UNHOLY WAR AND JUST PEACE: RELIGIOUS ALTERNATIVES TO SECULAR WARFARE

Abstract

This essay argues that contemporary warfare seems to be religious but is in fact secular in nature and as such calls forth religious alternatives. The violence unleashed by Islamic terrorism and the ‘global war on terror’ is secular in this sense that it is unmediated and removes any universal ethical limits from conflicts: unrestrained violence is either a divine injunction which is blindly and fideistically believed, or it is waged in the name of the supremely sovereign state which deploys war to uphold the constitutional order guaranteeing an exclusive state monopoly on the use of arbitrary physical force. The first part compares and contrasts two false universalisms, that of global market democracy and a revivified pan-Islamic Ummah. The second part explores the classical and modern origins of Islamic terrorism. The third part examines the perverted theology at the heart of the neo-conservative ‘global war on terror’. The fourth part analyses the permanent ‘state of exception’ which underpins the modern state and licenses unrestricted violence by the sovereign who stands outside and above the constitutional order of legality and legitimacy. The fifth and final part outlines religious alternatives to secular warfare, with specific reference to Islam and Christianity.

Key words: Warfare, Universalism, (state) Terrorism, Exceptionalism, True religion, Just peace.

Since the events of 11 September 2001 and the launch of the ‘global war on terror’, violence and warfare have once more been blamed on religion. Both Islamic terrorists and their neo-conservative foes are accused of appealing to fanatical faith in order to legitimate their geo-political goals. This, combined with the decline of more traditional forms of belief and the rise of atheist scientism, has led to fresh demands for a secular liberal resistance to religious extremism. Thus, we are seeing a growing confrontation between militant atheism and fundamentalist creeds.

In this increasingly shrill and hysterical debate, both sides are right about each other but wrong about religion. What unites both secular liberals and atheists, on the one hand, and religious conservatives and fundamentalists, on the other hand, is their mutual insistence on the exclusivity and absoluteness of their vision. In this both
sides are composed of extremists who mistake their subjective beliefs for the only objective truth. But true religion is not and cannot be fundamentalist. No true follower of monotheism can claim to know the mind and will of God absolutely and directly. Judaism is marked by the struggle to interpret the righteousness that is demanded by God.

Similarly, Jesus was never fully understood by his disciples nor was he even recognized by them after his resurrection. And in Islam, religious decrees used to be a nonbinding wisdom judgment of elders limited by the greater wisdom and judgment of God. It only became a lethal injunction when Muslims abandon Greek philosophy and adopted literalist readings of the Qur’an (a long process which ultimately led to the embrace of Napoleonic models of authority and legitimization). As such, the absolutist violence of terrorism and state warfare is not in accordance with the strict ethical limits imposed by traditional religion.

Equally, true religion is not and cannot be relativist. No genuine belief in God is just a matter of personal taste or subjective opinion. True religion has always been public and political because it is about forming communities around shared values and the practices that embody them. In the West and elsewhere, privatizing religion in the name of secularity initiated the abandoning of any collective public realm that expressed common substantive ideals. Over time, this led to aggressive, ‘programmatic secularism’ and the sort of militant atheism now preached by Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens and their acolytes. Paradoxically, by relegating religion to the private sphere, secular settlements produced religious fundamentalism. Confined to the realm of individual choice, religion is deprived of civic engagement that would mitigate fanaticism and foster moderation, and faith answers to no authority other than subjective inner conscience.

By contrast, the presence of religion in the public, political realm does not just limit religious extremism but can also correct the secular delusion that violence is essentially religious and that secularism has a monopoly on peace. In what follows, I argue that the ongoing clash between Islamic fanaticism and neo-conservatism is a clash of two variants of secular universalism and that only more orthodox, mediated traditions of Islam and Christianity can overcome this conflict and help provide a peace that is just and lasting.

1. Clash of Secular Universalisms

After 9/11, Francis Fukuyama’s well-known thesis about the end of history was the object of much irony and derision. But critics have ignored that Fukuyama was right to suggest that western politicians and pundits were convinced about the universality of capitalism and liberal democracy: “what we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government”.

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3 Fukuyama Francis, The End of History?, The National Interest, No. 16, Washington DC, Summer 1989, p. 3. See also Fukuyama Francis, The end of history and the last man, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1992; Fukuyama, Francis, On the Possibility of Writing
conservatism of Bush, Cheney et al. has merely radicalised the liberal interventionist belief held by Clinton and Blair in the absolute universality of individual human rights and global market democracy, a belief that is incompatible with the more orthodox, catholic Christian teachings on genuinely universal principles such as the dignity of the person and the diversity of local practices and arrangements. As such, neo-conservatism is a distorted universalism which is not legitimated by episcopally-based churches of the Christian tradition. This is evinced by papal and other opposition to the war in Iraq and also by Pope Benedict XVI’s critique of the unbridled free market in his encyclical, “Caritas in veritate” which has been dismissed by Catholic neo-liberals and neo-conservatives such as Michael Novak and George Weigel. Thus, the “end of history” highlights a growing opposition and divergence concealed during the Cold War between the false, secular universalism of neo-liberal and neo-conservative ideology and the true religious universalism of catholic, orthodox Christianity.

As I have already hinted, the other distorted universalism is Islamic terrorism and the perverted ideology which underpins it. Islamic terrorism operates at three levels. First, Islamic terrorists have attacked states and drawn nations into war with one another. Israel’s brutal war on Lebanon in 2006 was but the latest example of the political potency of Islamic terror. A spread of the conflict to Syria and Iran can no longer be excluded. Secondly, Islamic terrorism is fuelling civil war – in Lebanon, Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq. The third level of Islamic terrorism is neither local nor national but truly global. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates are waging a worldwide campaign of terror and violence. The bombs on the trains in Mumbai in July which killed over 180 people bear an unholy resemblance to those on the London underground last year and the transport network in Madrid the year before. In short, worldwide Islamic terrorism is increasing in scale and intensity. From nightclubs in Bali to primary schools in Beslan and market places in Baghdad, terrorist atrocities vie with one another for maximal human suffering and global impact. Global jihad seems to be a new and unprecedented threat which might be with us for generations, especially in the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan from where it can spread to Central Eurasia, Europe and beyond.

For its part, the West and its allies are also engaged in a global war of destruction. Indeed, the disproportionate and truly horrific response by the Israeli secular state to the continuous terror attacks by Hamas and Hezbollah exceeds legitimate defence and can only be described as state terrorism. Moreover, in Afghanistan and Iraq, actions such as the killings and rapes of innocent civilians in Haditha and Mahmudiya, indiscriminate aerial attacks, the flattening of Fallujah, and the abhorrent practices at Abu Ghraib and Bagram airbase speak of a supremacist ideology which only values Western lives and

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despises ordinary Muslims. In addition, the worldwide use of extraordinary rendition, torture and imprisonment without trial have all exacerbated the popular grievances and fuelled the ranks of Al-Qaeda. This, allied with Kashmir and Chechnya, creates a world in which the fundamentalist account of a universal crusade against Islam appears true.

This endless cycle of aggression and retribution has confirmed and reinforced two apparently rival worldviews. In the West, Samuel Huntington’s thesis that the end of the Cold War did not herald the “end of history” or Kant’s “perpetual peace” but was instead replaced by a “clash of civilizations” is gaining currency. The Evangelical fundamentalism that is driving the neo-conservative struggle of the free world against the ‘axis of evil’ and the ‘enemies of freedom’ echoes and intensifies this same ideology, as I have already suggested. In Islam, the world is divided into two houses, dar al-islam and dar al-harb – the house of submission governed by Muslim rulers and sharia law, and the house of war inhabited and ruled by infidels. Al-Qaeda has radicalised this in the direction of waging jihad or holy war not only against unbelievers but also against all apostates, i.e. those who have known the true faith but abandoned it; for renegades, there is no human forgiveness, only violent death by the sword. Thus, two false universalisms – an ‘unrepentant West and an unrelenting Islam’ – appear bound to collide. Not unlike the century-long battle over the Holy Land in the Middle Ages, the present conflict between Islam and the Judeo-Christian West is thought by its protagonists to be predestined and divinely sanctioned. What we are apparently seeing is a worldwide religious conflict and perhaps even a global war of religions.

Convinced that the resurgence of religion is wholly dangerous, liberals claim that religion needs once again to be privatised and eliminated from the public sphere; like Protestantism, Islam requires a reformation and Muslims need to become moderate. If the problem is religious, then surely the solution must be secular. The presumption is that Islamic fundamentalism and Evangelical extremism are deviations from the norm of secular rule. However, such and similar interpretations are mistaken for three closely related reasons. First, the thesis of a ‘clash of civilizations’ and the confrontation between dar al-islam and dar al-harb are mirror images of each other. Both believe that a violent confrontation between the West and Islam is somehow inevitable. As such, they reinforce and legitimate each other. As I will argue below, Islamic revivalist extremism and Christian Evangelical fundamentalism are profoundly secular phenomena whose genealogy is inextricably intertwined with the rise of modern secularism.

Secondly, both Islamic extremism and Evangelical fundamentalism are predicated upon a theology that is puritan, messianic and apocalyptic. Both, albeit in different ways, believe that they are the only true beholders of a pure and unadulterated version

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7 The original version of Huntington’s thesis was presented on 1st March 1993 in Luxembourg at a conference organised by the Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies (LIEIS). A shorter version was published in the summer of 1993 in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993. The original version can be found in: The International System After the Collapse of the East-West Order, Armand Clesse, Richard Cooper and Yoshikazu Sakamoto (eds.), Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994, pp. 7-27.


9 I borrow this formulation from Dr. Armand Clesse, Director of the LIEIS.

of divine Revelation; both believe that are directly invested by God with a sacred mission, and both believe that it is their God-given duty to wage war on their enemies. As such, the theology that underpins Islamic and Evangelical holy war is exceptionalist. This exceptionalism constitutes a secular perversion of Islam and Christianity because it sanctifies indiscriminate warfare and thus violates the shared monotheistic primacy of peace over violence.

Thirdly, the modern secular settlement is in fact a liberal variant of this exceptionalism and as such does not constitute a genuine alternative. This is so because modern politics is predicated upon a natural state of violence that legitimates the absolute power of the central state. This account is encapsulated by Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan and underpins the entire tradition of social contract from Hobbes via Locke to the contemporary liberalism of Rawls and Sen. All constitutional limits on state power are qualified by the state’s legal obligation to uphold the juridical order. As the supreme guarantor of the constitution, the state is itself within the law, yet must be outside of it in order to establish and defend it. In consequence, the state must be implicitly the exception to its own rules, and so its power continuously transgresses its own legitimating measure. Thus, the autonomy of the individual depends on the sovereignty of the state which consists in exercising exceptional powers in the name of defending freedom and the rule of law. It is this liberal exceptionalism which justifies indiscriminate violence as part of the so-called ‘global war on terror’.

Properly configured, religion offers the only real alternative to the secular warfare of religious fundamentalism and political liberalism because it imposes strict limits on the use of violence and only licenses defensive war to protect the peaceful and harmonious order of creation. Before I can sketch some of the contours of this religious difference, I will detail the secular nature of contemporary warfare.

2. The Modern Origin and Secular Nature of Islamic Terrorism

My argument that Islamic terrorism is modern in origin and secular in nature seems to meet easy refutation. First, Al-Qaeda and its henchmen are generally associated with a medieval ideology which has declared a global jihad in a quest to recreate the imperial caliphate from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. The strategic objective of Osama Bin Laden and his deputy Ayman Al-Zawahiri has always been to overthrow the current House of Saud and to eject the infidels and their troops from Islam’s most holy sites, Mecca and Medina. Secondly, a myriad of scholars from Tariq Ramandan via Olivier Roy to Gilles Kepel have argued that Al-Qaeda’s version of holy war derives from political Islamism and as such has got little or nothing to do with Muslim theology or the Islam of the Prophet. In short, Islamic terrorism is commonly described as medieval (rather than modern) and characterised as political (rather than theological).

Both these claims, I contend, are misguided and questionable. The ideology of global jihad rests on a revivalists extremism that is indebted to two sources. First of all, Al-Qaeda appeals nineteenth-century positivism and nihilism in order to position itself as a revolutionary vanguard. Secondly, Al-Qaeda reclaims the legacy of the Kharijites, a puritan sect which emerged shortly after the death of the Prophet Mohammed and

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practiced unrestrained warfare on all apostates. The puritanical tradition was extended by Ibn Taymyyah in the late thirteenth century and by Muhammad Ibn’Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism in the early eighteenth century. As such, Al-Qaeda is both distinctly modern and has a theological basis which is nevertheless and paradoxically secular. What binds together the modern origin and the secular nature of Islamic terrorism is an exceptionalist theology – the blind belief that only a revolutionary vanguard Islam at war with all apostates and unbelievers is faithful to the message of Mohammed.

Before I can detail the theology that underlies global jihad, let me first of all establish the modern origin of Al-Qaeda. The most obvious modern trait is the use of technology and networks in order to wage a worldwide campaign of terror: without satellite telephones, the internet, deregulated financial markets and off-shore tax havens, Bin Laden and his followers could not have operated on a global scale. But Al-Qaeda is not merely a modern organisation that deploys the fruits of scientific innovation. In fact, its entire ideology is wedded to modernity. Like the Positivism of Henri de Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte, Al-Qaeda believes in the possibility of remaking the human condition on the ruins of an obsolete and redundant society. Like the Jacobins in revolutionary France and nineteenth-century nihilism in Russia, global jihad pursues this utopia with exclusively violent means – spectacular acts of terrorism on the sacrosanct fetish of the time.

Indeed, during the Terreur in the 1790s in France, violence was directed against the symbols of the Ancien régime, above all the absolute monarchy and the reactionary Church. Likewise, Russian terrorists targeted both the Tsarist family and the icon of the West – technological innovation. A particularly vivid illustration of this variant of Russian nihilism can be found in Joseph Conrad’s novel The Secret Agent − the plot to blow up the Royal Observatory at Greenwich. He describes the terror of Russian anarchists as an attack on society’s most cherished beliefs.

The parallels with the destruction of the World Trade Centre and the attempted destruction on the Pentagon are striking. In Conrad’s time, the sacrosanct science was physics. Nowadays it is economics. 9/11 was an attack on the foundations of American society — finance capitalism which enables and secures American economic and military hegemony. After the events, Bin Laden declared that „the real targets [of 9/11] were America’s icons of military and economic power“. The sad irony is that Bin Laden could never have planned this assault without the global free market and military technology, not least the support of the CIA for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in the fight against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan during the 1980s. Like the Jacobins and Russian nihilism, the strategy was always to remake the world by spectacular acts of terrorism which follow the logic of madness. In The Secret Agent, Conrad writes that „madness alone is truly terrifying, inasmuch as you cannot placate it by threats, persuasion or bribes“.

What makes Islamic terrorism both modern and secular is the scorn for reason and the embrace of a creed which is blindly and fideistically believed.

But one can go further than this. One reason why Al-Qaeda is not seen as modern is because Bin Laden appeals to the Kharijite tradition in early Islam – a certain blend of

13 Gray, Al Qaeda or What It Means to Be Modern, p. 22-26. I am indebted to Gray’s work in this paragraph.
Puritanism and messianism. However, what ties together the modern and the classical appeal is that they both any form of mediation and are therefore profoundly secular. The mark of this secularism is that it is exceptionalist. Just like the revolutionary vanguard claimed to be unique, the Kharijites and their successors the Wahhabis both believed that they were the only true Muslims – exactly like Al-Qaeda today. In the name of their purity, they waged *jihad* on both apostates and unbelievers. As the Muslim commentator Ziauddin Sardar remarks, the violent tradition in Islam is not a medieval phenomenon but „can be traced right back to the formative phase of Islam“.16

Before I can give an account of the origins of Islamic terrorism in the early period of Islam, let me discuss the contemporary genealogy in some more detail. Bin Laden was deeply influenced by a twentieth-century advocate of this tradition, Dr. Abdullah Azzam, a Jordanian Palestinian and doctor of Islamic jurisprudence. Azzam was one of the architects of the radical Sunni group Hamas and one of „the most influential of the all the exponents of the modern *jihadist* movements“.17 As Bin Laden's intellectual mentor, Azzam helped shape Al-Qaeda's worldview. The emphasis on violent struggle and terrorism derives from Azzam's embrace of the works of Sayyid Qutb. An Egyptian thinker who composed a series of Quranic commentaries still widely read among Islamic militants, Qutb was the chief ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood. His approach to the Qur'an was a radical modern re-reading of the Prophet's original message. Qutb viewed the Qur'an both as a repository of literal truth and a work of art – the objectivity of God's absolute will and the subjectivity of individual faith. What stands out in his interpretation is the centrality of will divorced from reason. Faith is seen as a personal commitment made by a sheer act of volition.18 Qutb also called for a return to early Islamic revivalist movements because they exhibited an uncorrupted militant piety: „we must return to that pure source from which those people derived their guidance […] which is free from any mixing or pollution […] From it [that source] we must also derive our concepts of life, our principles of government, politics, economics and all other aspects of life“.19 Coupled with the emphasis on individual will and blind faith, the goal of purifying Islam is one of the many traits which this sort of theology shares with certain strands of the Protestant tradition, above all the Puritans and the Calvinists.

The appeal of Qutb's theology is that he fuses Western philosophy with anti-Western politics. He bemoaned the „hideous schizophrenia of modern life“ and the spiritual vacuity of the West. Yet at the same time, he drew on European nihilism and anarchism in order to oppose it. Indeed, he took the ideal of a revolutionary vanguard from a long-established European tradition that stretches back to the Jacobins and includes Bolsheviks, Fascists, Nazis, Maoists and Marxist guerrillas. On *jihad*, Qutb transmitted to Azzam and Bin Laden the ideas of Abu-al-A'la Mawdudi (1903-1979) who was born and grew up in pre-partition India. Mawdudi denounced the degraded nature of all

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18 Leonard Binder is partly right to argue that Qutb „adopted the post-Kantian aesthetic of liberal individualism that was the legacy of European romanticism to the cultural elite of the colonial world“. See Binder Leonard, Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development of Ideologies, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1988, p. 193. Besides post-Kantian Romanticism, there is of course the alternative Romantic tradition of the Cambridge Platonists, Wendsworth, Coleridge and others which is neither liberal nor individualist.
19 Quoted in Esposito, Unholy War, p. 43.
contemporary Muslim societies using a „new jahiliyya“ theory that society had lapsed into barbarism and usurped divine intention by abandoning the language of Arabic and the strictures of Islamic law. As such, he viewed integration with secular values as cultural „rape“.

Mawdudi characterised Muslim governments that did not implement strict sharia law as actually apostate (riddah) and called on true believers to wage jihad against them. In his text Islam’s Law of War of 1927 and his book Jihad in Islam of 1930, he deployed Qur’anic scriptural literalism in order to call for the formation of an “International Revolutionary Party […] to which the Qur’an gives the title of hizb-Allah [the party, followers or partisans of God]”. Such a movement exemplifies the God-given duty of all Muslim states to establish Islamic rule across the world. Indeed, Mawdudi denied the medieval distinction between offensive and defensive jihad. He wrote that

Islamic jihad is both offensive and defensive at one and the same time. It is offensive because the Muslim party attacks the rule of an opposing ideology, and it is defensive because the Muslim party is constrained to capture state power in order to protect the principles of Islam in space-time forces […] This party does not attack the home of the opposing party, but launches an assault on the principles of the opponent. The objective of this attack is not to coerce the opponent to relinquish his principles but to abolish the government which sustains them.21

Like Mawdudi, Qutb fused the history of Mohammed’s travails with a revolutionary vanguard-type ideology that championed a cult of death in the quest for a revivified caliphate. What united Mawdudi and Qutb was the blind belief that Islam is exceptional because it alone encapsulates God. For these reasons, it is the duty of all true Muslims to bring about a violent world revolution by means of a total war, war without any limits.

Thus, the mark of Qutb’s and Mawdudi’s theology is that they invoke a pure and unadulterated version of Islam. Like certain strands of Protestantism, this sort of appeal is profoundly modern. Indeed, the origins of Al-Qaeda’s modern theology go back to Wahhabism, named after the revivalist movement founded by Muhammad Ibn’Abd al-Wahhab in the first half of the eighteenth century. This revivalism occurred long before European imperialism and called for a return to an unblemished form of Islam closer to the ideals of the Prophet. Allied with the imperial House of Saud, Wahhabism engaged in the ruthless elimination of all those apostates, whether Sunni, Shi’ite or Sufi, who did not meet its standards of purity and authenticity.

In this, Wahhabism is not unlike some radical Protestant sects: faced with a decadent society, it reduced God’s revelation to one literalist interpretation that tolerated no dissent. This diminution is nowhere more visible than in relation to the four traditional sources of legal authority in Islam: the Qur’an, the hadith (the sayings and approvals of the Prophet), ijma (the consensus of the community) and qiyas (analogy). Wahhabism repudiated discernment by the community as it felt that the social order was itself corrupt. It also abolished analogy as a means of dealing with new events on the basis of reasoning to past experiences and traditions. By abandoning these two sources of authority, Wahhabism reduced Islam to a scriptural literalism and inaugurated an absolutism utterly hostile to other more medieval Islamic traditions. In this sense of

21 Abu Ala Maududi, Jihad in Islam 26, 14.
direct rule by God – Wahhabism is a truly modern theology. Not unlike Descartes and Kant, it argues for the unmediated and total grasp of its object. As such, total control over the external world as a result of blind faith licenses total war on those who deviate and embody rival traditions.

Moreover, Wahhabism and its modern-day advocates draw on a distinct tradition in Islam which goes back to the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century political philosopher Ibn Taymiyah (1263-1328) and the seventh-century Kharijites. Ibn Taymiyah developed two ideas which are central to secular warfare in Islam – the notion of the true believer and the duty to wage, the jihad of the sword. The ideal Muslim was part of the original community which surrounded the Prophet in Medina. All subsequent generations were in an important sense corrupt. Accommodation with non-believers is apostasy and apostasy is punishable by violent death. Thus it is the duty of all true Muslims to wage the jihad of the sword against the impure and the devious. In the chapter on ‘The Religious and Moral Doctrine of Jihad’ in his book Governance according to Allah’s Law, he describes offensive holy war as “the best voluntary [religious] act that man can perform”, superior to all other duties like fasting and prayer, including the great pilgrimage or Hajj. For him, this is an injunction of the Prophet himself who had stated that “the summit of Islam is jihad” because it leads to salvation. In other words, jihad claims to be soteriological because it marks the purification of both the true believer and the apostate through violent death – victory and triumph on earth and martyrdom and immediate ascent to Paradise.

This conception of jihad was not wholly unlike that of the Kharijites, a sect that held profoundly apocalyptic, puritan and messianic beliefs – history had come to an end after the revelation made to the Last Prophet and only a literalist reading of the Qur’an would lead to salvation. Proclaiming their own self-righteousness, the Kharijites embraced the doctrine of takfir and branded as unbelievers or kufr all those who did not share their puritan beliefs. Such a deviation could only be corrected by violent jihad. Their model of holy war against apostates was that of hijrah, that is to say, the escape of the Prophet and his companions from Mecca. This was not merely a historical event but crystallised the essence of an exemplary Muslim life. The Kharijites held a doctrine of holy war as a permanent armed struggle to preserve the community from the corruption of misrule; jihad was directed at once against rival political and religious leaders and against the emerging practice of ijma and quiyas – interpreting the Qur’an and the hadith by way of communal consensus and analogy. For the Kharijites, communal discernment and analogy violate the absolute will and arbitrary power of God.

The genealogy of Islamic terrorism which leads from the Kharijites, Ibn-Taymiyyah and Wahhabism, to Maududi, Qutb and Azzam can be described as the rise and spread of jihadi Salafi ideology fuelled by fascist dreams of a prior Islamic golden age. Nowadays Al-Qaeda sympathisers avidly read fascist literature of the 1930s and 1940s and pursue rightwing ends via leftist methods. Recruits to the cause are not the excluded uneducated poor – they are middle-class Muslim who have formed a radical critique of western society and its impact upon Islam. In contemporary Islamic movements from Algeria to Indonesia, this thinking has become dominant. In this unholy alliance of atavistic appeal and radical mobilisation, the new Islamicists repeat the ideology of Nazism and Fascism, insofar as they advocate a divinely sanctioned total war on apostates and unbelievers in the name of their own purity and exceptionality.
Accusing all other Muslims of being decadent and unfaithful to the true teachings of the Prophet, the Kharijites then and Al-Qaeda now practice unrestrained warfare on both unbelievers and apostates in a quest to restore Islam's original purity. Here one can note striking similarities with forms of religious fundamentalism in other religions. For example, contemporary American evangelism is influenced not just by the early modern Puritan and Calvinist tradition and their shared emphasis on divine election and the promise of a New Jerusalem. American Puritans and Calvinists also retrieved the millennial cult of early Christian apocalyptic movements such as the Montanists who thirsted for martyrdom in order to be reborn as the denizens of the New Millennium. Likewise, Zionist sects (both Jewish and Christian), expect and advocate a violent apocalypse that will put an end to the fallen world in a mighty conflagration called Armageddon and thus usher in a new Israel that saves the entire globe. What is common to these forms of fundamentalism is that they all represent heretical perversions of orthodoxy. The Kharijites were a splinter group that refused arbitration and rejected the consensus of the mainstream community in the pursuit of a caliphate where state and mosque form a monolithic theocracy. Millenarian and apocalyptic movements substituted the New Testament eschatological vision of a universal peaceable kingdom for a literalist apocalyptic that views America and Israel as the only redeemed nations that will bring salvation to mankind. With fanatic certainty, fundamentalists declare that they alone were chosen by God to redeem the world from corruption, evil and unbelief through violence and conflict. Their obsession with purity generated perverse acts of iconoclasm that destroyed images of God and replaced them with an idolatrous worship of holy books.

3. The Perverted Theology underpinning the ‘Global war on Terror’

If the religious extremism that drives Al-Qaeda’s global jihad is exceptionalist, then so is the Evangelical fundamentalism that underpins the neo-conservative war against the „axis of evil“. Not unlike the Wahhabi-inspired horror at the ‘hideous schizophrenia of modern society’, the neo-conservative ideologues, in a fanatical overreaction to the atomization of liberal society, have embraced a new Christian fundamentalism that promised its followers an eternal community, composed only of themselves. It is this sort of self-righteousness which explain why, as Robert Kagan writes, „It was always so easy for so many Americans to believe, as so many still believe today, that by advancing their own interests they advance the interests of humanity. As Benjamin Franklin put it, America’s cause ‘is the cause of all mankind’“. In this sense, the neo-cons repeat the very fundamentalist vision of their enemies in Al-Qaeda who want to build a new caliphate from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. They are mirror images of each other

because they both lay exclusive claim to divine election and see themselves as the vanguard in the perpetual struggle against the corrupt and the wicked.

Paradoxically, the Evangelical fundamentalism which is at the heart of neo-conservatism fuses the liberalism of Reinhold Niebuhr and the realism of Richard Neuhaus and George Weigel. Niebuhr asserts America's divinely sanctioned mission of spreading democracy, freedom, prosperity and peace throughout the world. As "tutors of mankind in its pilgrimage to perfection," America has the moral duty to use the force of military coercion in order to answer God's unique calling. At the hands of the Americans, war is always already just because it is human embodiment of "the angel of God that directs the storm", the idea that it is not Americans who direct the storm but the angel of God was the cornerstone of George W. Bush's first Inaugural Address on 20th January 2001.

Manichean liberal Protestantism re-moralises war as a force of the good. Niebuhr's understanding of just war underpins America's religiously framed unilateralism and exceptionalism, the new Israel which has been elected by God to save the world.

This strand of Protestant liberalism is by no means a deviation or aberration from the normal course of American politics but instead has deep roots in a perverted religion of millennial apocalypse and messianism. I will outline the nature of this theology before drawing out the implications for warfare. Niebuhr's Protestantism prolongs and extends a tradition which can be traced back to millenarian movements in early modernity, after the break-up of the medieval order. Reformation Christians like Jan Huss in the early fifteenth century refused to submit to the authority of the Catholic hierarchy and sought to recover the purity of the biblical message. In this he followed Luther's injunction of *sola scriptura* — constricting divine revelation to the Book of Scripture, thereby erasing God from the Book of Nature. Over time this entailed scriptural literalism and absolutism, discarding allegorical readings of the Bible and dismissing the metaphysics of analogy which were an integral part of the fusion of Greek philosophy and monotheistic theology. Moreover, later Reformation movements held extreme apocalyptic beliefs, not least the Puritans who abandoned the old world of England to embark upon a journey that would lead them to found a new world — this is one core constituent of the modern American Evangelical and fundamentalist imaginary.

Indeed, the Puritan tradition goes as far as laying claim to Christopher Columbus who after his discover wrote "God made me the messenger of the new heaven and the new earth of which he spoke in the Apocalypse of St. John [...] and he showed me the spot where to find it." As Michael Northcott has documented, the very name 'The New World', which was adopted to describe the American territories, carries this sense that America was 'the new heaven and new earth', of which the Book of Revelation speaks. The messianic drive even pervades agnostics such as Tom Paine who was central to the framing of the American constitution. He declared that "we have it in our power to begin the world all over again. A situation, similar to present, hath not happened


27 Northcott, An Angel Directs the Storm, pp. 1-43.

28 Quoted in Northcott, An Angel Directs the Storm, p. 9.
since the days of Noah until now. The birthday of a new world is at hand".\textsuperscript{29} America is God’s ultimate Chosen People – the latest and the last elected nation on earth. As such, America replaces and surpasses Israel and the foundation of the USA marks God’s perpetual covenant with the American people. John Locke once remarked, perhaps ironically, that „in the beginning, all the world was America“.

What contemporary liberal Protestantism à la Niebuhr has added to this is the blind belief that America is not only divinely chosen as the new world but also God’s instrument in bringing liberty and democracy to all the nations, America as „the shining city on the hill“ and „a beacon to the world“. This blend of Puritanism, messianism and exceptionalism was encapsulated in the opening paragraph of George W. Bush first inaugural address which I referred to earlier: „We have a place, all of us, in a long story – a story we continue, but whose end we will not see. It is the story of a new world that became a friend and liberator of the old, a story of a slaveholding society that became a servant of freedom, the story of a power that went into the world to protect but not to possess, to defend but not to conquer […] Through much of the last century, America’s faith in freedom and democracy was a rock in a raging sea. Now it is a seed upon the wind, taking root in many nations“.\textsuperscript{30} It is this vision which ultimately legitimated the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq and the ongoing ‘global war on terror’, to which I now turn.

Inspired by Niebuhrian liberal Protestantism, the neo-conservative ideologues and their acolytes have distorted the ‘just war’ tradition. The inception of the crusade against the „axis of evil“ was cast in terms of the friend-foe imagery („You are either with us or against us“) and the logic of the „state of exception“ („America is a nation at war against global terrorism until we achieve victory“).\textsuperscript{31} Equally, the war in Iraq is the product of a messianic and apocalyptic misinterpretation of ‘just war’ theory. This even extends to some American liberal Catholic theologians. Indeed, George Weigel – the official biographer of the late Jean Paul II – provides perhaps the clearest statement of the secular perversion of the just war tradition. In a lecture given in October 2002 entitled „Moral Clarity in a Time of War“, he put forward the idea that the ‘just war’ idea is a tradition of moral reasoning and statecraft which demands public assertiveness in times of war.\textsuperscript{32} For Weigel, this ideal is not based on the „presumption against violence“, but on the definition of „morally worthy political ends“ which provide a moral justification for the resort to violence.\textsuperscript{33} Such „morally worthy political ends“ can only be liberal market democracies because they alone fully actualise the Augustinian notion of peace-as-order (\textit{tranquilitas ordinis}).\textsuperscript{34}

Following Niebuhr, Weigel seeks to rescue war from pacifism and to re-establish it.

\textsuperscript{29} Northcott, An Angel Directs the Storm, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{30} Quoted in Northcott, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{33} This claim rests on three assumptions: all politics falls under the purview of moral judgement; it is the moral responsibility of all governments to protect their citizens and uphold the international order; eradicating evil is a morally appropriate political end. See Weigel, Moral Clarity in a Time of War, pp. 3-9.
as the new categorical imperative. For him, the ‘just war’ tradition can explain why war
in the name of the peaceful order of market democracies against all enemies of the
West and its allies is not simply a moral possibility but always and everywhere a ‘just
cause’; it is not simply the “last” but the „only resort“. On this account, the US-led war
of pre-emption in Iraq in 2003 was a „moral obligation“ which exemplifies just moral
reasoning about the right to resort to war. Weigel’s ultimate justification that „[w]e
defend America because America is worth defending, on its own terms and because
of what it means for the world“ betrays the messianic inspiration of his position. A war
is just if and only if it is waged by the USA. For America and its allies – and they alone
– defend and promote an order that vouchsafes the ‘peace and security of all’. So for
Weigel, Pax Americana is the sole and supreme instantiation of Augustine’s tranquilitas
ordinis.

This is not only a profoundly ideological position which is in no way borne out by
the ‘just war’ tradition. Moreover, the idea that war is somehow the new categorical
imperative is also diametrically opposed to Augustine’s vision that peace is inscribed
at the heart of being and that violence in the name of state power is evil, which is
a privation of the good and has no station within the order of being. Instead, in a
perverse instrumentalisation of the Second World War and the Cold War, an unholy
trinity of neo-liberals, neo-realists and neo-conservatives has hijacked the ‘just war’
tradition in order to create nothing less than a „New World Order“.35

**4. Secular Rule: Exception as the Rule**

Most liberals who are horrified by the evangelical and fundamentalist take-over of
American politics imagine that the privatisation of religion and the re-establishment
of secular rule based on the constitution would somehow restore limits on the power
of the executive in general and on warfare in particular. Unfortunately, the ‘global war
on terror’ that has been unleashed upon the world has its own proper dynamic which
liberalism cannot arrest. The logic of this perpetual war is that of a universal exception
– the violation of constitutional principles and the rule of law in the name of defending
the very order which this war suspends.

Moreover, the current configuration does not represent a temporary deviation
from the norm of political liberalism. Instead, the entire edifice of the modern state
rests on a permanent state of exception that licenses war without end. Politically, it
flouts the Enlightenment promise of a ‘perpetual peace’ among nations. Theologically,
it legitimates unlimited and open-ended warfare and as such violates the monotheistic
primacy of peace over violence. Thus, the violence of conflicts like the ‘global war
on terror’, which appears to be at the margins of legality, lies in fact at the heart of
constitutional and political liberalism; if, quite literally, the exception confirms the rule,

35 Novak Michael, War to Topple Saddam is a Moral Obligation, The Times 12 February 2003; Weigel George, The Just War Case
for the War, America 188.11, 31 March 2003. For a compelling theological critique of Weigel’s position, see the lecture by
the Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, Just War Revisited, Lecture to the Royal Institute for International Affairs,
(accessed 08.11.2009).

36 For a concise statement of this self-proclaimed “New World Order”, see Kagan, Paradise and power. See also Pabst Adrian, Can
then the sovereignty of liberal regimes ultimately rests on the violence of such liberal secular warfare.

Before I can demonstrate this argument, I need to establish that the ‘global war on terror’ is neither an aberration nor a violation of the constitutional norm. There is ample legal evidence to suggest that the Iraq war was illegal under international law. Likewise, there are doubts about the legality of anti-terrorist legislation and the concomitant actions. In the 2006 Justice lecture at the Law Society and the 2006 Attlee Lecture, the former Lord Chief Justice Lord Steyn argued that the UK and the USA breach international law on at least five accounts: first, the ongoing lawlessness of Guantánamo, which Tony Blair has described merely as an understandable anomaly; secondly, extraordinary renditions to kidnap suspects and interrogate them in countries where torture is tolerated; thirdly, secret US prisons across the globe where torture is equally common; fourthly, outrageous crimes against civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan and finally the support for Israel’s merciless bombing of targets in civilian areas during the summer in Lebanon.

Unfortunately, these and other abhorrent practices are not strictly speaking illegal in terms of the modern concept of national sovereignty, upon which all states and the international system are founded. Indeed, sovereignty and the non-dissociable right of national self-defence permit special legal provisions in the name of safeguarding the existing constitutional order, including the indefinite suspension of constitutional rights of habeas corpus and due process. Sovereignty so configured is the cornerstone of modern political philosophy and legal theory from Thomas Hobbes via Immanuel Kant to Max Weber and Carl Schmitt. As I will now argue, the state of exception, and the use of violence which it authorises, are constitutive of the sovereignty of the modern state. As such, the Enlightenment is a liberal variant of exceptionalism; not unlike Islamic fanaticism and Evangelical fundamentalism, liberal exceptionalism licenses the indiscriminate violence of unrestrained warfare.

The political theology and philosophy of Thomas Hobbes is central to this tradition because he grounds the authority and legitimacy of the supreme sovereign or Leviathan on the violence of the state of nature. Since “man is a wolf to man” (homo hominis lupus),

the law of nature is unbounded violence. Just as natural violence lacks any legal or ethical limits, so does the right and power of men. For in the state of nature, men have a right over everything (ius in omnia) and a right against everyone (ius contra omnes). The natural desire of power breeds more desire of power; this upward spiralling vicious circle can only be broken by death: in the words of Hobbes, the essence of men is a „perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death“. For in the state of nature, the only limit on the human will to power is death. The effect is that Hobbes naturalises violence; if the law of nature consists in the absence of limits on violence, then the state of nature is an unending enmity and the war of all against all (bellum omnium contra omnes).

37 For a summary, see Steyn Johan, This all-powerful government is prone to creeping authoritarianism, The Guardian 22 April 2006.
Crucially, it is the identity of violence and the state of nature which justifies the absolute power of the almighty sovereign. The sovereignty of the Leviathan is grounded in the in-distinction of law and violence. This is so because after the formation of central authority, the state of nature survives in the sovereign who is the only one to retain the right against all (ius contra omnes). Thus, naturalised violence — the order of nature — is incorporated into the commonwealth — the order of the state. The violence of the war of all against all, which is the rule in the state of nature, becomes the exception in the state of law. As such, it constitutes the modern state and defines the essence of the entire political system — modern politics and the rule of law regulate violence, but they do not eliminate it. The centrality of violence in the constitution of the state is not only an abstract argument but in fact corresponds to the history of state formation. From the late Middle Ages to the early modern period, state formation and warfare were inextricably intertwined. Charles Tilly summarises this well: „War made the state, and the state made war“.

Modern states embody violence because they are territorial and as such deploy systematic violence to secure and extend their domains. The Kantian Enlightenment is not so much a deviation from this account of sovereignty and exception as a further exemplification of it. Kant comes perilously close to Hobbes in his definition of the state of nature that pertains between individuals: this state is not a state of peace but instead a condition that warrants war: „war is the sad necessity in the state of nature“ and „the state of peace among men, who co-exist, is not the state of nature (status naturalis), which instead is a state of war”. Because „human nature is wicked“, the state of nature is a „perpetual war“. Kant’s promise of a universal or „perpetual peace“ is little more the imposition of particular legal norms and constraints. War is a matter of raison d’état, not the re-establishment of justice.

What unites Hobbes and Kant is the move to incorporate the state of nature into the commonwealth or the nation-state and thus to locate supreme authority at the summit of the political and legal system. The effect is to internalise the logic of war and thereby to ground sovereignty on violence. For the state has the exclusive power to deploy force in order to defend and safeguard its own existence and security. This absolute power applies not only to war against external enemies but also to police action against internal sedition and disorder, as any threat to state authority warrants all the necessary violence to eliminate it. Violence is the limit which defines the remit of state power.

Like war and state formation, this conception of sovereignty is not limited to philosophical debates but extends to the actual history of the modern state and the

rise of constitutional rule. As Giorgio Agamben has documented, during the French Revolution and the immediate aftermath, Enlightenment ideas helped to define the new constitutional order. In line with the logic of exception, the Constituent Assembly gave the military branch of the state exclusive right to suspend the constitution and thus to assume all the functions hitherto entrusted to the civil authorities. In the constitution of 22 Frimaire Year 8, Article 92 says that „in the case of armed revolt or disturbances that would threaten the security of the State, the law can, in the places and for the time that it determines, suspend the rule of the constitution“. Based on a detailed study of the history of martial law and emergency powers, Agamben concludes that „it is important not to forget that the modern state of exception is a creation of the democratic-revolutionary tradition and not the absolutist one“.44

On this point it is instructive to draw on the works of Michel Foucault. I am thinking in particular of his insight that the modern Western state has combined techniques of subjective individualisation with procedures of objective totalisation — e.g. the police force and mass conscription, with the effect that only the modern state could wage total war, warfare without any ethical or legal limits, as exemplified by the First and the Second World War. Thus, the modern state which is grounded in the idea of total sovereignty manifests a „real political ‘double bind’, constituted by individualisation and the simultaneous totalisation of structures of modern power“.

The essence and meaning of modern sovereignty thus conceived is encapsulated in Carl Schmitt’s famous definition of the sovereign as „he who decides on the state of exception“.

integral part of modern political and legal philosophy; it does not mark a departure from Renaissance humanism and the Enlightenment project but instead represents a radicalisation of it. Montesquieu’s theory of the separation of powers depends on Hobbes’ and Weber’s account of the absolute power of the sovereign and the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force – organised and systematic violence against internal and external enemies is constitutive of modern politics.

However, the fact is that no law and no constitution can be self-generated or self-sufficient. Therefore, the whole political and juridical order requires an ever-present source of authority which is both internal and external – precisely the state of exception. Modern philosophy and politics, by erasing God from the world and relegating Him to the supernatural realm of noumena which is cognoscible by blind faith alone, deprives itself a genuinely transcendent source of authority and legitimacy that limits the human will to power. Instead, the modern state relies on its own sovereignty in order to justify its power. If the essence of sovereignty is the violent state of exception, then modern politics is predicated exclusively on violence. The result is a legitimation of war, if necessary unlimited warfare, in order to defend the existence and security of the constituted order that is itself constituted by the use of violence. Politically, this logic perpetuates the status quo and precludes any systemic transformation, except by violent means. Theologically and philosophically, this logic sacralises the state of exception and as such represents a secular variant of exceptionalism which as such can and must be resisted by religion.

5. Muslim and Christian Alternatives to Secular Warfare

Now I can finally outline religious alternatives to the secular warfare of fundamentalist, Evangelical and liberal exceptionalism. Both Islam and Christianity must first and foremost call for a restoration of limits on violence and war. To this effect they must repudiate all those traditions which sanctify the indiscriminate violence of war without limits. Muslims cannot tolerate or excuse those who wage offensive jihad and commit suicide bombings in its name. Islam must ask itself why the tradition of the Kharijites has retained legitimacy in the eyes of several revivalist movements, including Wahhabism and, more recently, the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda. It must develop a comprehensive critique that is intelligible to all the faithful. This does not mean that Islam should embrace Tony Blair’s sterile appeal to ‘moderate’ Muslims. Such a move will not shift a single radical, for this amounts to nothing more than the demand to become ‘like us’ – bourgeois consumers who lead a life that is (at least for religious people) both decadent and ungodly. Instead, only a theological injunction can change the ideas and practices of religious extremists. Indeed, as the Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, said in reference to the anniversary of the attacks of 7 July 2005 in London, to clothe suicide with the spiritual power of martyrdom is an act of blasphemy because it presupposes that human violence is necessary to secure God’s honour and justice. To denounce offensive jihad and suicide attacks as blasphemous will undoubtedly persuade more Muslims to reject fanaticism than any appeal to Western secular standards.

Likewise, Christians cannot remain silent about the co-optation of the ‘just war’ tradition by the neo-cons and other Evangelical fundamentalists across the world. To
be sure, Christian leaders and their faithful were unusually united in their opposition to the Iraq war – Anglicans, Catholics, Orthodox, United Methodists, Lutherans, Presbyterians and Baptists. However, many Evangelicals and Pentecostals who are the fasting-growing churches continue to support the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq and the ‘global war on terror’, as well as global capitalism. Moreover, ordinary Christians in the West tend to be passive in the face of the ongoing injustice and fail to offer any significant resistance to the ruling elite – instead, what dominates is conformity and compliance. More specifically, Christians must reject the pagan warrior ethos which the political class proclaim with blind self-righteousness – ‘rid the world of evil’ in a holy crusade against wickedness. In response to this self-deceptive delusion, Christian Churches must condemn corrupt leaders and oppressive empires in the name of a counter-imperial culture.

In addition to theological injunctions and condemnations, Islam and Christianity need to clarify in what sense *jihad* can be holy and war just. To this effect, both must reconsider the relation of religion to territoriality and the state, for war – as I have shown – is inextricably linked to state formation and territorial conquest. Islam must revise the dichotomy between *dar al-islam* and *dar al-harb* in the direction of the idea of *dar al-'Ahd*, the house or abode of Covenant or Treaty that binds together all Muslims, whether they live under Islamic rule or not. Indeed, as Tariq Ramandan has argued, Muslims in the West do not live in foreign societies and desperately hope to return or join *dar al-islam*. On the contrary, they are at home in the West and as such the old terminology is „completely restrictive and out of context“. What Muslims could do is to develop civic and political ties with their countries of residence. A shift from territorial control to civic allegiance would eliminate any justification for offensive wars of conquest and domination. It would also be a pre-condition for restoring limits on military *jihad*, including the determination of a just cause (resistance to oppression, tyranny and injustice) and absolute prohibition on killing civilians.

Moreover, Islam could recover the medieval tradition of chivalry that imposed strict ethical limits on warfare and constituted an alternative to the pagan tribal warrior ethos. In turn, this requires a recovery of all those traditions which have resisted the exceptionalist logic, above all Sufism. As Tim Winter has remarked, Sufism is by no means a purely contemplative other-worldly mysticism which calls on its followers to withdraw from the world: „nothing is further from reality, in fact, than the claim that Sufism represents a quietist and non-militant form of Islam. However, it has always been utterly different from modern, wild extremism, in that it is rooted in mercy and justice, forbidding the targeting of civilians, and conforming to the ethical ideal of the just war. Sufism forms no part of modern terroristic radicalism“.

For its part, Christianity must revisit its post-Theodosian history and question its relation to the state. It could do worse than to remember the fifth-century Pope Gelasius I who made the separation of church and state into doctrinal orthodoxy,

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50 Ramandan Tariq, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 53, 63, 93, 159. A full analysis of Ramandan’s theological and political commitments is beyond the scope of the present article.

arguing that God granted two swords for earthly governance — that of the Church for the government of men’s souls and that of the state for the regulation of temporal affairs. Likewise, it would benefit from embracing Byzantium orthodoxy which helped to formulate the first just war theories, clarifying that Christians should only engage in warfare for defensive purposes. More specifically, for the Church Fathers and medieval theologians, ‘just war’ was a matter of practical judgement. Rather than representing a systematic theory about the justice of certain forms of military intervention, reflections on ‘just war’ were part of a larger framework grounded in the specific praxis of Christian beliefs, namely the belief that peace is the highest truth and constitutes the ontological shape of the world. From this belief it follows that in a metaphysical sense, violence is not because evil, according to Augustine’s definition, is the privation of the good (privatio boni) and as such is not situated at the same ontological station than peace. The specific praxis of Christianity is to secure the peace of the good out of the opposition and antagonistic difference which generate the violence of evil. As such, the telos of all actions is to overcome the logic of violence and to create and preserve peace. With reference to Augustine, Aquinas argues that only the pursuit of peace can ever justify a war. He writes:

- a just cause is required namely that those who are attacked deserve it for some wrong they have done. So Augustine: ‘We usually describe a just war as one that avenges wrongs, that is, when a nation or state has to be punished either for refusing to make amends for outrages done by its subjects, or to restore what it has seized injuriously. Those wars are looked on by true religion as peacemaking which are waged neither from aggrandisement nor cruelty but with the object of securing peace, of repressing the evil and supporting the good’.

For patristic and medieval theology, peace and the good are not matters of theoretical ratiocination. As universals, they are real and can only be actualised in practice. Equally, knowledge of peace and the good is not a function of mental abstraction but requires practical judgement. For Augustine, judgement is equally concerned with being, knowledge and action. To judge is not to project one’s mental fictions or faith-based beliefs onto the world. Nor is it to deduce concrete conclusions from a priori principles. Much rather, judgement marks the discernment of the proper order of things in the material world. As such, judgement blends the theoretical and the practical because to discern the actual ordering of things induces action either to preserve or to pursue the beauty and harmony of relations that pertain between things in certain regular and analogical proportions. An act of judgement can only be true if it leads to practical action aimed at governing the relations between different parties and securing their peaceful co-existence.

Beyond theological injunctions and limits on warfare, both Muslims and Christians need to develop a self-critical theological renewal and another form of engagement with one another. A revived religious critique of fanatic exceptionalism would speak to Muslim communities across the globe. In order for such a critique to issue forth into a reinvigorated theology and religious practices, Islam requires a structural transformation. The hitherto amorphous and subjective pattern of local imams and

52 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ila Iiae. Q. 40, a. 1, resp. 2
53 Augustine, De Musica, VI, xiii, 38.
54 Augustine, De Musica, VI, xvii, 57.
conflicting readings prevent a recognition that some Qur’anic interpretations are more accurate and faithful than others. An intellectual Islamic revival would benefit everyone, since literalist readings of the Qur’an that license the indiscriminate killing of apostates and unbelievers are wholly based on ignorance.

Islam could recover and extend the medieval tradition that interprets the Qur’an (God’s word) and the hadith (the sayings and approvals of the Prophet) via two now discarded sources of authority: qiyas (analogy) and ijma (the consensus of the community). Analogy as a means of dealing with new events based on reasoning to traditions past will allow Islam to express the more noble aspects of its history, like chivalry which was the ethical limiting of unrestrained warfare. Likewise, the consensus of the community ensures that interpretation is not a matter of individual private determination but rather a shared activity of communal discernment.

In addition, Islam needs to become more, not less, political. To suppress religious faith is to drive it underground and radicalise it. Wider political and civic activity forces an engagement with the reality of other people, thus mitigating fanaticism and fostering moderation. In consequence, Muslims should indeed form political parties and contest elections, like the AKP party in Turkey and various political formations in Lebanon and elsewhere.

**Conclusion**

That violence begets violence is a lesson that genuine religion has long taught. Indeed all the great faiths saw themselves as replacing and correcting far more violent tribal and pagan cultures. The mark of true religion is and has been the absolute prohibition on the use of indiscriminate violence. That the differing faiths have themselves fallen prey to a belligerent secular logic should at least remind us that secularity has no monopoly on peace. Christianity and Islam all share the belief that peace has a higher ontological station than violence and that peace is a God-given possibility which all Christians and Muslims are all called upon to make real in this world. Indeed, there is a theological imperative to shift the focus away from the justice of war towards the justice of peace. Genuine justice is transcendent, substantive and inclusive. It is transcendent because true justice requires a discernment beyond ethnic, economic and social division. Such justice negates self-interest as ultimately destructive. It envisages an equitable peace and reconciliation between all parties. Just wars must really deliver systemic transformation, not merely regime change. Most importantly, a truly just settlement cannot be a pale imitation of Western variants but instead it must be an inclusive process that blends universal values with particular traditions. Only if the indigenous cultures believe that the war was conducted justly and nobly by a legitimate force will there be any hope for genuine reconciliation and a lasting permanent peace.
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НЕСВЕТИ РАТ И ПРАВЕДАН МИР: РЕЛИГИЈСКЕ АЛТЕРНАТИВЕ СЕКУЛАРНОМ РАТУ

Резиме

Овај есеј доказује да се савремени рат чини религијским, али да је његова природа, у ствари, секуларна, те да као такав позива на религијске альтернативе. Насиље које су покренули исламски тероризам и „глобални рат против тероризма“ је секуларно у том смислу да је непосредно и да из конфликтака уклања сва универсална етичка ограничења: неконтролисано насиље је или божанска заповест у коју се слепо и фидеистички верује или је покренуто у име супер-суверене државе која рат почиње ради одбране уставног поретка који гарантује ексклузивни државни монопол на самовољну употребу физичке силе. Први део пореди и супротставља две нетачне универзалне – ону о глобалној тржишној демократији и ону о оживљеној панисламској Умми (Умма). Други део истражује класично и модерно порекло исламског тероризма. Трећи део испитује изопачену теологију у срцу нео-конзервативног „глобалног рата против тероризма“ Четврти део анализира перманентно „ванредно стање“ на коме се заснива модерна држава и одобрава неограничено насиље суверена који се налази изван и изнад уставног поретка легалитета и легитимитета. Пети, завршни део, истиче религијске альтернативе секуларном рату, с посебним освртом на ислам и хришћанство.

Кључне речи: рат, универзализам, (државни) тероризам, ексцептионализам, истинска религија, праведни мир.

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