a threat to a nation's existence.<sup>3</sup> Religious frontiers are defined as "geographic borders where two regions or peoples, each prominently influenced by a specific and unique religion, come together."<sup>4</sup> It is in these locations that religion serves as a useful tool in group differentiation and identification, a key aspect of nationalism (or any form of identity formation, for that matter). However, religious differentiation alone is not enough to lead to the linkage between religion and nationalism. In addition to this religious "other", there must be some sort of existential threat.<sup>5</sup> This threat need not be religious in nature. In other words, the threat to the Irish from the British was never a threat based on Papal supremacy. It was a threat based on economic and social conditions, on equal rights, and on self-determination. However, the fact that the Irish were primarily Catholic and the English/British were primarily Anglican meant that religion provided the most useful tool for mass mobilization and national consciousness. In other words, political conflict fell along religious lines. (It is worth noting that the conflict between the Irish and the English began before the introduction of a religious frontier, and Irish nationalism was based on cultural and linguistic factors up to that point.) Examples of this are numerous – in addition to Ireland and its religious frontier with England/Britain, there is Greece and its religious frontier with Turkey/Ottoman Empire; Pakistan and its religious frontier with India; Israel and its religious frontier with its neighbors, etc.

What is important to recognize in each of these cases is that religiously-based national identities arose in response to specific causal factors. These factors are not independently sufficient, nor are they jointly necessary (there may be other paths to religious nationalism), but they do appear to be, for the most part, jointly sufficient. When a people group is threatened by a religious "other", they are almost certain to rally around religion as a unifying force. This was evident in the United States post-September 11<sup>th</sup>, when church attendance, anti-Muslim hate crimes, and religious rhetoric from state officials all increased.<sup>6</sup>

This general pattern holds for Europe over the past several centuries, despite the general trend towards secularism on the continent. It also appears to hold in large areas of the world outside of Europe, although this has yet to be studied in as thorough a manner, perhaps because much of the world lags

3 Philip W. Barker, *Religious Nationalism in Modern Europe: If God Be For Us*, Routledge, London, 2009; John Coakley, *Religion and Nationalism in the First World*, *Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World: Walker Connor and the Study of Nationalism*, Daniele Conversi (ed.), Routledge, London, 2002; David Martin, *A General Theory of Secularization*, Harper Colophon Books, New York, 1978.

4 Philip W. Barker, *Religious Nationalism in Modern Europe: If God Be For Us* . . .

5 Ibidem; Pippa Norris, Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*, Cambridge University Press, 2004.

6 Philip W. Barker, Muck J. William, *Secular Roots of Religious Rage: Shaping Religious Identity in the Middle East*, *Politics and Religion Journal*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2009, pp. 177-196.

behind Europe in terms of economic development. The relevance for contemporary Europe is more nuanced. The twentieth century was one in which most conflict in Europe was ideological - between Fascism, Liberalism, and Communism. This, outside of communism's insistence on an atheistic world-view, was a conflict largely devoid of religious overtones. In the past several decades, however, the question of religion has resurfaced as many states have faced a different type of religious "other" in the form of large-scale immigration from outside of Europe and from the Muslim world specifically. The reemergence of a religious divide to many parts of Europe has reintroduced the question of religious nationalism in many parts of the continent where secularism and secular nationalism had previously been declared victorious.<sup>7</sup>

### **Immigration and Identity**

The logical jump from religious frontiers/wars to immigration is not as dramatic as it might seem. Both issues relate to a group identity formation in response to outsiders. The general concept of group identity influenced by immigration is one that has been discussed extensively in the field. Markus Crepaz has addressed the impact of immigration on the European concept of welfare.<sup>8</sup> Crepaz argues that immigration is challenging the notion of European identity, potentially resulting in a return to primordial notions of the nation. Crepaz does not address the issue of religion specifically, but his study dovetails nicely with arguments about the impact of religious others on national identity.

Assuming that Crepaz and others are correct, and assuming that the pattern of conflict leading to identity shifts is correct, then one can induce that there should be a pattern of immigration leading to increased religious nationalism, specifically when the immigrants come from another faith tradition. Therefore, the following hypotheses can be made:

*H<sub>1</sub>: States with higher levels of Muslim immigration (relative to population) will have stronger ties between religion and nationalism.*

*H<sub>2</sub>: The strength of religious nationalism will increase over time in countries experiencing growth in immigrant Muslim populations.*

Thankfully, there is abundant survey data available to provide perspective on these propositions. That is the purpose of this paper.

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7 Philip W. Barker, *Religious Nationalism in Modern Europe: If God Be For Us*, Routledge, London, 2009; John Coakley, *Religion and Nationalism in the First World*, *Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World: Walker Connor and the Study of Nationalism*, Daniele Conversi (ed.), Routledge, London, 2002.

8 Markus Crepaz, *Trust Beyond Borders: Immigration, the Welfare State, and Identity in Modern Societies*, University of Michigan Press, 2007.

## Methods and Findings

As mentioned previously, a great deal of research has focused on the role of religion in national identity, both globally and in Europe specifically.<sup>9</sup> However, these studies all use largely qualitative case study approaches. In an attempt to further understand the phenomenon of religious nationalism, this paper proposes a method of measuring religious nationalism quantitatively. To test the hypotheses quantitatively, data on national sentiment and religiosity was gathered from a number of states across Central and Western Europe using the European Values Survey (EVS) and the World Values Survey (WVS).<sup>10</sup> This data spanned a number of years, although the primary focus was on the 5<sup>th</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup>, and 7<sup>th</sup> waves of the survey, which were carried out from 2005 onward. Data from the other four waves is also used for comparison in a few cases. In the initial examination of European nationalism, the cases examined were limited to European Union members. The exclusion of a number of member states from the latest wave of the WVS meant that the case selection was further limited by factors outside the control of the author. Thus, the primary cases initially examined included Bulgaria, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Great Britain. For each case, the number of available survey results was at least 900 in each wave.

In order to quantitatively measure the link between religion and nationalism, two primary variables were used. It can be assumed that countries with high levels of religious nationalism will demonstrate some measurable link between sentiments of national pride and religiosity. As a result, the strength or weakness of this linkage can be used as a measure of religious nationalism in individual countries. In other words, statistical tests can tell us how strongly interrelated religious views and national views are in each European country. In particular,

9 S.S. Acquaviva, *The Decline of the Sacred in Industrial Society*, Blackwell Publishers, 1979; Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, revised, Verso, London, 1991; Philip W. Barker, *Religious Nationalism in Modern Europe: If God Be For Us*, Routledge, London, 2009; Peter Berger, *The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview*, *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics*, Peter Berger (ed), Ethics and Public Policy Center, Washington, 1999; Steve Bruce, *Religion in the Modern World*, Oxford University Press, 1996; Jose Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, University of Chicago Press, 1994; John Coakley, Religion and Nationalism in the First World, in: *Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World: Walker Connor and the Study of Nationalism*, Daniele Conversi (ed), Routledge, London, 2002; Grace Davie, *Religion in Modern Europe: A Memory Mutates*, Oxford University Press, 2000; Ernest Gellner, Nationalism and Modernization in: *Nationalism*, John Hutchinson, Anthony D. Smith (eds.), Oxford University Press, 1994; Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983; Adrian Guelke, Religion, National Identity and the Conflict in Northern Ireland, *The Secular and the Sacred*, William Safran (ed), Frank Cass, London, 2003; Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion, and Nationalism*, Cambridge University Press, 1997; Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background*, MacMillan Company, New York, 1944; Martin, 1978; William Safran, Introduction, in: *The Secular and the Sacred*, William Safran (ed), Frank Cass, 2003, London; Anthony D. Smith, The Origins of Nations, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1989, pp. 349-356.

10 WORLD VALUES SURVEY 1981-2014 LONGITUDINAL AGGREGATE v.20150418. World Values Survey Association ([www.worldvaluessurvey.org](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org)). Aggregate File Producer: JDSsystems, Madrid SPAIN.; EVS (2015). *European Values Study Longitudinal Data File 1981-2008* (EVS 1981-2008). *GESIS Data Archive*, Cologne. ZA4804 Data File Version 3.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.12253.WVS (2015).

this paper will use one-way ANOVA tests, OLS regression, and logit to quantify the strength of religious nationalism.

In order to do this, World Values Survey and European Values survey data was analyzed. Two primary variables were focused upon. The first variable used in the measurement process is Religiosity. The score for this variable comes from one of two World Values Survey questions. The first asks about the importance of God in the respondent's life on a ten-point scale, with 1 being "not at all important" and 10 being "very important." This particular variable is useful for regression analysis. The second question simply asks if the respondent considers themselves to be religious. This binary variable is used in the logit analysis later in the study. The second major variable in the measurement of religious nationalism is National Pride. The score for this variable comes from a World Values Survey question that asks specifically about pride in one's nation. The question wording is as follows: "How proud are you to be [Nationality]? 1 = very proud, 2 = quite proud, 3 = not very proud, 4 = not at all proud." For statistical analysis, this scale was then inverted so that both key variables reflected a similar directionality: higher scores equal higher religiosity/nationalism. For subsequent logit analysis, this variable was recoded into a dummy variable based on whether the respondent claimed to be "very proud" or not. Survey results were then separated by Country and by Wave of WVS (1994-1999, 2000-2004, 2005-2007, etc.). The mean scores of each country on these two key variables can be seen in Tables 1 and 2.

The structure of the two key variables reveals significant variation across Europe. The mean score on the nationalism scale for each country is shown in Table 1, along with the *n* for each country. Unsurprisingly, Germany's mean response was the lowest of the examined states. The standard deviation associated with Germany's score also indicates that there is a great deal of variation within the German population in regard to pride in the German nation. Other low scores include France (a bit of a surprise) and the Netherlands, while the highest means are found in Poland and Spain. Each country's mean score on the Importance of God question, along with the associated *n*, is shown in Table 2. The scores here vary greatly, and again there are no significant surprises. Poland and Cyprus have both had recent conflicts with religious others (Poland with atheist Russia and Cyprus with Muslim Turkey) and Romania has long had to deal with religious others – most significantly the Catholic Austrian Empire.

**Table 1. National Pride by Country**

	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>n</b>
<b>Germany</b>	2.86	.842	1,913
<b>Netherlands</b>	3.06	.718	994
<b>France</b>	3.14	.690	960
<b>Bulgaria</b>	3.20	.858	908
<b>Romania</b>	3.20	.753	1,732
<b>Italy</b>	3.30	.693	998
<b>Sweden</b>	3.30	.717	951
<b>Cyprus</b>	3.44	.713	1,031
<b>Great Britain</b>	3.44	.700	965
<b>Slovenia</b>	3.46	.707	995
<b>Finland</b>	3.49	.625	1,002
<b>Spain</b>	3.53	.649	1,169
<b>Poland</b>	3.58	.602	997

Source: World Values Survey, 2005-07

Question: "How proud are you to be [Nationality]? 1 = not at all proud, 2 = not very proud, 3 = quite proud, 4 = very proud"

**Table 2. Importance of God by Country**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>n</b>
<b>Sweden</b>	3.93	3.048	993
<b>Germany</b>	4.48	3.198	2,017
<b>France</b>	4.68	3.137	994
<b>Netherlands</b>	4.69	3.224	1,018
<b>Bulgaria</b>	4.88	3.054	1,017
<b>Spain</b>	5.34	3.033	1,180
<b>Slovenia</b>	5.42	3.205	989
<b>Great Britain</b>	5.58	3.347	1,025
<b>Finland</b>	6.01	2.997	998
<b>Italy</b>	7.84	2.306	994
<b>Cyprus</b>	8.51	2.350	1,049
<b>Poland</b>	8.70	1.998	980
<b>Romania</b>	9.17	1.627	1,758

Source: World Values Survey, 2005-07

"How important is God in your life? 1 = not at all important, 10 = very important"

One interesting feature of the data is the fact that the mean religiosity score and the standard deviation in each country are inversely and strongly related. The  $r$  value for the relationship is  $-.922$ . States with low mean levels of religiosity experience a great variance in their population on the importance of religion, whereas counties with high means experience little variation. Why exactly this occurs is a potentially interesting subject for subsequent research.

### **ANOVA Analysis**

Initially, a one-way ANOVA test was used to establish the strength of the relationship between religiosity and nationalism in available European Union member states in the 2005-2007 wave of surveys. At this point, analysis was limited to Western European states, eliminating the post-communist states of Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, and Slovenia from the examination. The variation in each of these post-communist states is interesting to study, but the elimination of post-communist states provided for a simpler initial comparison. The results of the ANOVA tests can be seen in Table 3.

When looking at the relationship between these two variables (national pride and importance of religion), the findings are as expected and initially supportive of hypothesis one. Table 3 shows the average importance of God for each level of national pride in each Western European country.  $F$  scores indicate the strength of the relationship on a country-by-country basis, and the countries are listed in order of increasing  $F$  score. The relationship is statistically insignificant in only two cases – Finland and the Netherlands. The remaining seven counties all have a significant relationship between religion and nationalism, with Spain's score the highest. The conclusion is that each of these seven states have some level of religious nationalism, although the strength varies. Germany proves to have a mid-level relationship between the two variables, and Germans with low levels of national pride show significantly lower levels of religiosity (4.83 vs. 3.58 on the ten-point Importance of God measure).

### **Regression Analysis**

Although the ANOVA analysis is useful, it fails to control for a number of potentially significant contributory factors. In other words, it is likely that income, education, and political ideology (among others) are likely to explain both religiosity and national pride. In order to control for these intervening factors, an OLS regression was used to measure the impact of nationalism on religiosity in each country. The regression analysis used religiosity as the dependent variable, national pride as the primary independent variable, and included controls for age, sex, Catholicism, and education. The education variable is a three-point scale of education based on each country's educational system (1 = low, 2 = medium, 3

= high). The coding for education was performed by the World Values Survey. The resulting coefficients for national pride provide a measure of the link between religion and national identity in a given state. The regression coefficients can be found in Table 4. Once intervening variables have been controlled for, the relationship between national pride and importance of God falls away in France, Great Britain, and Sweden, but remains significant in Italy, Germany, Cyprus, and Spain. Spain shows a remarkably strong relationship, with a one-step increase in national pride (4-point scale) leading to more than a one-step increase in the importance of God (10-point scale). The results of this regression analysis – specifically the regression coefficient for national pride – present a new and interesting measure of the strength of religious nationalism in each country. Therefore, one can argue that only four of the nine states examined demonstrate religious nationalism, in which religious identity and national identity are intertwined – Italy, Germany, Cyprus and Spain.



**Table 3. Relationship Between National Pride and Importance of God, by Country**

Importance of God (1-10)				Importance of God (1-10)			
	n	Mean	Std. Dev.		n	Mean	Std. Dev.
<b>Netherlands</b>				<b>Sweden</b>			
Not at all proud	29	4.55	3.804	Not at all proud	17	4.59	3.641
Not very proud	131	4.21	3.181	Not very proud	89	3.54	3.012
Quite proud	553	4.68	3.109	Quite proud	432	3.60	2.920
Very proud	256	4.85	3.310	Very proud	405	4.26	3.118
f = 1.205				f = 8.752 **			
<b>Finland</b>				<b>Italy</b>			
Not at all proud	7	5.86	4.22	Not at all proud	16	7.25	3.550
Not very proud	48	6.10	3.466	Not very proud	81	7.15	2.651
Quite proud	385	5.71	3.011	Quite proud	470	7.58	2.249
Very proud	546	6.19	2.895	Very proud	415	8.33	2.134
f = 1.984				f = 11.507 ***			
<b>France</b>				<b>Cyprus</b>			
Not at all proud	24	3.21	3.162	Not at all proud	25	6.16	3.460
Not very proud	95	4.20	3.273	Not very proud	60	7.53	2.613
Quite proud	558	4.44	2.982	Quite proud	381	8.49	2.083
Very proud	278	5.31	3.210	Very proud	565	8.71	2.380
f = 7.477 ***				f = 13.533 ***			
<b>Great Britain</b>				<b>Spain</b>			
Not at all proud	16	5.06	3.660	Not at all proud	18	3.61	3.032
Not very proud	64	5.45	3.817	Not very proud	46	3.41	1.995
Quite proud	349	4.78	3.225	Quite proud	398	4.54	2.702
Very proud	522	5.92	3.205	Very proud	688	6.02	3.079
f = 8.658 ***				f = 31.199 ***			
<b>Germany</b>							
Not at all proud	138	3.58	2.991				
Not very proud	405	3.99	2.976				
Quite proud	918	4.83	3.289				
Very proud	415	4.83	3.289				
f = 8.752 ***							

Source: World Values Survey, 2005-2007, Notes: One-Way ANOVA test,  
\*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

Question items used in ANOVA: "How proud are you to be [Nationality]? 1 = not at all proud, 2 = not very proud, 3 = quite proud, 4 = very proud" "How important is God in your life? 1 = not at all important, 10 = very important"

**Table 4. Relationship Between National Sentiment (IV) and Importance of God (DV) (OLS Regression Coefficients)**

	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$	a	n	Adj. R <sup>2</sup>
	Nat. Pride	Age	$\beta$ Educ.	Female	Catholic	Constant				
Netherlands	-.044 (.179)	.043 *** (.007)	.252 (.175)	.103 (.243)	-1.317 *** (.241)	4.741 *** (.814)		492		.112
France	.027 (.177)	.016 * (.007)	-.018 (.148)	.901 *** (.231)	-2.486 *** (.331)	7.260 *** (.770)		471		.118
Great Britain	.124 (.189)	.025 *** (.007)	.154 (.215)	.759 ** (.260)	.768 * (.327)	4.586 *** (.900)		452		.057
Finland	.138 (.152)	.040 *** (.005)	.111 (.128)	1.432 *** (.186)	3.380 (2.696)	2.858 *** (.701)		846		.118
Sweden	.231 (.151)	.050 *** (.006)	.062 (.153)	1.022 *** (.213)	2.986 *** (.799)	.387 (.765)		709		.135
Italy	.367 *** (.097)	.018 *** (.004)	.003 (.086)	.746 *** (.125)	-.655 (.821)	6.437 *** (.892)		857		.078
Germany	.518 *** (.099)	.026 *** (.005)	.218 (.120)	.872 *** (.167)	.468 ** (.168)	2.290 *** (.487)		1,044		.074
Cyprus	.582 *** (.090)	.008 (.005)	.074 (.095)	.590 *** (.126)	1.380 (1.133)	5.924 *** (.444)		972		.067
Spain	1.028 *** (.139)	.042 *** (.005)	.029 (.126)	.729 *** (.165)	-2.423 ** (.790)	2.337 * (1.014)		916		.176

Source: World Values Survey, 2005-2007

Notes: OLS Regression, \*\*\*  $p < .001$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*  $p < .05$

Dependent Variable Question: "How important is God in your life? 1 = not at all important, 10 = very important"  
 Independent/Control Variables: "How proud are you to be [Nationality]? 1 = not at all proud, 2 = not very proud, 3 = quite proud, 4 = very proud";  
 Education: 1 = low, 2 = medium, 3 = high; Female and Catholic are both dummy variables. Age is respondent's actual age.

## Immigration and Religious Nationalism in Europe


At this point, the study turns directly to an examination of hypothesis 1. Is there a relationship between levels of immigration and religious nationalism? In order to test this hypothesis, the regression coefficients produced above were compared to national levels of immigration provided by the European Union (Eurostat).<sup>11</sup> Specifically, the percentage of a country's population that has immigrated from outside the EU was chosen based on the underlying theory that identity is shaped by the "other". Non-European immigrants are more likely to come from non-Christian backgrounds and provide the most likely source of mobilization for religiously based national identity. Unfortunately, the EU data did not differentiate between the religion of the immigrants, but non-European immigration is used here as a close approximate.

Figure 1 shows the relationship between the percentage of a country's population that has immigrated from outside the European Union and the strength of religious nationalism (as measured by the aforementioned regression analysis.) Although there are few cases, the relationship is rather remarkable. In fact, the  $r$  score for the relationship is .90.

It appears that when the percentage of a given state's population reaches the point where it is composed of approximately four to five percent immigrants from outside the EU, nationalism becomes intertwined with religion. This is in line with what was predicted in hypothesis one. As more non-Europeans (in this case assumed to be largely Islamic) enter a country, the native population's identity becomes increasingly solidified on that factor which most easily differentiates them from the "other" – in this case religion. Italy, Germany, Cyprus, and Spain all have significant Muslim populations, and all have a significant tie between religion and nationalism. Although other countries also have sizeable non-EU populations (e.g. France), the proportions relative to the total population remain smaller. In states with less than four percent non-EU immigrant populations, the relationship between religion and nationalism was insignificant in each and every case.

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11 Eurostat, <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/>



Sources: Religiosity and Nationalism data from World Values Survey, 2005-2007; Immigration data from Eurostat  
 Notes: \*\*\* p<.001; R=.90

Question items used in regression:

“How proud are you to be [Nationality]? 1 = not at all proud, 2 = not very proud, 3 = quite proud, 4 = very proud”

“How important is God in your life? 1 = not at all important, 10 = very important”  
 Regression controlled for age, level of education, sex, and Catholicism.

Immigration Data: Percent of a nation’s population that has immigrated from a non-EU state.

In order to further examine this relationship, OLS regressions were carried out for two of these states (Spain and Germany) using data from various waves of the World Values Survey to see if the relationship between religion and nationalism has increased over time as immigration has continued. The results are presented in Table 5. As can be seen in the tables, the strength of the relationship between religion and national identity has increased with each wave of the survey, and the relationship has been significant at each point in time. This supports hypothesis 2 and indicates that the relationship is in fact causal, as religious nationalism cannot be the cause of immigration. As immigration to Europe has continued to increase, so has the strength of religious nationalism.

**Table 5. OLS Regression for Importance of God in Spain and Germany, by Year**

Spain				Germany		
	1995	2000	2007		1997	2006
<b><math>\beta</math> Nat. Pride</b>	.542 *** (.113)	.716 *** (.128)	1.028 *** (.139)	<b><math>\beta</math> Nat. Pride</b>	.261 * (.117)	.518 *** (.099)
<b><math>\beta</math> Age</b>	.020 *** (.004)	.028 *** (.005)	.042 *** (.139)	<b><math>\beta</math> Age</b>	.040 *** (.006)	.026 *** (.005)
<b><math>\beta</math> Educ.</b>	-.150 (.111)	-.047 (.122)	.029 (.126)	<b><math>\beta</math> Educ.</b>	.235 (.137)	.218 (.120)
<b><math>\beta</math> Female</b>	1.055 *** (.150)	1.165 *** (.164)	.729 *** (.165)	<b><math>\beta</math> Female</b>	.781 *** (.197)	.872 *** (.167)
<b><math>\beta</math> Cath.</b>	-1.039 * (.475)	-.670 (.511)	-2.423 ** (.790)	<b><math>\beta</math> Cath.</b>	.435 * (201)	.468 ** (.168)
<b>a Constant</b>	5.125 *** (.684)	2.609 *** (.738)	2.337 * (1.014)	<b>a Constant</b>	2.893 *** (.567)	2.290 *** (.487)
<b>n</b>	998	966	916	<b>n</b>	817	1,044
<b>Adj. R<sup>2</sup></b>	.104	.130	.176	<b>Adj. R<sup>2</sup></b>	.083	.074

Source: World Values Survey, 1994-1999, 1999-2004, 2005-2007

Notes: \*\*\* p&lt;.001, \*\* p&lt;.01, \* p&lt;.05

Dependent Variable Question: "How important is God in your life? 1 = not at all important, 10 = very important"

Independent/Control Variables: "How proud are you to be [Nationality]? 1 = not at all proud, 2 = not very proud, 3 = quite proud, 4 = very proud"; Education: 1 = low, 2 = medium, 3 = high;

Female and Catholic are both dummy variables. Age is respondent's actual age.

### Logit Analysis at a Global Level

In order to build on the initial findings from the small sample of Western European countries, a wider examination is necessary. By including data from the World Values Survey in addition to the European Values Survey, we can create a more complete picture of both the European continent and its place in the world. This joint data spans a number of years, which provides useful data for time-series analysis of multiple countries, although for this particular study, the most recent survey wave was used for each country. For instance, the United Kingdom is included in every wave, so the data from the most recent survey (EVS 2013) is used here. Other countries date back as far as the mid-1990s (El Salvador, Dominican Republic), and as a result, that data is older, but still used for comparative purposes.

In order to measure the strength of the relationship between religion and nationalism, the same two primary variables are used. The first is national pride,

which is coded on a four-point scale. This variable was recoded into a dummy variable that differentiates between respondents who said they were “very proud” of their nationality – the highest possible response – and those who answered anything else. The second primary variable used was a dummy variable coded according to respondents’ answers to a question about whether or not they were religious.

The data was divided by country and year, and in this round, logit analysis was used to measure the extent to which religiosity predicted national pride in each country. In total, this produced measurements for 271 individual country-years. For the purpose of this paper, only the most recent survey was used for each state, thus providing logit scores for 103 separate countries. In each calculation, sex, age, income (national deciles), and self-positioning on a political scale were controlled.

The resultant logit scores provide a measure of religious nationalism, which can then be compared across regions and globally. The logit coefficient can be interpreted as a percentage. This percentage should be understood as something akin to “a person who describes themselves as religious is X% more likely to be very proud of their nationality.” This percentage will thus forth be discussed as the “religious nationalism coefficient” or “religious nationalism score”.

Table 7 presents a summary of religion, nationalism, and religious nationalism by region. It is important to note that the percentages listed are the average national score, thus Singapore is weighted the same as China in the Asia category. However, the table is useful for comparing the role of religion and nationalism globally. It is also worth noting that there is overlap between the Arab states category and the MENA category. Not surprisingly, Africa scores the highest for religiosity and Asia the lowest. Eastern Europe, however, scores as high as Latin America, despite its reputation as a largely secular region. Interestingly, Eastern Europe also scores the lowest (by a significant margin) on the national pride score (percent of respondents who are very proud of their nation). Outside of Europe and Asia, there is remarkable continuity in the scores.

**Table 6. Religion Nationalism by Region**

<b>Region (n)</b>	<b>Avg. % Religious</b>	<b>Avg. % Very Proud</b>	<b>Avg. Religious Nationalism Score</b>
<b>Western Non-Euro (4)</b>	55.8	67.0	6.2
<b>Arab States (14)</b>	80.1	66.8	8.4
<b>E. Europe (21)</b>	74.7	39.6	9.6
<b>Asia (15)</b>	53.8	55.9	9.8
<b>W. Europe (22)</b>	60.2	50.6	11.8
<b>MENA (21)</b>	81.5	70.6	14.3
<b>Latin America (14)</b>	73.8	73.4	15.6
<b>Africa (11)</b>	91.6	76.0	19.7

In terms of religious nationalism, the Arab world scores near the bottom. In other words, a religious person in the Arab World is only 8.4% more likely to be very proud of their national identity than a non-religious person. Religion, therefore, is not a particularly good predictor of nationalism. Compare this with Africa, where a religious person is nearly 20% more likely to be very proud of their nationality. This goes against the commonly accepted notion that the Arab world is a hotbed of religious nationalism. In fact, the Arab World shows a weaker link between religion and nationalism than does Europe, widely considered to be the most secular of the world's regions.

Within Europe, there is a significant amount of variation. This stands in contrast to the old notion of Europe as monolithically secular. The religious nationalism score for each European country is shown in Tables 7 (Western Europe) and 8 (Eastern Europe). The calculated scores line up well with what one would predict, thus providing a level of validity for the new measure. The states that score the highest tend to be states that have a history of conflict with religious others. As predicted, religion provides a powerful tool for national mobilization in these countries (Malta, Ireland, Greece, Poland, Bosnia, Lithuania, Ukraine, etc.)

**Table 7. Religious Nationalism in Western Europe (Logit Analysis)**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Avg. % Religious</b>	<b>Avg. % Very Proud</b>	<b>Avg. Religious Nationalism Score</b>	<b>Sig.</b>
<b>Sweden</b>	32.3	42.6	-0.6	0.790
<b>Norway</b>	44.7	59.9	1.9	0.448
<b>Northern Ireland</b>	63.7	54.6	2.1	0.679
<b>Great Britain</b>	48.3	54.1	2.5	0.279
<b>Luxembourg</b>	52.6	51.6	4.3	0.222
<b>Belgium</b>	57.8	29.4	4.5	0.052
<b>Netherlands</b>	45.5	21.5	6.3 **	0.005
<b>Germany</b>	50.9	26.8	6.5 ***	0.001
<b>Denmark</b>	72.3	49.2	7.1 **	0.008
<b>Austria</b>	63.9	47.7	7.6 **	0.002
<b>France</b>	43.1	37	8.2 ***	0.000
<b>Switzerland</b>	62.4	44.7	8.3 **	0.006
<b>Andorra</b>	48.1	39.5	8.5 ***	0.001
<b>Iceland</b>	68.4	61.6	8.5 **	0.005
<b>Finland</b>	53.5	56.2	9.6 ***	0.000
<b>Cyprus</b>	78.3	49.1	17.4 ***	0.000
<b>Spain</b>	41	58.6	20.3 ***	0.000
<b>Italy</b>	85.1	45.9	21.4 ***	0.000
<b>Portugal</b>	83.1	65.2	21.6 ***	0.000
<b>Greece</b>	87.6	66.9	23.6 ***	0.000
<b>Ireland</b>	68.6	77.4	26.8 ***	0.000
<b>Malta</b>	72.9	72.7	42.2 ***	0.000




**Table 8. Religious Nationalism in Eastern Europe (Logit Analysis)**

Country	Avg. % Religious	Avg. % Very Proud	Avg. Religious Nationalism Score	Sig.
Montenegro	87.6	34	-3.2	0.244
Macedonia	83.9	53.3	-2.9	0.256
Estonia	32.8	21.4	-0.8	0.756
Slovakia	84.4	40.7	-0.2	0.933
Czech Republic	33.9	32.8	2.3	0.286
Slovenia	69.2	51.3	2.6	0.397
Bulgaria	61.1	34.3	4.8	0.051
Russia	61.1	30.2	5.7 *	0.015
Latvia	77.4	32.3	7.4 *	0.022
Croatia	83.6	41.8	7.8 **	0.004
Serbia	90.2	42.5	7.9 **	0.003
Albania	90.8	42.5	9.5 ***	0.000
Poland	88.4	60.6	9.6 **	0.006
Hungary	47.7	44.1	10.4 ***	0.000
Belarus	62.5	32.8	12.5 ***	0.000
Bosnia & Herzegovina	94	29.1	13.6 ***	0.001
Moldova	83.3	26	15.7 **	0.002
Lithuania	85.1	22.6	16.7 ***	0.000
Ukraine	68.3	27.5	18.1 ***	0.000
Kosovo	99.5	88.4	28.8 ***	0.000
Romania	83.4	43.6	35.7 ***	0.000


### Logit Findings on the Impact of Immigration on Religious Nationalism in Europe

The more extensive data created by combining multiple waves of both the European Values Survey and World Values Survey allows us to look more in depth at the question of immigration and its impact on religious nationalism today, and the results are more mixed than expected. There are certain trends that emerge, however. To begin, there is a clear correlation between religious diversity and religious nationalism. Figure 2 shows the relationship between these two variables. The religious diversity score was taken from Pew Research's measure of religious diversity and is based on population measures from the natural sciences. As religious diversity

**Figure 2: Religious Nationalism and Religious Diversity in Europe**

increases, religious nationalism declines. This is a logical relationship. A homogenous country will have an easier time using religion as a defining national characteristic than will a largely heterogeneous state. This, however, goes against the presumption that immigration would lead to increasing notions of religious nationalism. In fact, it appears that, *in the long run*, increasing immigration would undermine a religious-based nationalism in favor of a more civil or cultural based nationalism.

Figure 3 looks at the same phenomenon from a slightly different perspective. It includes only Western European states and looks at religious nationalism in relation to the percentage of Muslims residing in each country. Again, it shows that higher levels of diversity actually work to undermine religious nationalism, although there is also the possibility that the causal arrow flows in the opposite direction – that in fact religiously nationalistic states are less likely to welcome non-Christian immigrants.


**Figure 3: Western European Religious Nationalism and Muslim Populations**

In addition to the tie between increased diversity and decreased religious nationalism, it is also noteworthy that there are clear differences between primarily Catholic states (in red) and primarily Protestant states (in blue). Catholic states consistently score higher on religious nationalism than do Protestant states, and this will be a relationship that should be examined in further depth in the future.

Finally, Figure 4 shows the relationship between the makeup of immigration and religious nationalism in Western European countries specifically. The x-axis represents the percentage of total annual immigration from non-European Union states. As such, this is not looking at the size of an immigrant populations. Instead, it is looking at the make-up of immigrant populations. In other words, a country might have a low level of immigration, but those immigrants might be 90% non-European. When viewed from this angle, a link does emerge. Countries that are experiencing immigration largely from outside the EU (used here as a proxy for non-Christian groups), do in fact have higher levels of religious nationalism. Regardless of how many immigrants a country is receiving, if those immigrants come largely from a non-European state, the receiving country is likely

to have a stronger level of religious nationalism. Obviously, in order to establish the causal nature of this relationship, data from multiple WVS and EVS waves will need to be examined. If fluctuating immigration demographics also lead to fluctuations in religious nationalism, then an argument can be made that immigration is encouraging the redefinition of nationalism in a religious direction.

**Figure 4: Religious Nationalism and Immigration Make-up**



## Discussion

The findings of this study have significant implications for our understanding of the relationship between religion, nationalism, and immigration. The broad theory that religion and nationalism become intertwined when a religious “other” threatens group identity is supported, although the relationship is quite complex. This fits well with the established literature on immigration and its influence on collective identities. If the established relationship holds outside of the nine initial cases examined, we should see a significant relationship in other Western European states with significant non-European immigrant populations. These nations include Greece (7.3%), Luxembourg (5.9%), Austria (6.7%), and Switzerland (8.5%). Belgium (4.0%) and Denmark (4.0%) are borderline cases and appear to be at or near the transition point. Using the Logit measure of religious nationalism, four of these six states demonstrate a significant level of religious

nationalism, and two (Luxembourg and Belgium) are borderline.

The deeper analysis using both World Values Survey and European Values Survey data provides a more complex picture of immigration in Europe. Several points from this analysis are worth emphasizing. First, using logit analysis to measure the relationship between religion and nationalism is a useful tool. The religious nationalism scores obtained from the data analysis stand up well to an eye test and seem to be in line with our general understanding of religious nationalism in the world today. As such, the method laid out above appears to be a valid means to measure a phenomenon that is of increasing importance in today's world. The ability to quantify a concept like religious nationalism is useful for nuanced studies, particularly of more recent developments in religious nationalism. Future research will look to tie these quantitative measures to case studies in the field in order to further establish this validity.

Second, assuming that the measure of religious nationalism is valid, then we can learn a fair amount about the nature of religious nationalism around the world. There is much to be drawn from this data, but initial analysis shows that the Arab World, for instance, may not be the hotbed of religious nationalism we previously suspected. Additionally, there are fascinating questions to be probed dealing with the variation of religious nationalism within Latin America, for instance, or why the United States continues to be a global outlier in religiosity and religious nationalism. This methodology could easily be applied to a US-specific study to compare states or counties using election surveys.

Third, the findings of this study have significant implications for our understanding of the relationship between religion, nationalism, and immigration. The broad theory that religion and nationalism become intertwined when a religious "other" threatens group identity is further supported, but with very real caveats. The link between immigration and religious nationalism is not straight-forward. In fact, continued immigration will likely lead to a secularized notion of nationalism, as religious diversity appears to undermine religiously-based nationalism. However, the data also indicates that, in the short-run, the type of immigration may play a key role in a nation's response. As such, there appears to be a two-stage process, in which early immigration into a rather homogenous country likely exacerbates religious identities before leading in the longer term to a more heterogeneous and diverse notion of nationality. Again, causality is essential here, and further analysis will help to establish whether or not there is a relationship over time within individual countries. In Europe specifically, there are several countries that have been surveyed in an ongoing manner for the past 20 years. That information will help shed light on this relationship more clearly.

Finally, the relationship between religion and nationalism in Catholic countries in Europe is stronger than the relationship in Protestant states. This phenomenon has been explored in other works, but survey data could be used to further test and understand those established theories.

## Conclusion

The concept of religious nationalism is complex and nuanced. Despite the limits of quantifying a complex phenomenon such as this, there are real benefits to be gained by pairing quantitative measures of nationalism with case-specific qualitative studies. This research hopes to contribute to that process. The use of these measures allows us to investigate the relationship of immigration to changing notions of nationalism. It is clear that national identities in Europe are being reshaped in response to the growth of non-European immigration, and it is also clear that the path forward will likely be complex and tumultuous. However, there is evidence that in the long term, national identities adjust to incorporate, in religious terms at least, non-Christian immigrants to the continent.

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Филип Баркер

## ИМИГРАЦИЈА И ВЕРСКИ НАЦИОНАЛИЗАМ У ЕВРОПИ

### Сажетак

Претходна истраживања су успоставила да је концепт различитости упитан у питању формирања националног идентитета. Овај рад примењује широко схваћену идеју формирања идентитета на тренутни процес имиграције у Европи и тражи везу између имиграције, национализма и религиозности у европском контексту. Ако су теорије о верској различитости тачне, онда би државе са великим и растућим бројем муслиманских имигранта требале да покажу јаче мере верског (хришћанског) национализма јер Европљани виде религију као кључну тачку свог идентитета. Овај хипотеза је тестирана ОЛС регресионом анализом и Логит методом како би се израчуна снага везе између религије и национализма у централним и западно-европским земљама, на основу података база World Values и European Values Surveys. Контролне варијабле, које укључују године, пол, образовање, приходе и политичку оријентацију, су такође укључене. Након тога, добијени резултати о верском национализму су доведени у вези са имиграционим трендовима. Налази показују увећану, иако компликовану, везу између религије и национализма у земљама са већим бројем не-европских имигранта и делимично потврђују хипотезу. Налази такође показују да увећана верска различитост утиче на верски национализам током времена, правећи измешану слику о будућности идентитетске политике у Европи.

**Кључне речи:** религија, национализам, имиграција, Европа, идентитет

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