BETWIXT AND BETWEEN:  
THE POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS OF ROMAN CATHOLIC NEO-PENTECOSTALS

Catholic Charismatic Renewal and Politics: Competing Dynamics

While an appreciable collection of extant academic literature surveys the political opinions of Roman Catholics in the USA and, more recently, their relationships and alignment with the so-called New Christian Right, the orientation of charismatic Catholics as a distinct constituency within the Roman Church has attracted relatively little attention over the years. This paper overviews the piecemeal historical evidence and scholarly works that allows a degree of analysis on the subject over the last four decades. The paper argues that the indications suggest that charismatic (neo-Pentecostal) Catholics are pulled in different directions regarding political views and allegiances, and are thus subject to the influence of contrasting dynamics and competing loyalties which renders conclusions difficult to reach.

To some degree such dynamics and competing loyalties result from the juxtaposition of the charismatics in the Roman Church and the juxtaposition of the Church within the USA’s politico-religious culture. Moreover, the religious journeying of charismatic Catholics within the broad Charismatic Renewal movement that impacted in many of the mainstream denominations of the USA since the 1960s has, in many respects, been a difficult one. Many of the problematic aspects historically relate to the movement’s legitimacy in the Catholic Church at large and its significance with-

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in ecclesiastical structures. Put succinctly, the Catholic Church has long demanded the loyalties of the charismatics, while accepting the legitimacy of the movement within its jurisdiction.

A related predicament has proved to be the Catholic charismatics’ relationship to the wider neo-Pentecostal movement that has predominantly been Protestant in orientation. A further and connected complication has been the Catholic charismatic’s interaction with the secular world including political processes and institutional affiliation. Generally speaking, a degree of accommodation with the secular sphere, with a number of its liberalizing impulses, has pulled the charismatics culturally towards the USA mainstream, causing, at least initially, a departure from traditional Catholicism. Over time, however, the tendency for the charismatics to largely be re-incorporated into Catholic corporate life has come to blunt the edge of cultural assimilation. These processes, as the scanty evidence suggests, have at least partially informed the political orientations of the Catholic neo-Pentecostals in various ways and to various degrees.

**Charismatic Renewal in the Roman Catholic Church**

Before providing an analysis of the Catholic charismatics’ political inclinations something may be said of the movement in which they have been swept up in for some four decades. The Charismatic Renewal movement that moved through the majority of the mainstream Protestant denominations of the USA in the 1960s has proved, in hindsight, to be merely one sector of the vibrant neo-Pentecostalism phenomenon. In turn, the neo-Pentecostal movement adopted many of the core characteristics of the ‘classical’ Pentecostal movement that emerged during the first decades of the twentieth century and which the Catholic charismatics were to embrace, albeit tempered by their own tradition, teachings and praxis.²

The early Pentecostals, with their alleged beginnings during the Azusa Street revival in Los Angeles in 1906, believed that they were restoring the early and ‘lost’ experiences of the first century Christian Church. Hence, the emphasis on the baptism in the Spirit and the ‘spiritual gifts’ or ‘charismata’ including healing, miracles, prophecy and especially speaking in tongues which became the hallmark of classical Pentecostalism. In addition, the movement was typified by its ‘free’ expression of worship, its emotionalism, millenarianism and faith in a global revival before Christ’s Second

Coming. Pentecostalism’s ecstatic enthusiasm was supplemented by the tendency towards fundamentalism in its Biblical literalism and frequent sectarian or at least elitist leanings. It was these tendencies, as further detailed below, that were to render the broad Pentecostal movement historically largely apolitical in disposition.

A series of events from the 1950s, most notably the ecumenical overtures made by a number of Pentecostal bodies towards the historical denominations, alongside the activities of itinerant Pentecostal ministries, sparked the historical events leading to the Charismatic Renewal movement in the mainstream denominations in the USA. As early as 1963 the spread of Pentecostalism into the mainline Protestant denominations in the form of the Charismatic Renewal movement received the attention in an early article by Frank Farrell entitled ‘Outburst of Tongues: The New Penetration’. The article suggested that the ‘Third Force’ of Pentecostalism was beginning to be dispersed among the other two ‘forces’ of Catholicism and traditional Protestantism.

The movement in the Catholic Church, in the form of Charismatic Renewal, took off in earnest somewhat later than its Protestant counterpart, in the late 1960s. Nonetheless, it displayed, despite its departures, many of the theological and cultural attributes of Renewal found among Protestant churches. Catholic Charismatic Renewal also brought a degree of unity with the broad world of Pentecostalism that was fast becoming the most significant expression of global Christianity. The Charismatic Renewal movement in Catholic and Protestant quarters inherited many traditional Pentecostal characteristics, although its revivalism and millenarianism was rather muted. Instead, the emphasis was upon spiritually renewing the mainstream churches.

By 1967 the Charismatic Renewal movement had broken out from Protestant enclaves and was evident as an active force among Roman Catholics. From that time Charismatic Renewal, as an expression of neo-Pentecostalism, represented a contestation within the Catholic Church. More widely, Pentecostalism, in its various forms, has presented a challenge as well as a paradox over the last four decades. In the USA, the Charismatic Renewal movement within Catholic circles offered a localized theological and cultural challenge and also indicated how broad the Church had become. It was a movement of some significance. Citing a 1967 source, the renowned historian of Pentecostalism, Walter Hollenweger, suggested that 10,000 Roman Catholic lay people and clergy in the USA had received the Pentecostal experience of Baptism in

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5 See, for example, O’Connor, E. (1971), The Pentecostal Movement in the Catholic Church, Notre Dam, IN: Ave Maria Press, pp. 33-34.
the Spirit. \(^6\) Later, a 1979 Gallup survey, while not distinguish between classical Pentecostals and the charismatics, estimated that 19 percent of the total USA adult population identified themselves as Pentecostal/charismatic. This included 18 percent of all Roman Catholics.\(^7\)

In many respects Charismatic Renewal differed from those rival movements that were more traditionalist, conservative and ultra-Catholic in orientation which emerged around the same time. These included the Neocatchumenate, the Communion et Libération and the Army of Mary. The formation of these three constituted, to some extent at least, a reaction to Vatican II and liberalizing forces, both political and theological, that was unleashed within the Catholic Church. Initially the Charismatic Renewal movement in the Church in the USA appeared to be ambivalent towards such developments. Nonetheless, the movement, as explored shortly, carried at least some liberalizing impulses in respect of attitudes towards the historical church and concerning the cultural milieu outside of its boundaries.

The Renewal movement within Catholicism traces its earnest beginnings to 1967 among theologians and students at Duquesne University, Pittsburgh. Its subsequent spread can then be traced through inter-related networks to the Catholic universities of Michigan State and Notre Dame, Indiana. From these centres, by the late 1960s, Renewal was dispersed to other campuses and finally to parishes and religious communities across the USA. At Duquesne University a handful of faculty members laid claim to having received the Baptism in the Spirit. A good number of these individuals had been involved in the Cursillo movement. The latter was to be found on the liberal wing of the Church and had come to exert growing influence among lay Catholics. In essence, it stressed the relevance of the faith to everyday life as a reaction to the dryness of the conservative Catholic orthodoxy. It also sought individual assertiveness and the creativity of each person in becoming aware of their potential and to exercise their freedom of conviction, within proscribed limits, in religious and secular matters.

Archbishop Jean Jadot, the Vatican’s apostolic delegate in the USA, in attempting to put the Charismatic Renewal in the Catholic Church in perspective, refers to the many movements of spiritual rejuvenation in the Church’s history.\(^8\) Regarding developments from the mid-twentieth century, he not only mentions the Cursillo but such movements as Marriage Encounter which were, with their liberalizing tendencies, parallel movements at the time Charismatic Renewal emerged within Catholicism. It might be contended, then, that politically as well as theologically speaking,


Renewal was born in radical, rather than reactionary, circles. However, the clear political views of the early charismatic Catholics, drowned in the throes of an ecstatic, revivalistic form of Christianity, remain largely unclear. For example, a certain ambiguity was discernible in the two principal publications of the Renewal movement in the Catholic Church. Despite their Pentecostal theological leanings, *Catholic Charismatic* and the *New Covenant* typified how the movement in Catholic circles throughout the USA defied any remit: neither substantially traditionalist or progressive, liberal or conservative.

There were in the early years, however, periodic indications of a stirring political conscience which might have suggested a more radical agenda. Given that Catholic neo-Pentecostalism largely emerged within the liberal academic community and within a church that compared to evangelical and fundamentalist Protestant was not at the time inherently middle-class or associated with the social and political status quo, it should not be surprising that Catholic charismatics seemed to have a greater social conscience and embraced a more liberal orientation than their Protestant counterparts. Yet there were also sufficient clues that hinted, by way of contrast, at their more conservative disposition. For instance, the Roman Catholic Blessed Trinity Society in Van Nuys, California, was one of the first charismatic fellowships and publishing organizations of the Renewal movement and could claim several wealthy and high status patrons. An early sample of the society in the early 1970s found that in terms of political party support Republicans outnumbered Democrats in a ratio of some seven to one.10

Academic studies in the early 1970s unveiled a complicated picture which indicated that Catholic charismatics tended to be right-wing in orientation, but departed on some issues in a liberal direction in comparison with their non-charismatic counterparts.11 Research also found there was a link between socio-economic status and political views. Harper12 discovered that, while traditional Pentecostals tended to be of the lower socio-economic classes and politically conservative in their attitudes, Catholic members of the Renewal movement were in fact to be found in high-

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9 The first Pentecostal ‘experience’ at Duquesne, typified by glossolalia, displayed all the familiar patterns of the spread of Renewal, while a rudimentary knowledge of what baptism in the Spirit entailed was supplemented by the impact of influential popular Pentecostal literature. Despite these observable overlaps with Pentecostalism, specific developments generated the spread of the Renewal movement into the Catholic Church. In his detailed account of the early years of the Catholic Charismatic Renewal, Fr. James Connelly of the University of Notre Dame, mentioned a number of Pentecostals and charismatic Protestants who had an influence on the leaders of the movement during the formative years. See O’Connor, *The Pentecostal Movement in the Catholic Church*.


er classes and, on social issues, of a more liberal disposition albeit selective on certain political issues. As a distinct grouping within the Catholic group they were more educated and more likely to have been educated in secular educational institutions than Catholic colleges.

There were also other indications during this period that compounded the picture. One consideration was the interaction with Protestant charismatics. An early rightist emphasis within the broad Charismatic Renewal movement had been noted by Logan\(^\text{13}\) in the mid-1970s. He pointed out that the ‘demons’ identified by the Charismatic movement, Catholics as well as Protestants, were often depicted in a highly individualistic guise. The collective concern for more liberal issues was seemingly absent, while the list of individual moral ineptitudes was extensive. One searched in vain, he pointed out, for American charismatic materials for references to the ‘principalities and powers’ of racism, the ravages of war, business imperialism in the Majority World, blatant corruption and the abuse of political power in high places. Despite such tendencies, many of the orientations of Charismatic Renewal pointed towards a wider cultural orientation and, for the Catholic Church, this had profound implications that suggested liberalizing processes, as broadly defined, although apparently not of an overtly political nature.

**Catholic Pentecostals and Cultural Accommodation**

The developments of Charismatic Renewal within the Roman Catholic Church, irrespective of the similar subjective spiritual experiences claimed by its adherents, were in a number of regards very different to events documented within the various Protestant denominations. This reflected Catholicism’s contrasting history, churchmanship, and its relatively peripheral position in the religious life of the USA. Here, religious freedoms had always informed a greater liberty of expressions of faith and where there existed no single counterpart to a national Church. This meant that, Catholicism, too, was reduced almost to the form of a denomination in a highly pluralist religious milieu.

The marginalization of Catholicism, however, was supplemented by its weight and influence as a global Church with centuries of history, a greater authoritarian hierarchy (at least until the reforms of Vatican II), and an age-accustomed strategy of incorporating movements of revival, albeit of different forms, into its own traditions. Indeed, Jadot, at a time when Charismatic Renewal in the historical churches reached it apogee, observed that part of the reason why the Catholic Church had

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relatively little difficulty in accepting the Renewal was due to ‘her long experience with renewal movements.’

The Charismatic Renewal movement was initially liberal in the sense that it offered overtones of rebellion which appealed to a new Catholic individualism. It was no less than a cultural revolution that conceded much to the secular world around it, a fact acknowledged by adherents of the movement. In this respect, Ellwood wrote of Charismatic Renewal in Catholic circles as constituting an American acculturation movement. It represented a generation of Catholics who felt alienated from the Church's stance towards the modern world. From the 1950s and 1960s Catholics in the USA had become radically enculturated into American society. The separation of Catholics from other of the nation's institutions had finally and irretrievably been overcome. The Charismatic movement and the ecumenicalism it espoused was thus an expression of a longer process of adaptation.

Neitz, in her account, similarly interprets the Charismatic movement in Catholic circles as a means by which the Church increasing joined the central core of religious life in the USA. She notes that Catholicism in the nineteenth century was usually described as an ‘immigrant church’ outside the American cultural mainstream and with which the existence of the parish mission displayed a complicated relationship. Throughout the middle of that century the Catholic Church faced what amounted to an unusual situation in its history. In a country where religion was viewed as a matter of voluntary association, the Church had to compete for members with other forms of Christianity (particularly Protestant revivalism). Catholicism adapted its own tradition of the parish mission for the American situation: its response to the social conditions resembled that of the Protestant revival but was undeniably Catholic.

Neitz suggests that something similar had occurred in the case of Charismatic Renewal. The movement was a reply by a faction within the Catholic Church to the cultural distortion widespread in the USA. In its formulation, the Catholic Charismatic movement borrowed a great deal from Pentecostalism. Yet it did so in a way that was not inconsistent with its own traditions. Thus, Renewal in the Church was an identifiable Catholic interpretation of Pentecostalism and perhaps a solution for some Catholics to the problems presented by the modern world, in particular, the challenge of upholding Catholic traditions in an increasingly individualistic and liberal culture.

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According to Neitz, the Catholic Church was ‘pre-modern’ until the 1960s. Its primary emphasis was on sacramental mysteries but from that time certain strands of Catholicism, not least of all that of Charismatic Renewal, opened up to the possibility of these secular developments for the purpose of the Church, albeit with a spiritual veneer that was consistent with traditional teachings. The separation of Catholics from other American institutions was thus breached. Meredith McGuire came to similar conclusions. In acknowledging Garry Wills’ earlier work in the area, McGuire demonstrates that American Catholic life has always emphasized conversion, doctrine or theological instruction. Only secondary was the free expression of emotion, individualism, human potential and presence of spiritual and physical healing. These elements were incorporated with the emergence of Renewal.

McGuire also sees Renewal in Catholic circles as an expression of Wallace’s designation of the ‘revitalization movement’ whereby people dissatisfied with their culture may, through a ‘deliberate, organized and conscious effort’ introduce transformations in the way that the world is perceived, a shift into a new gestalt, bringing a ‘revitalization’ of culture. Catholics, McGuire explains, were anxious about change in their Church exemplified by Vatican II and of the wider social turmoil of the 1960s. Thus neo-Pentecostalism within the Church offered a reinterpretation of the faith in the modern age and, in doing so, was as much about Catholic renewal as Charismatic Renewal. However, McGuire notes that the role of Charismatic Renewal in bringing the Catholic Church in the modern age did not lead to clear political inclinations. Rather, Catholic Pentecostals, in their search for a pristine spiritual experience, tended to be apolitical.

**Returning to the Fold**

Despite the apparent ambivalence of the early Catholic charismatics towards the authority and traditions of the Church of Rome, their activities frequently posed serious pastoral problems. The Renewal movement’s ecumenical leanings threatened to dilute Catholic doctrine and praxis on moral and political matters. Neitz found, through her ethnographic survey, that the ecumenical desire of the Catholic charismatics frequently led to them feeling more at home with their Protestant brothers.

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22 This is probably why the Church produced no less that 104 official or non-official reports on the Renewal movement.
and sisters than in their own congregations. A few even used the charismatic relationship with God to justify having taken a position opposed to the Church’s official line on a number of political and moral issues. Those who had problems with some Catholic teachings such as birth control intensified their hostility on joining Renewal, often saying that they discerned God’s will above the authority of the Church. While a good number ultimately submitted to the authority of the Vatican, others dissented. On the whole, however, the charismatics in McGuire’s study remained close to the spirituality of Catholicism. Moreover, the charismatic wing of the Church, in a very short space of time, was purified of its excesses and made stable by being part of the ordered, corporate life of Catholicism.

In many parts of the world - Asia, Africa, Latin America - Catholic Charismatic Renewal had undoubtedly grown rapidly and enjoyed a considerable influence on the spiritual life of the Church from the late 1960s. This was no longer the case in Western countries from the 1980s, despite many Bishops’ Conferences increasingly making positive statements about the spiritual fruit of Renewal. At the beginning of the twenty-first century Catholic Charismatic Renewal had by no means disappeared. The International Council of Catholic Charismatic Renewal received formal Vatican recognition and statues from the Pontifical Council for the Laity, while the Fraternity of Catholic Covenant Communities was also established to strengthen the charismatic intentional communities. In 1997, on the occasion of the Catholic Charismatic Renewal’s thirtieth anniversary, the U.S. Bishops’ Ad Hoc Committee on the Catholic Charismatic Renewal affirmed once more that all those Catholics involved in this movement of the Holy Spirit were ‘to be encouraged in their efforts to renew the life of the Church.’ The reality, however, was that the number of active Catholic charismatics and the dynamism of the movement as a whole in the USA began to experience decline well before the 1980s, while there was certainly a dwindling of numbers attending ecumenical charismatic conventions.

Some charismatics exited the Catholic Church altogether to join Protestant groups, while others came to see themselves as ‘ex-charismatics’. This latter category included a number who began to query the validity of the Pentecostal experience. Others still, interpreted that experience in retrospect as simply one facet of a much richer and more complex Catholic spirituality and thus not the grounds for a sepa-

23 Neitz, Charisma and Community, p. 217.
24 McGuire, Pentecostal Catholics, pp. 166-71.
26 In 1982 Stephen Clark, a leading figure in Catholic Charismatic Renewal in the USA, publicly asked ‘Has the charismatic renewal peaked’. Around this time the movement’s leaders called for a ‘back to basics’ strategy - a tacit admission that a re-direction was needed. In 1986, in part in response to Pope John Paul II’s stress on the ‘New Evangelism’, proselytization came more into focus as a primary task for the Catholic Renewalists despite their declining numbers.
rate identity. Alternatively some former renewalists came to be pre-occupied with rival concerns such as the growing Marian movement, since interest in the supernatural aspects of the charismata often showed some continuity with the supernatural dimensions of Marian apparitions.

Throughout the 1990s the energy of the evangelistically-minded Catholic charismatics worldwide crystallized into a network of schools of evangelism designed to train lay people for the task. In 1995, an estimated 1100 such schools operated around the globe, with one hundred in 54 African nations alone. Such initiatives, however, hid the fact that the interest of Catholics in the Renewal movement was in descent in the USA as in Western Europe. During the 1990s, many Protestant renewalists were swept up in the revivals of the broader neo-Pentecostal movement. While some Catholic charismatic participated in these developments they had increasingly become ‘bit-players’ in the charismatic world. It was also blatantly clear that even from the early 1980s a conscious decision was taken by the Catholic renewalist to progress closer to the heart of the Roman Church.

Although Catholic charismatics had largely re-integrated themselves into the mainstream of the Church in Western societies and seemingly subscribed to the traditional teachings of the Vatican in regard to moral and political issues, joining the ‘mainstream’ also plausibly denoted adhering to developments related to lay people’s attitudes. In the West, despite the official teachings, indeed dogma of the Catholic papal authorities, lay Catholic acceptance of doctrines and attitudes have become highly differentiated or what Dobbelaere refers to as a ‘pick and choose Catholicism’ - an individualistic form of faith where lay people personally decide the merits of ethical, doctrinal and political issues. To some extent, as Hornby-Smith suggests, there has been the dissolution of the defensive walls around the previously distinctive and impenetrable Catholic sub-culture. Indeed, there has been a strong indication of a substantial convergence towards the norms of the general population on matters such as contraception and divorce, and to a lesser extent, towards abortion. In the case of Britain at least, Hornsby Smith’s analysis shows a range of attitudes by Catholics towards political and social issues and a definite rejection of traditional sexual and marital proscriptions. The USA, however, has a different political and religious culture, both now subject to what Hunter calls the ‘cultural wars’ in which Catholics, charis-

28 Most notably the so-called Toronto Blessing and the Brownsville Revival.
matics among them, may be obliged to take sides as the nation seemingly polarizes over a whole range of political and moral issues.

**Catholic Pentecostals and the New Christian Right**

What was innovating in regard to the so-called New Christian (NCR) that emerged in the 1970s, even before the Reagan Presidential administrations, was its apparent level of success in mounting grass-roots support for wholesale political activism on a wide range of conservative issues. The full extent of the unity of the religious groups, Catholics—charismatic and non-charismatics—included, that comprised the NCR has never been completely clear. However, it is evident that they have continued to share a cluster of attitudes based on conventional moral standards, traditional family values, abortion, anti-gay rights, all of which separated them from radical and secular political activists and leftward-leaning evangelicals.

Few such political movements as the NCR have enjoyed a heightened public profile from the 1970s through organizations such as the Moral Majority, Christian Voice and the Religious Roundtable. Others agencies are single issue groups fighting abortion and similar issues, such as the Pro Family Forum, the Right to Life Commission and the Eagle Forum. Some have been on the political scene longer, including the Institute for Christian Economics. The more recent ones took political commentators by surprise by actively lobbying Congress and sponsoring vast voter registration and ‘education’ drives supported by candidates from the local to Congressional and Presidential level.

For many a decade the older Pentecostal movement, preoccupied religious revivalism had little time for the secular politics of a fallen world. Hostility from the social order beyond its sectarian boundaries, as well as the established churches, alienated the Pentecostals from political involvement. Above all, however, the apolitical stance of Pentecostals can be traced to their dogma concerning the ‘rapture’, the pre-millennial teaching which asserted that believers would be miraculously removed from earth before the foretold ‘time of tribulation’.32

Many traditional Pentecostals took a new direction in the latter part of the twentieth century in their embrace of the cause of the NCR which, in some respects at least, appeared to be a popularist movement of a kind. When more conservative-minded Christians were seemingly prepared to move confidently into the political arena, many of the older Pentecostal denominations were among their number. To a degree their greater respectability and organization allowed them to become part of the very religious and cultural mainstream that had been alien to Pentecostals for so

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long. However, politics in the eyes of many Pentecostals was primarily about issues of morality and its evident decline in the USA and, especially in the post-war years, the emergence of the so-called ‘permissive’ society.

In the USA the Pentecostals were joined by a number of charismatic elements, including those in the Renewal movement, who became co-workers in the same moral and political campaigns. Given their numbers, the Pentecostals and charismatics were a potentially formidable political force. Abandoning their largely apolitical stance, they joined the ranks of the fundamentalists and conservative evangelicals, embracing the new moral agenda. In doing so they too were to prove selective of the issues they embraced, seemingly placing themselves towards the right of the political spectrum. Although this tendency might have been anticipated, there was hitherto little empirical evidence of the political preferences of the neo-Pentecostals but it was perhaps of no surprise that they should embrace the New Christian Right.

While over the past few decades, political analysts have explored the fresh profile of evangelical and fundamentalist Protestants in American public life at some length, they have been less interested in the parallel activation of Pentecostal and charismatic Christians groups, including Renewalist Catholics, which overlap with the evangelical community but extend into other religious traditions. The neo-Pentecostals had earlier tended to be politically quietist in disposition: the moral regeneration of society by political means was an aspect that few charismatics had entertained. The core concern of bringing renewal in the churches was the priority which superseded all other causes.

Seemingly, in the 1970s, no Christian constituency in the USA was so well positioned to challenge the liberal elite and the so-called ‘permissive society’ than the charismatics. Their political orientations and ideology soon became clearer. With its numerous cohorts of adherents, with its dogmatic faith and enthusiasm, capable leadership, and support from the neo-Pentecostals in the denominations and independent churches, the Charismatic movement potentially appeared orientated to confront the liberal cultural mainstream.

Although many saw only the excitement and fervour of the early mass Charismatic Renewal conventions, there was a deeper significance. Indeed, the potential for political activism was growing among the charismatics. The Kansas City conference of 1977, at the height of the Renewal movement, brought Protestants and Catholics together. To some, the conference indicated a resistance to the secular and materialistic culture of the times and a return to spiritual values. Such a stance was

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articulated by one notable figure in the movement, Bob Mumford, who had spoken at the climax of the conference to a monumental approval of the attendees across the denominations. Mumford spoke of the political challenges ahead in challenging the religious and moral decline of American society. According to David Stump, the Kansas City charismatics were clearly seeing the years ahead as a struggle between a Christian image and the image of a secular culture. Hence, they looked forward to the coming ‘cultural wars’ of the 1980s onwards and exposed Catholic charismatic to the cause of the New Right that at least carried many of the traditional moral overtones of the Catholic Church.

What was innovating about the NCR of the 1980s was its ability to rise above the continuing disputes regarding political activism in some churches, convincing both Pentecostals and charismatics to mobilize. The Charismatic movement’s political potential was further evident in the Washington for Jesus demonstration, in April, 1980, which attracted half a million Christians, including Catholics, to the mall in one of the largest gatherings in the capital’s history. Charles Stanley, pastor of the First Baptist Church in Atlanta, the home base for his television ministry called ‘In Touch’, spoke at the rally on the subject of the decline of the family. It was, he claimed, the most important institution in America and that no nation had ever survived the collapse of its family life. The family, in Stanley’s words, was established by God and constituted the very foundation of USA society. This event showed the political potential of Pentecostals and charismatics. As the rally was sponsored by the high-profile charismatic, Pat Robertson, it seemed to indicate a deference of the charismatics for Republican Party politics.

During his Presidential campaign bid Robertson sought to widen the base of his movement by appealing to Catholics, charismatic or otherwise. It might be supposed that, given his neo-Pentecostal disposition that he would be particularly attractive to Catholic charismatics. The social distance between them and other Christians had apparently been eroded and, as a result, the early animosities between Pentecostals/charismatics and non-Pentecostal, Protestants and Catholics, seemingly declined as well. Plausibly Robertson’s political platform was one to which charismatic and non-charismatic Catholics could subscribe at a time when the former were returning to the heart of traditional Catholicism.

There was a limit to Robertson’s strategy however. One-third of the donors to Robertson’s campaign came from non-denominational or independent churches.

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largest share were the charismatics in the mainline Protestant churches. More than four-fifths of Robertson’s donors took the most conservative positions on abortion, school prayer and regulation of pornography; one-half identified social and moral issues as the ‘most serious problem’ facing the nation; and two-fifths labelled themselves as ‘extremely conservative’. One-quarter of donors came from churches outside of the evangelical tradition including Catholics. Given that the Catholic Church was the largest denomination in the USA, Robertson had nonetheless largely failed to solicit the support of the majority of Roman Catholics.

**Disunity and Fissure**

In my earlier paper for *Religion and Politics* I drew attention to the scholarly work that indicated the disunity of the Christian Right and this included the Catholic segment, not least of all Catholic charismatics. To be sure, it was Gerry Falwell and his Moral Majority’s uncompromising agenda that alienated the more moderate Christian denominations, as well as Protestant evangelicals and fundamentalists who disliked the ecumenical stance that invited Catholics to participate. There were certainly other reasons for failure. The inability of the NCR to make considerable electoral inroads, including Robertson’s presidential bid, partly resulted from obstacles to the full mobilization of political resources. While many deeply religious people remained disinterested in politics, religious broadcasting was not especially influential on political matters and the audiences were not overwhelmingly Republican in orientation. Although conservative Christians were increasingly likely to vote Republican, it was uncertain whether they would support a ‘Christian’ for the White House, while Black conservative Christians were hard to attract.

Internally, despite attempts at a coalition, the NCR was deeply divided on religious grounds, and this entailed long-standing tensions between fundamentalists

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and what Wilcox calls the ‘Spirit-filled’, including Catholic charismatics. To be sure, earlier studies of evangelicals and fundamentalists suggested that they were rather like other Americans except on social and moral issues. As much could be said of the Pentecostals and charismatics, but their unique variant of Christianity set them apart. Neither was the charismatic contingent politically united. The fact that they were so widespread was significant: they were a distinct minority among evangelicals, mainline, black Protestants and Catholics. Only within the evangelical and black Protestant camps did Pentecostal and charismatics constitute a substantial percentage. Slightly more than one in three could be counted among black Protestants. No one group dominated the contemporary ‘Spirit-filled’ movements. Those found within denominations formed a plurality of all ‘Spirit-filled believers’ (43.9 percent, with charismatic Catholics trailing at 24.7 percent).

Guth argues that religious tradition has an important impact on ‘Spirit-filled’ movements. He found that the difference in mean scores between those who are ‘Spirit-filled’ and those who are not within each tradition are usually smaller than the differences among the ‘Spirit-filled’ across such traditions. In other words, there is a greater similarity in issue stands within each tradition, regardless of whether the respondents are Pentecostals and charismatics, than among the ‘Spirit-filled’ across various traditions. Charismatic Catholics, tend to take political positions closer to those of other Catholics than those adopted by charismatic mainline Protestants. This might have been anticipated especially with the increasing re-integration of Catholic charismatics back into the mainstream Church. Thus, although these ‘Spirit-filled’ movements had some potential to bridge long-standing divides in American religious and political life, up until the 1990s they still had a long way to go to forge a united political bloc of voters across the major religious traditions.

Other factors mitigated against the political unity of the ‘Spirit-filled’ movements prior to the 1990s. Pentecostals and other evangelicals have historically exhibited strong anti-Catholic sentiments, for theological, liturgical and possibly cultural reasons. Guth found that among white Pentecostals as a whole, only 7 percent reported feeling close to Catholics, while 62 percent reported feeling little affiliation with Catholics. The comparable percentages among evangelical respondents were 11 percent and 46 percent respectively. At a minimum, such hostility contributed to disunity among different segments of the ‘Spirit-filled’ movement and to the creation of distinct social and religious structures within different religious traditions. Ironically

then, the diffusion of the ‘Spirit-filled’ across religious traditions produce obstructions to cooperation in an organized religious and political sense.  

The ‘Spirit-filled’ constituted a sizeable group, widely distributed across the Christian landscape, but whether they were a cohesive political bloc until the 1990s was unclear. Their location in different religious traditions constituted a double-edged sword. Although such diffusion created important political opportunities and strategic advantages, it also diluted unity in political attitudes and behaviour. In other words, their separate religious traditions may well have shaped the way they viewed the political world and acted within it.

In Smidt et al’s findings it was evident that on twelve political issues, evangelical Protestants, whether preferring the term ‘Spirit filled’ or not, generally express the most conservative views, but among Evangelicals, the ‘Spirit-filled’ take more conservative stances than other Evangelicals.  

The differences were largest on social issues, with the primary exceptions occurring on standard-of-living questions such as health care and job protection. These exceptions related in large part to the sizeable presence of black Pentecostals within the evangelical Protestant tradition, where such standard-of-living questions moved many poorer blacks away from the more conservative positions of their white Pentecostal counterparts. This greater conservatism of ‘Spirit-filled’ believers generally helds for mainline Protestants and Roman Catholics as well, although exceptions extend to topics such as affirmative action on poverty issues and defence spending. Yet, among those affiliated with black Protestant denominations, the ‘Spirit-filled’, if anything, moved in a more liberal political direction. So, arguably were the Roman Catholic charismatics, given their more middle-class and educated background.

While many Protestant Evangelicals and Fundamentalists were unhappy to subscribe to political unity with Catholics and eschewed such organizations as the Moral Majority, many Catholics were also weary of such a coalition. Catholics, including charismatics, were willing to form political coalitions with activists of the Christian Right but remained reluctant to join its organizations. Many Catholics may have held very conservative positions but they embraced somewhat distinctive views among Republicans on such issues as the death penalty, the teaching of Creationism in schools, the social welfare opportunities for women and nuclear weapons. There were also particularly issues where the Catholics have proved to be more liberal in their attitudes. One is gay sexuality, an anti-gay stance being a major political plank of the NCR.
marked contrast, for example, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops regularly called for the acceptance and pastoral care of homosexuals. Although the Church has not abandoned its traditional prohibition against homosexual activity, it recognized that a homosexual orientation is a deep-seated dimension of personality that is not in itself sinful. The statement also reiterated traditional Catholic teaching about respecting the inherent dignity of every person and insisted that nothing in the Bible nor in Catholic teaching could be used to justify prejudicial or discriminatory attitudes and behaviour.

**Recent Developments**

Rozell et al. have documented Christian Right organizations in the 1990s that tried to avoid the failures of the religious particularism that undermined the earlier endeavours of such groups as the Moral Majority to build enduring political coalitions. Robertson’s Christian Coalition (CC) and other organizations (including his television company), largely replacing the now disbanded Moral Majority, clearly tapped an element of evangelicalism and began to mobilize the Pentecostals and especially charismatics. Because of the Catholics’ reluctance to join the Protestant dominated Moral Majority, that attempted to broaden its support base, leaders of the CC decided to target conservative Catholics, as well as mainline Protestants, African-Americans, orthodox Jews, and other groups. For many Christian Right leaders, conservative Catholics appeared to be a particularly attractive constituency to reach for membership recruitment and political coalition building. There is some evidence that the CC has succeeded in this effort.

Perhaps no group has been sought after more by the CC and some of the newer Christian Right organizations than Catholics. At its annual ‘Road to Victory’ conferences, the Christian Coalition held workshops on building bridges to Catholics and has featured Catholic speakers and organizations. It has also included Catholics in leadership and staff positions in the national, state, and local organizations. It has involved Catholics in leadership and staff positions in the national, state, and local or-

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52 Rozell et al. ‘Uneasy Alliance’.


organizations. Finally, in 1995, the organization launched the Catholic Alliance in an attempt to attract Catholic members, campaigning solely on issues where there was agreement. In these strategies the Christian coalition imitated Gerry Falwell’s Moral Majority and was open to all those concerned with neglected traditional values and marked a struggle against secular humanism. It was plausible, but by no means certain that at least some Catholic charismatics were among them.

There are many reasons to believe that the CC might attract conservative Catholics. Clearly, there are several issues where the official positions of the Catholic Church resemble those of the CC - most notably on abortion and school vouchers and there are significant numbers of individual Catholics who are in substantial agreement with certain other issue positions of the Christian Right. Moreover, Catholics have historically comprised a significant part of earlier right-wing movements and groups, including support for the John Birch Society. More recently, there has been cooperation in some dioceses between the Catholic Church and the CC, most notably in the New York school board races in 1993. Moreover, a small but not insignificant minority of Catholics have adopted evangelical styles of religiosity, and these are more likely to share evangelical political attitudes on issues where the Catholic Church has not adopted a position. Plausibly the charismatics make up a reasonable share of this constituency.

Such efforts undertaken by the CC, however, have proved disappointing. Rozall et al.’s findings are based on a large survey of Republican Party state convention delegates in Virginia. The research indicates that Catholic delegates hold very conservative issue positions in line with Christian Right organizations and have positive feelings toward Christian Right candidates and organizations. Nonetheless, they still embrace somewhat distinctive stances among Republicans on issues of the death penalty, teaching of Creationism, and the social welfare net, expanded opportunities for women, among others, and therefore remain reluctant to join the CC and other such groups.

Cutting across such factors in recent years has again been the anti-Catholic sentiment of not only segments of the Christian Right, but the population at large. This has, in turn, influenced Catholic voting patterns, although it is impossible to state whether this has impacted the Catholic charismatic constituency. Contemporary controversies in the media over anti-Catholicism alleged by elites on both the left and the right of the political spectrum raises the question of how perceptions of religious prejudice relate to political preferences among Catholics. Using survey data on 746 self-identified adult Catholics, Paul Perl and Mary Bendyna examine the extent to which they perceive anti-Catholic bias and how those perceptions are related

55 Rozell et al. ‘Uneasy Alliance’.
to political party identification. The likelihood of perceiving a general anti-Catholic bias in the USA and anti-Catholic hostility from liberal socio-political groups increases with more frequent attendance of the Catholic Mass. The likelihood of perceiving hostility from conservative groups is unrelated to attendance. While the perception of a general anti-Catholic bias in the USA does not predict political party identification, perceptions of hostility from liberal groups tend to predict Republican identification, and perceptions of hostility from conservative groups tend to predict Democratic identification. Though perceived hostility from liberal groups has a stronger effect on party identification, perceptions of anti-Catholic prejudice are seemingly related to the politics of some Catholics on both the left and the right ideological wing.

Summary

This paper has argued that over some four decades the Catholic charismatics have been pulled in different directions regarding their political views and allegiances and that this is a result of contrasting dynamics and competing loyalties which renders conclusions as to their political orientations difficult to reach. To some degree such dynamics and competing loyalties result from the relationship of the charismatics in the Roman Church and the juxtaposition of the Church within USA politico-religious culture.

In the early days of the Charismatic Renewal movement in the Roman Catholic Church the ‘spirit-filled’ Catholics appeared to show an indifference to secular political issues. Concern with spiritually renewing the Church, ecumenism and deep involvement with a variety of ecstatic Christianity drove this apolitical stance. If anything, as the academic works showed, the Catholic charismatics seemed in some respects more liberal than their non-charismatic counterparts in the Church. To some extent this reflected their middle-class and more educated demographic features. More broadly they adopted mainstream cultural changes while remaining largely politically inactive.

As they grew closer to their Protestant brethren in the Renewal movement Catholic neo-Pentecostals tended to express more conservative views that were then part of the embryonic New Christian Right - the broad Charismatic movement becoming more overtly politicised in the 1980s. Somewhat later the Catholics were being pulled towards the traditional core Catholicism at a time the Renewal movement found itself well beyond its peak and influence in the mainstream denominations including the Roman Church. The Catholic charismatics were ‘returning to the fold’. During this period too the New Christian Right increased its attempt to marshal a broad coalition

of conservative minded Protestants and Catholics. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s this proved to be largely ineffectual.

The 2004 American Presidential election saw the initiation of the second office of George Bush. It seems clear that without the support of the New Christian Right - fundamentalist, Evangelicals, Pentecostals, charismatics - the victory would not have been secured. Based on research in South Carolina, however, suggests that the CR continues to be inwardly split and quarrels with other wings of the Republican Party, particularly business interests are evident.57 It is also apparent that into the twenty-first century there has proved to be an uneasy alliance in the New Christian Right, threatening to split along lines already observable in the 1970s and 1980s. For one thing the some of the political and social, if not moral teachings of the Catholic Church are at variant with such organizations as the Christian Coalition. The re-invention of the New Christian Right has not fully incorporated conservative Catholics nor Catholic charismatics. A further dynamic is that lay Catholics, charismatics or otherwise, have increasingly adopted a ‘pick and choose’ Catholicism in which there is a tendency to exercise personal views over a range of political issues irrespective of the formal teachings of the Church.

To conclude, we might take a broader sweep in our understanding of the role of Catholicism in USA politics, in which the Catholic charismatics are merely one constituency. Recent scholarly work has pointed to the often under-estimated political influence of Roman Catholics in the USA. Genovese et al.58 show how today, as well as historically, Catholics and the Catholic Church has played a remarkably complex and diverse role in US politics. Dismissing notions of a cohesive ‘Catholic vote,’ Genovese et al. show how Catholics, Catholic institutions, and Catholic ideas permeate nearly every facet of contemporary American politics. Swelling with the influx of Latino, Asian, and African immigrants, and with former waves of European ethnics now fully assimilated in education and wealth, Catholics have never enjoyed such an influence in American political life. However, this Catholic political identity and engagement defy categorization, being evident in both left-wing and right-wing causes. It is fragmented and complex identity, a complexity to which the charismatics within the ranks of the Catholic Church continue to contribute.


References


Abstract

Stephen J. Hunt

BETWIXT AND BETWEEN: THE POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS OF ROMAN CATHOLIC NEO-PENTECOSTALS

This paper has argued that over some four decades the Catholic charismatics have been pulled in different directions regarding their political views and allegiances and that this is a result of contrasting dynamics and competing loyalties which renders conclusions as to their political orientations difficult to reach. To some degree such dynamics and competing loyalties result from the relationship of the charismatics in the Roman Church and the juxtaposition of the Church within USA politico-religious culture.

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Party, particularly business interests are evident. It is also apparent that into the twenty-first century there has proved to be an uneasy alliance in the New Christian Right, threatening to split along lines already observable in the 1970s and 1980s. For one thing the some of the political and social, if not moral teachings of the Catholic Church are at variant with such organizations as the Christian Coalition. The re-invention of the New Christian Right has not fully incorporated conservative Catholics nor Catholic charismatics. A further dynamic is that lay Catholics, charismatics or otherwise, have increasingly adopted a ‘pick and choose’ Catholicism in which there is a tendency to exercise personal views over a range of political issues irrespective of the formal teachings of the Church.

To conclude, we might take a broader sweep in our understanding of the role of Catholicism in USA politics, in which the Catholic charismatics are merely one constituency. Recent scholarly work has pointed to the often under-estimated political influence of Roman Catholics in the USA. Genovese et al.  show how today, as well as historically, Catholics and the Catholic Church has played a remarkably complex and diverse role in US politics. Dismissing notions of a cohesive ‘Catholic vote,’ Genovese et al. show how Catholics, Catholic institutions, and Catholic ideas permeate nearly every facet of contemporary American politics. Swelling with the influx of Latino, Asian, and African immigrants, and with former waves of European ethnics now fully assimilated in education and wealth, Catholics have never enjoyed such an influence in American political life. However, this Catholic political identity and engagement defy categorization, being evident in both left-wing and right-wing causes. It is fragmented and complex identity, a complexity to which the charismatics within the ranks of the Catholic Church continue to contribute.

**Key words:** Catholic, Charismatic, Morals, Christian Right.

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Резиме

Стивен Џ. Хант

НИ ЈЕДНО, НИ ДРУГО: ПОЛИТИЧКА ОРИЈЕНТАЦИЈА КАТОЛИЧКИХ НЕОПЕНТЕКОСТАЛАЦА

У овом чланку се тврди да су се католички харизматици у протекле четири деценије кретали разним правцима када је реч о њиховим политичким гледиштима и склоностима, као и да је то била последица контроверзне динамике и супротстављених лојалности. Због тога је и тешко доношење било каквих коначних закључака о њиховој политичној лојалности. Таква динамика и супротстављене лојалности представљају у извесном смислу последицу односна који постоји између харизматика у Римској цркви и места које та црква има у политичко-верској култури САД.

У првим данима деловања Харизматичког покрета обнове у оквиру Католичке цркве, чинило се као да „духом испуњени” католици показују индиферентност у односу на секуларна политичка питања. Заокупљеност обновом духовности цркве, екуменизам и дубоко инволвирање у бројне облике екстатичког хришћанства утицали су на заузимање таквог аполитичког става. Ако ништа друго, као што то показују академске студије, изгледало је као да су католички харизматици у неким стварима много либералнији него њихове наохаризматске колеге у цркви. То је донекле одсликавало чињеницу да су они потицали из средње класе и да су долазили из „окружења” са бољим образовањем. Шире гледано, они су прихватили најважније културне промене, остајући углавном политички неактивни.

Како су се све више приближавали својој протестантској сабраћи из Покрета обнове, код католичких неопентекосталаца се све више испoљавала тенденција изражавања конзервативних гледишта, која су у то време била саставни елементи опредељења Нове хришћанске деснице у њеном ембрионском облику – у широком харизматском покрету политичка опредељења су почела отворено да се исказују осамдесетих година 20. века. Нешто касније, католици су се окренули ка традиционалној суштини католичанства, у време када је Покрет обнове већ добро прошао свој зенит, односно када је његов утицај почео да опада у важнијим деноминацијама, укључујући и Римску цркву. Католички харизматици су се, да- кле, „ враћали у стадо”. Такође, у истом том периоду је Нова хришћанска десница појачала своје покушаје стварања шире коалиције протестаната и католика конзервативних опредељења. Али, у току осамдесетих и деведесетих година 20. века на том плану нису били остварени значајнији резултати.
Амерички председнички избори 2004. године означили су почетак другог мандата Џорџа Буша. Јасно је, изгледа да, ова победа не би била остварена без подршке Нове хришћанске деснице – фундаменталиста, јеванђелиста, пентекосталаца, харизматика. Ипак, истраживања спроведена у Јужној Каролини показују да хришћанска десница остаје међусобно подељена, као и то да је она у сталној свађи са другим крилима Републиканске партије, посебно када је у пи- тању постојање пословних интереса. Очигледно је, такође, да се у 21. веку показује да је алијанса у оквиру Нове хришћанске деснице кркна, као и да постоји опасност да се она подели по истим оним линијама које су већ виђене седамдесетих и осамдесетих година 20. века. Ако не због чега другог, онда зато што се политичка и социјална учења Католичке цркве, па чак и њена морална учења, не слажу са таквом организацијом као што је Хришћанска коалиција. Ни конзерваторивни католици, ни католички харизматици нису били потпуно инкорпорисани у обновљену Нову хришћанску десницу. Даљи развој је тај да лаички (световни) католици, харизматички или неки други, све више прихватају католицизам типа „изабрати и узети”, у којем постоји тенденција да се изражавају лична гледишта о бројним политичким питањима без обзира на то каква су формална учења цркве о њима.

У закључку, могли бисмо да изложимо наше схватање улоге католицизма у политици САД, у којем су католички харизматици само један саставни део би- рагог тела. Последња академска испитивања указују на политички утицај католица у САД, који је иначе био често потцењиван. Ђеновезе и његови сарадници показују како католици и Католичка црква данас, као и током историје, играју изразито сложену и различиту улогу у политици САД. Одбацићи представе о јединственом „католичком гласу” на изборима, Ђеновезе и његови сарадници показују да католици, католичке институције и католичке идеје прожимају скоро све видове испољавања савремене америчке политике. Јачајући упоредо са таласима имиграната из Латинске Америке, Азије и Африке, као и садашњом потpunom asimišla 辣jом rаниjeg talasa emigranata evropskog poroks, пре свега, када је реч о њиховом образовању и имовинском стању, католици никада раније нису имали толики утицај на политички живот САД. Али, овај католички политички идентитет и ангажовање не укључују се у постојеће категоризације, без обзира да ли се он испољава у свом левичарском или десничарском виду. Реч је о фрагментизованом и комплексном идентитету, сложеном појави у којој харизматици у редовима Католичке цркве настављају да дају свој допринос.

Кључне речи: католички, харизматички, морал, хришћанска десница.