

RELIGIOUS DOCTRINE AS A FACTOR OF STABILITY OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS. A STUDY OF TWO NORTH AMERICAN THEOCRACIES

Abstract

The article theorizes theocracy – political power based on religious legitimation – in terms of the theory of social exchange, as arising out of unequal access to and control over religious goods. It then identifies the factors of stability of a system as the actions the rulers must take to successfully counter various attempts by the ruled to neutralize unequal conditions of exchange in which the power relation is grounded. Two empirical examples are offered of the use of religious doctrines to protect the stability thus conceived. The idea of covenant was used by the authorities of 17th century Massachusetts to justify the persecution of dissenters as a means of maintaining the purity and unity of the community, and thereby the necessary condition of fulfilling the society's contract with God. The doctrine of continues revelation, on the other hand, gave Mormon leadership throughout 19th century, and especially during the crisis over polygamy, the much needed flexibility to adapt to external pressure without compromising the legitimacy of their God-granted power and the stability of the system.

Keywords: Theocracy, exchange theory, political power, Mormons, Puritans

Introduction

The following discussion of the role of religion as a factor of stability and adaptation will apply primarily to theocratic political regimes, i.e. those where power is justified in religious terms. Having clarified my understanding of theocracy, I will attempt to explain the genesis of theocratic power relations in terms of the theory of social exchange. From this theoretical framework conditions of stability of political regimes in general, and theocratic ones in particular, will be derived, understood as challenges that such political systems face and possible

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ways to meet them. The second part of the article presents particular religious ideas – the doctrines of covenant and of continuous revelation – as tools of managing a political system which, in the cases of, respectively, New England Puritans and the Mormons, contributed greatly to the founding, development and survival of their theocratic regimes.

1. Theocracy

By *theocracy* I understand power based on religious justification. In this, I depart from the most popular treatment of theocracy as the rule of priests (hierarchy) or God-like kings. The defining criterion in such approach becomes the source of the ruler's legitimacy, rather than his lay or religious occupation or the way in which he acquired power. It is therefore quite conceivable for a theocratic leader to be chosen democratically (as in 17th century Massachusetts, for instance), as long as his claim to his subjects' obedience is derived from a supernatural source, rather than the will of the people. Furthermore, I do not restrict the concept of theocracy to state regimes, but apply it to other political systems, too, since it facilitates a comparative analysis of sources and mechanisms of religiously legitimized power, whether it occurs in states, non-state political actors or even non-territorial bodies, such as religious sects. As social organizations, they all have certain political dimension which, insofar as it is theocratic in this quite broad sense, shares some common characteristics².

2. Theocracy as exchange

Social exchange theories explain social relations as a series (or, structurally speaking, a network) of transactions involving various goods or services, both material and non-material (such as prestige, love, advice etc.), occurring between individuals or collective social actors. From this perspective, power is understood as a relation arising from unequal terms of exchange. Thus, according to Blau, A gains power over B when B cannot return rewards of roughly equal value to those provided by A to B. In order to sustain the provision of rewards valuable to him, B must respond with submission³.

2 For examples of standard, hierocratic definitions of theocracy, see Perl Lila, *Theocracy*, Marshall Cavendish Benchmark, New York, 2008, p. 43: "Theocracies – governments ruled by godlike kings or high-ranking religious leaders"; Wintrobe Ronald, Padovano Fabio, *Theocracy, Natural Spiritual Monopoly and Dictatorship*, in: *The Political Economy of Theocracy*, Ferrero Mario and Wintrobe Ronald (eds.), Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2009, p. 95: "Theocratic rule usually involves the dominance of a priestly class". For a different approach, closer to the one proposed here, compare Allen Douglas W., *Theocracy as a Screening Device*, in: *The Political Economy of Theocracy*, p. 181: "By theocracy I mean a situation where government offices, including the leadership, are held by members adhering to a particular theology".

3 Blau Peter, *Exchange and Power in Social Life*, Wiley, New York, 1964, chapter V. Such an approach is in keeping with the prevailing trend of treating power as emerging from social relations, rather than simply an ability to do something (to achieve a goal). For a representative example see Pansardi Pamela, *On abilities and power again: a reply to Peter Morriss*, *Journal of Political Power*, vol. 5, no. 3, Galway, 2012, defining power as "those possibilities to act that an individual has on the basis of her social interactions

Social exchange theorists did not intend this framework to apply primarily to political systems or institutionalized power relations between a ruler and his subjects, but rather to everyday relations occurring, e.g., between employer and employees, inside informal groups of friends or even between colleagues or lovers. It nevertheless offers an attractive approach to the question of genesis and functioning of political regimes. So how exactly does it apply to various types of political systems and, specifically, to theocracy?

To answer this, we should determine what sort of goods and services are exchanged, who is involved in the exchange and what kind of rules and norms guide the process. Most political systems, especially states, are regarded as providers of protective assets, such as defence (against external threats) and procedures for conflict resolution (a system of justice). In the Western liberal tradition these services have been, indeed, considered as the state's *raison d'être*, the standard justification for its emergence from the pre-political state of nature and for the willing submission of its subjects, who are simply "buying" the valuable protective services from the monopolistic protection agency that is the state⁴. Other, non-minimal conceptions of political power attach to it the role of (re)distributing economic assets, often in an effort to arrive at some desirable social, political or economic structure of a society.

All of these functions are, to a certain extent, performed by theocracies, too, especially theocratic states. Our discussion, however, focuses on the religious goods whose provision is peculiar to theocracies. They range from god's blessing, miraculous healing or inflicting defeat upon enemies, to the ultimate religious reward which is eternal salvation. The dispensers of these goods are priests or different types of religious functionaries and secular leaders allied with them, while their receivers – the rank and file believers. Thus conceived, theocracy is a system of government arising out of the administering of supernatural rewards which, since these rewards cannot be adequately returned, leads to submission and, consequently, to the emergence of power relations.

Another important theoretical consideration is the role of norms in social exchange. In order to evaluate the fairness of transactions they engage in, social actors need an independent – external to the transaction itself – set of basic principles (rules of justice), such as the principle of reciprocity (stating something like: "a good or a service received should be returned with a good or a service roughly equal in value in reasonable time"), supplemented with certain amount of social trust, making it possible to initiate an exchange relation with delayed "payment". The purely behavioural assumption that the very fact the actors willingly engage in exchange means they regard it just – will not suffice, since we still need to explain why they actually think so. The moral self-perception of an actor's situation

with others" (p. 496).

4 For the libertarian case, and moral justification, for the minimal state see Nozick Robert, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1974.

in certainly mediated through normative structure of the society.

In political terms, a part of this normative structure related to power exchanges (unequal exchanges leading to submission) may be referred to as legitimation formula. Thus conceived, legitimacy is a state of a political system where the ruled regard the existing principles and conditions of exchange fair and, hence, the rulers' claim to submission – justified. Significantly, while in certain types of political regimes these rules are considered internal, originating within the society (from the will of the people in democracies or from the society's past in traditional regimes in the Weberian sense), in theocracies they are of external, namely divine origin⁵. Theocratic succession procedures are thus infused with divine sanction and god's law provides a blueprint for the organization and functioning of government. This perception of the social and political order being established and guaranteed by god(s) as a part of a higher supernatural order, coupled with ultimate religious sanctions supporting it, are likely the primary reasons why theocratic mode of legitimation may in fact be more effective than many others⁶.

It is important to note that interpreting theocracy as social exchange does not require treating all religious phenomena as transactions. This radical step is taken by Bainbridge and Stark who, in their impressive theory of religion, perceive all relations between a believer and deity as exchange transactions⁷. In the present study this notion applies solely to relations between the faithful and the administrators of supernatural rewards. Moreover, this kind of relation between priests and believers does not necessarily lead to the establishment of a political regime. It happens only when religious functionaries or their lay allies successfully claim control over other, non-religious spheres of life, too (or, more appropriately, succeed in presenting all spheres of life as religious). This usually entails a non-secularized worldview or a still-“enchanted” world, to paraphrase Max Weber, a natural milieu for theocracy.

In order to initiate such a power relation, a religious functionary has to, first, convince potential subjects of the importance, preferably ultimate importance, of the doctrines, rituals, sacred operations or whatever other religious services he has to offer and, second, successfully claim him- or herself to be the (sole) valid, divinely sanctioned dispatcher of those services. One obvious example would

5 The distinction between external and internal sources of legitimacy is made by Beetham David, *The Legitimation of Power*, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills and New York, 2003, p. 71–76.

6 As Mark Haugaard put it, “What made that order normatively compelling was that it was the work of God. Why is God significant? [...] God is the creator of nature, or maybe even stronger, he is infinite and immutable. Thus, to the extent to which the meanings and norms of society reflect the will of God, they are neither *socially constructed*, nor the will of mankind. Thus, in a theocracy, God serves the function of reifying society, making it other than culture, thus constructed and arbitrary. Anyone who goes against that society, is not going against other members of society, but is violating the laws that govern heaven and earth or the humblest ant and the firmament of the heavens” Power and Truth, paper presented to the 21st World Congress of Political Science, Santiago de Chile, 2009.

7 Stark Rodney, Bainbridge William S., *A Theory of Religion*, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, N.J., 1996.

be the Christian concept of sin, with the accompanying feeling of guilt, which the church has constantly incited in the faithful, and the role of clergy, especially Catholic, in absolving transgressors of their sins, thereby returning them to the state of grace⁸.

Most importantly, the power of the religious functionaries stems from their ability to manage the ultimate concern of a believer, a salvation. In some religions, sacred manipulations of priests played the fundamental role of supporting the universe, preventing the cosmos from returning to the state of original chaos (as in minutiae rituals performed by Vedic priests, or the bloody sacrifices required by the Aztec gods to keep the world going)⁹. In others, the significance of religious functionaries lies in their potential for opening or reopening channels of personal salvation for the believers (the above mentioned example of Catholic clergy in remission of sins or the Mormon Melchizedek-order priests in temple rites of eternal marriage or baptism of the ancestors)¹⁰. Obviously, not all religions entail such a role of priesthood and hence produce such power effects. For example, those of a mystic or ascetic variety, are, for this reason, ill-suited to support theocracy. It is perhaps no accident that most theocratic regimes emerged out of either highly ritualistic ancient religious systems, or within the ethical Judaeo-Christian tradition¹¹.

3. Factors of stability

In talking about power as emerging from unequal exchange, social exchange theories predict the occurrence of certain balancing operations. These are alternative courses of action which the subordinate side of the relation (the ruled) may follow to reduce or wipe out completely the inequality of the relation. The four alternatives to submission by B in exchange for the desired rewards provided by A are: 1) the provision by B of goods and services sufficiently attractive to A that the latter wishes to continue the exchange even without submission from B; thereby, power relation is transformed into equal exchange relation; 2) finding by B of other suppliers of the desired rewards, who are ready to exchange them for a lower cost (submission is reduced) or are interested in rewards that B can provide (again, power relation disappears); 3) forcing A to provide the desired goods; the power relation is reversed – now B dominates A – and often

8 This Christian mechanism of guilt inculcation and its remission by priest has been the object of well-known critiques of Christianity, from Marxists, to 19-th century anarchists, to Nietzsche and beyond.

9 On the function of Vedic rituals see Eliade Mircea, *A History of Religious Ideas*, vol. I, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1978, chapter 9. On Aztecs see Aztek Anonim, *Zdobycie Meksyku*, Ossolineum, Wrocław, 1959 and the introduction by Tadeusz Milewski explaining the significance of human sacrifice (pp. 28–30); Perl, *Theocracy*, pp. 64–66.

10 See e.g. O'Dea Thomas, *The Mormons*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1957, pp. 56–60.

11 This assertion is somewhat weakened by the case of Buddhism, which did produce theocracies in South-East Asia, most notably in Tibet.

based on force or the threat of using force; or 4) constraining by B of his needs, so that he does not desire anymore the rewards that A has to offer; the power relation is broken by means of discontinuing the exchange¹².

If we look at the problem from the perspective of the power holders, we will treat these situations as challenges to their position which demand adequate responses. The four corresponding responses, which I propose to conceive of as *conditions of stability of power relations*, would be, respectively: 1) avoiding dependency on the goods and services provided by the subjects; 2) retaining monopoly on the provision of rewards desired by the subjects, e.g. by eliminating other possible suppliers; 3) assuring full control of the instruments of force, which, in the case of state regimes, means the monopoly of legitimate use of force; 4) inculcating in the subjects the conviction of the necessity and importance of obtaining the rewards the power holder provide – this may be achieved by propaganda, marketing techniques, socialization (compare Lukes' third dimension of power)¹³ etc.

Now how does it translate to theocracy? The first scenario seems to be the least likely one, since it is difficult to imagine rewards which could match those distributed by religious functionaries. They do, to be sure, obtain certain goods and services from the rank and file, ranging from material support (especially in the case of monks or temple priests, as opposed to theocratic rulers who are wealthy landowners etc.) to admiration, high social prestige and the like. Nothing compares, however, to the promise of eternity, as long as the faith remains strong among the believers.

The second situation accounts for political consequences of schism and dissent in religiously legitimized systems. The appearing of a pretender or a splinter group who questions the genuineness of certain doctrines and practices and hence the legitimacy of a regime based on them may seriously alter power relations within a community. If the dissenters seize power or split to form their own group, some of them – the closest associates of the new leader(s) – immediately rise to power positions, while others may be able to obtain the same rewards (the promise of salvation, let's say) for a lower price (less submission). There may be multiple variations of this scenario (for instance, the claimant may be more doctrine-oriented, like Luther, or charismatic, like Savonarola), but it is generally in the interest of the regimes' stability to eliminate any challenges to its monopoly on religious goods.

Using force to extract religious rewards, the third scenario, in our context may mean either gaining control by civil rulers over religious functionaries to use them to the formers' advantage (e.g. control over oracles or soothsayers, channelling charismatic powers of "instruments" into a desired direction, as in

12 Blau, *Exchange and Power*; Emerson Richard, Power-Dependence Relations, *American Sociological Review*, vol. 27, 1962, pp. 31–32.

13 Lukes Steven, *Power: A Radical View*, Macmillan, London, 1974, pp. 21–25.

Shakerism during the “Era of Manifestations”) or some sort of popular rebellion against theocratic rulers, with the purpose of gaining easier access to the precious religious rewards¹⁴. It may constitute both an impulse to rise against foreign rulers attempting to impose a different religion and a cause for unrest within a single religious tradition, when the religion of the rulers has become excessively formalized, inaccessible etc. (e.g. a movement in Catholicism to use national languages in liturgy and in the translation of the Bible and in other ways open the church to the lay members).

Finally, there is the threat of irrelevance of the rewards offered by the rulers, which, in this case, means simply secularization.¹⁵ When faith falters, theocracy gets delegitimized and falls apart, usually transforming into some kind of secular regime – most often authoritarian, but sometimes democratic, like the Puritan colonies of New England. Meeting this challenge requires from the rulers maintaining the religious view of the world, a goal which may be achieved through various strategies, depending on the context: conservatism, anti-modernism, elaborate ritualism, isolation from the outside world etc.

The following table summarizes the above discussion of stability of theocracies. It shows the potential factors of destabilization (alternative courses of action by the subjects) and the corresponding responses required to maintain the power relation (conditions of stability).

Alternatives to submission in general	Alternatives to submission in theocracies	Responses by theocratic rulers (conditions of stability)
Providing counter-rewards.	–	–
Finding other suppliers.	Religious dissent, new revelation, schism.	Maintaining monopoly by persecution of heretics, quieting the opposition, stressing the unity of the group.
Using force to take over the rewards.	Taking control over and the use of priests; popular rebellion.	Firm control over the instruments of force.
Renouncing the rewards.	Decreasing importance of religion in a person's life; secularization.	Maintaining coherent religious world view; propaganda; traditionalism; isolation.

Table 1. Factors of stability of theocratic political systems

14 On the Era of Manifestations in Shakerism see Stein Stephen J., *Shaker Experience in America*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1992, pp. 165–199; Andrews Edward D., *The People Called Shakers*, Dover Publications, New York, 1963, chapter VIII; Paterwic Stephen J., *The A to Z of the Shakers*, Scarecrow Press, Lanham, 2008, pp. 66–69. For the elaboration and theoretical interpretation of these events see Potz Maciej, Legitimation mechanisms as third-dimension power practices. The case of the Shakers, *Journal of Political Power*, vol. 5, issue 3, Galway, 2012, pp. 396–400.

15 It would be hard to imagine the conscious giving up of the hope of salvation while still believing in it, something which is conceivable in the case of other values or desires of less ultimate importance. For instance, one might renounce travelling or pursuing academic career if the regime demands too much submission from her in exchange, while still highly valuing these activities (although, with the time, some rationalization mechanisms will probably creep in).

4. Theology as a source of stability

If we were to draw one general conclusion from the above discussion of potential threats to the stability of theocratic political systems, it would probably be the imperative to uphold the legitimacy of power at all costs, especially that, in a theocracy, legitimate authority prevails over power based on coercion.¹⁶ In the social exchange framework, political legitimacy may be conceptualized as the justification of the existing conditions of exchange and the distribution of power which results from them. Ideally, power should be deemed legitimate by the subjects on all three levels of: general norms and values (in this case, religious doctrine), institutions and procedures of government and the particular persons who hold positions of power. Delegitimation of any of these dimensions – normative, institutional or personal – may lead to the dysfunctional processes described previously, such as heresies, dissent, apostasies, unrest and secularization, all threatening the functioning and, ultimately, the existence of the system.

In what follows I will be concerned primarily with the normative level. I will attempt a functional analysis of certain religious ideas as factors of stability, showing how they, first, serve rulers to articulate their claim to legitimacy and, second, contribute to the development and the lasting of a system, often in the face of serious internal and external difficulties. Two cases have been selected – the 17th century Puritan colonies of New England and the quasi-autonomous Mormon territory in Utah in the 18th century – to emphasize that the usefulness of various legitimizing ideas is relative to circumstances. Different strategies may be called for in response to particular conditions (persistence and conservatism in one case, adaptation and flexibility in the other) and different religious doctrines may prove more or less suitable for these strategies.

4.1. Covenant

The idea of covenant is certainly the central religious doctrine of New England Puritans, which influenced their theocratic political systems in many ways. It is, obviously, of Biblical origin, where a number of covenants had been sealed between God and the patriarchs, the people of Israel and the whole humanity (New Testament). For Jews, it has been one the most important theological concepts shaping their religious and political fate. It featured prominently in some Christian denominations, too, including the Mormons, whom it had motivated to enormous collective efforts towards building their Zion. For the Puritans, the chief source of inspiration was the Old Testament covenant with the people of Israel, whose story, in the minds of New England settlers, bore many similarities to their own odyssey (pharaoh = king of England, exodus = flee from

16 For the evidence in support of this non-obvious assertion and the elaboration of the relationship between the elements of legitimacy and coercion in theocratic acts of power see Potz, *Legitimation Mechanisms...*, pp. 379–380.

England, crossing the Red Sea = crossing the Atlantic, Jerusalem = first Puritan settlements, etc.).¹⁷

The meaning of covenant in the Puritan context was best explained by John Winthrop, one of the leaders and a future governor of Massachusetts Bay Colony, in his famous sermon on the way to American shores:

“Thus stands the cause between God and us. We are entered into covenant with Him for this work. We have taken out a commission. The Lord hath given us leave to draw our own articles. We have professed to enterprise these and those accounts, upon these and those ends. We have hereupon besought Him of favor and blessing. Now if the Lord shall please to hear us, and bring us in peace to the place we desire, then hath He ratified this covenant and sealed our commission, and will expect a strict performance of the articles contained in it; but if we shall neglect the observation of these articles which are the ends we have propounded, and, dissembling with our God, shall fall to embrace this present world and prosecute our carnal intentions, seeking great things for ourselves and our posterity, the Lord will surely break out in wrath against us, and be revenged of such a people, and make us know the price of the breach of such a covenant.”¹⁸

The covenant was thus understood as a kind of a contract where the people undertake to obey God’s commands and remain faithful to him in return for his blessing and assistance, both on their way through the ocean and in the fulfillment of the commission. This commission is to build a model Christian community, pure and uncorrupted, which would be like “the city upon a hill”, a lodestar for all nations. The breach of covenant would result in withdrawing God’s blessing, with possibly fatal consequences for the well-being and even the survival of the people cast in wilderness.

The exact terms of this contract are the God-given laws which are regarded as a blueprint for government and ethical standards for everyday behaviour¹⁹. Every effort was made to legitimize them in religious terms, including references to Bible passages from which a particular norm with the accompanying sanction had been derived. Thus, in the 1641 law code of Massachusetts, death penalty is stipulated not only for traditional secular capital crimes such as murder or treason, but also for certain offences against morality (such as homosexual sex, zoophilia and adultery) and even purely religious crimes – blasphemy, idolatry and witchcraft.²⁰

17 For similar interpretation of Mormon history see Shipps Jan, *Mormonism. The Story of a New Religious Tradition*, University of Illinois Press, Urbana and Chicago, 1987, p. 81. For the significance of Jerusalem (Old and New) for Christians see Al Hindy Ellie, *The New Jerusalem: An Oriental Christian Perspective*, *Politics and Religion*, vol. V, no. 2, 2011, p. 168–169.

18 Winthrop John, *A Modell of Christian Charity*, 1630.

19 This “contract” is not to be understood, though, in an overly legalistic sense. In fact, Daniel Elazar draws a distinction – applicable to both Judaism and Protestantism – between “covenant” and “contract”, the former implying moral, not merely legal obligations. See Elazar Daniel J., *Covenant and Community*, *Judaism*, vol. 49, issue 4, 2000, p. 390, 393.

20 *The Liberties of the Massachusetts Collonie in New England*, 1641, chapter 94, available online at <http://history.hanover.edu/>

On closer inspection, the idea of covenant reveals its heterogeneity. In Puritan New England, it was conceived of in at least three senses: as covenant of grace, church covenant and national or civil covenant. The former reflects the Calvinist conception, adopted by Puritans, of a man's justification before God, based on the idea of predestination, according to which God chooses freely, independently of, and prior to, any human activity, who will be saved and who (the majority) will be damned forever. Covenant of grace is the promise of undeserved saving grace granted by God to an individual.²¹

In a sense, such an idea is extremely ill-suited as a foundation for a political system. Firstly, it is par excellence individual rather than social, tying a person solely to the Creator, on whom his or her lot entirely depends, rather than with a social group or political community. Secondly, a person is only a passive receiver of grace, with no social responsibilities or ethical obligations. It is even misleading to talk about "covenant" in this case, since the relation between sovereign God and the believer is hopelessly unidirectional; it does not in any way resemble a contract, because the receipt of certain goods (salvation, in this case) is not in any way contingent on fulfilling of certain conditions by the receiver.

Confronted with a similar problem, Max Weber explained how the doctrine of predestination could lead to a specific Protestant ethos and, later, to produce the "spirit of capitalism".²² The New England Puritans managed to bridge the gap between this individualistic doctrine and community by construing the concept of covenant in a peculiar way which combined the Calvinist elitism of the elect with the Jewish idea of the chosen people. Church covenant was a congregation of the faithful who regarded one another as "saints", i.e. the elect (destined for salvation) and, as representing the true church of Christ, were supposed to stick to high moral standards. Importantly, only full members of the Congregational church – those under the church covenant – enjoyed full civil rights, including electoral rights to the colonies' legislative bodies. Finally, the notion of national or civil covenant encompassed all citizens of a colony, bound together by the obligation to follow the law of God, lest he should turn away from them.²³ Another

texts/masslib.html (accessed 4.01.2013). This division into certain categories of crimes is certainly somewhat artificial and made from a secular perspective. For serious literalist believers, all crimes are religious in nature, since they offend God and break His laws. Such is also the view of a contemporary fundamentalist, theocratically-minded strand of American Protestantism called Christian Reconstructionism. See Bahnsen Greg L., *No other standard. Theonomy and its critics*, Institute for Christian Economics, Tyler, Tex, 1991, p. 172.

21 The distinction of the three kinds of covenant comes from Miller Perry, *The New England Mind. From Colony to Province*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1954, p. 14, 25.

22 Weber Max, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Dover Publications, Mineola, N.Y., 2003, pp. 98 ff.

23 On the political institutions of New England colonies see e.g. Henneton Lauric, *Establishing "a due form of government, both civil and ecclesiastical". A Reassessment of Theocracy, Aristocracy and Democracy in Early New England*, MA thesis, University Créteil-Val de Marne, 2000, chapter III.2; Lockridge Kenneth A., *A New England Town. The First Hundred Years*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York and London, 1985. Incidentally, since the legislative bodies were elected, the Puritan colonies were limited democracies. As explained in 2, this is perfectly consistent with their being theocratic, considering that the legitimation of power acquired via whatever procedure, including popular election, was unmistakably religious: it wouldn't occur to anybody in 17th century

way to put the difference is in the words of Daniel Elazar: "The ties of covenant are moral, either between God and humans or between humans under God, that is to say, a moral promise witnessed and guaranteed by a transcendent power".²⁴ Church and civil covenant are thus, unlike covenant of grace, more of a compact between fellow believers and citizens supervised, so to say, by God, than between God and each individual.

In this way, the individualistic Calvinist idea of election to salvation (covenant of grace) gained a social dimension – a gathering of the elect (church covenant), which, in turn, constituted the backbone of the body politic (civil covenant). Theologically, this is a step from uncompromising predestinationism, to which Puritans had always paid at least lip service, towards justification by works, if the people's fate depends on their fulfilling their contract with God. Politically, however, the embracing of an idea of covenant based on such ethics of collective rewards and punishments was functionally indispensable.

The political potential of the idea of covenant became apparent even before the settlement proper had begun, when, on board "Mayflower", Puritan settlers bound to what was to become the colony of Plymouth, had signed a document called *Mayflower Compact*. In it, they established a political community and entrusted it to God, very much according to the logic of covenant described above. We, they declared,

"solemnly and mutually, in the presence of God, and one of another, covenant and combine our selves together into a civil body politic, for our better ordering and preservation and furtherance of the ends aforesaid; and by virtue hereof to enact, constitute, and frame such just and equal laws, ordinances, acts, constitutions and offices, from time to time, as shall be thought most meet and convenient for the general good of the Colony, unto which we promise all due submission and obedience"²⁵.

Interestingly, this situation constitutes a rare example of a realized social compact, the idea of people getting together and establishing a government upon themselves being a historical fact, rather than merely philosophical fiction used as a legitimizing formula for various, not necessarily democratic, political regimes.²⁶

The political impact of the idea of national covenant was not limited to this foundational act. Its significance lies in its placing on individual a burden of

Massachusetts that the members of the assembly, the governor or other elected authorities should do the will of the people rather than the will of God.

24 Elazar, *Covenant and community...*, p. 393.

25 *Mayflower Compact*, 1620.

26 As it was, among others, by Hobbes in and absolutist version and by various liberal thinkers, from Locke to Rawls.

responsibility not solely for his own this- and otherworldly fate, but for the well-being and fate of the community. Such view legitimized authorities to thorough, nearly total control of citizens' piousness and morality, and a strict enforcement of Bible-derived laws. Institutionally, 17th-century New England was not a complete mixture of church and state – government posts were not held by pastors, although Congregational church was *the* established state church and it remained so in Massachusetts well into the 19th century. Rather, it was a community of purpose, with church and state elites cooperating in the goal of securing Lord's favor by keeping the people faithful, God-fearing and pure.²⁷ It can even be argued that the state's role in this task was preeminent, given that, by the very nature of their congregational ecclesiology, independent Puritan churches were ill-disposed to maintaining unity, being instead the hotbeds of individualism and separatism.²⁸ Specifically, this maintaining of purity and unity meant cleansing the community of all sorts of religious error. It was a justification invoked for both restricting full political rights to the members in good standing of Congregational Church and for persecution of heretics, including Protestants of other denominations and even Puritan dissenters.

The most representative cases are perhaps those of Anne Hutchinson, Roger Williams and the Quakers. Each of them aroused the enmity of Massachusetts authorities for different doctrinal reasons. Hutchinson had taken to its logical consequence the preaching of John Cotton back in England and her embracing of Calvinist doctrine of grace led her to antinomianism – a doctrine which, by its very nature, is at odds with law and order which it is in the interest of government to enforce.²⁹ Williams, on the other hand, demanded complete separation of civil government from religious matters and, consequently, granting full freedom of religion – precisely what Massachusetts leaders perceived as a grave offence to God. No less abominable was for them the Quaker religion, with their insistence on inner "light", or intimate communication with God unmediated through Church or clergy, as well as their pacifism and gentle anarchism, leading them to acts of civil disobedience. Regardless of these doctrinal differences, however, the principal justification for persecution and ultimately expulsion (and even death penalty in the case of some Quakers) was the same, and fully consistent with the covenant logic: tolerating dissenters would constitute the breach of the conditions of the contract with God and thus put the society in peril³⁰. As Edmund S.

27 Zakai Avihu, *Theocracy in New England: The Nature and Meaning of the Holy Experiment in the Wilderness*, *Journal of Religious History*, vol. 14, 1986, p. 135.

28 Morgan Edmund S., *The Puritan Dilemma. The Story of John Winthrop*, Longman, New York, 1999, p. 71.

29 *Ibid.*, p. 120–123; McEvoy Don, *Democracy or Theocracy?*, iUniverse, New York, 2005, p. 2–4.

30 I am aware that actual *reasons* for such dealing with dissenters might have been at times more political or pragmatic than doctrinal, for example getting rid of a nuisance who denounces the colony in London or protecting public order against extravagant behaviour of the Quakers (see Stawiński Piotr, *Demonizmiczary w życiu społecznym Purytanów amerykańskich i okolicznych*, WSP, Częstochowa, 1997, p. 84, 111). However, we are concerned here mainly with the *justification*, not the

Morgan put it, "Winthrop and his colleagues believed that the Lord would punish Massachusetts if they *did not* punish Mrs. Hutchinson".³¹

Functionally, these acts of religious intolerance represent one of the strategies used by the rulers to maintain the stability of the regime we referred to earlier. By ousting heretics and dissidents, monopoly of the supply of and full control over religious goods was retained. Silencing the critique helped maintain the tremendous cohesion of the society, this tightly knit fabric of common religious beliefs and ethical norms, together with shared belief in the justifiability of power relations and legal norms that underwrote them. It was much later, in the 18th century, that this coherent worldview with its central concept of a covenant had gradually fallen apart and the New England theocracies became delegitimized.

In the meantime, towards the end of the 17th century, another danger crept in, namely the relaxation of religious and moral discipline, an example of renouncing religious rewards by the subjects. This threat to stability of a theocracy coming from secularization had elicited ruler's response immersed in the logic of covenant, too. It found its literary expression in the form of a jeremiad³²: the lament over the sinful people who diverted from the path of God and the accompanying vision of the day of judgement fast approaching unless they repent.

4.2. Continuous revelation

The doctrine of continuous revelation is, to my mind, the single most important theological idea that shaped this unique religious and socio-political phenomenon that is Mormonism. For the majority of mainstream Christian denominations, revelation is, to a large extent, a closed process. Initiated by God's theophany in the Garden of Eden, it had continued throughout the Old Testament (Mount Sinai, the prophets etc.) and was fulfilled in the sacrifice of Christ. No new public revelation has been added ever since. Occasional communications to individual believers are still possible, but they are not binding on the whole community.³³ It only remains for the Church to guard, interpret and explain this deposit of faith, based on the Bible only (in Protestantism) or Bible and the tradition of the church (in Catholicism). A similar position is taken by the mainstream of Islam and Judaism.

The concept of continuous revelation, characteristic mainly for heterodox Christian groups often of charismatic origin, proclaims, on the other hand, that God never ceased to communicate with His people, that He constantly counsels,

explanation, of the government actions.

31 Morgan, *The Puritan Dilemma*, p. 135.

32 Miller, *The New England Mind*, chapter II.

33 For the Catholic position see *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 65; II Vatican Council's *Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation* „*Dei Verbum*“, 4.

reprimands and guides it through history. A closely related concept, which allows a revelation to materialize, so to speak, is that of prophecy, understood as a gift to receive God's word and announce it to the people, both in relation to the future and, perhaps even more importantly, to day-to-day life of the community.³⁴

The position of a prophet in relation to political power varies. A prophet may be the leader him- or herself (as in the Mormon church, and, indeed, in the majority of charismatic sects), may be a medium or "instrument" controlled by the leaders (as in Shakerism during the "Era of Manifestations" or some ancient oracles) or the conscience and the chastiser of the leaders (as in ancient Israel). In any case, the political potential of this functional complex of continuous revelation-prophecy is evident. It offers the rulers the strongest possible legitimacy: their decisions and actions, as direct realisation of God's will, cannot be questioned by any earthly authority. In this respect, the continuous revelation has an edge over the "petrified" revelation of the main denominations. The former is, in a certain sense, private: only the prophet has a direct access to the messages entrusted to him by God and he reveals them as and when he chooses, which, in the final analysis, allows him nearly complete control over their content, interpretation and political consequences. The latter, on the other hand, is inescapably public (unless the holy scripture is made secret): the revelation written down and publicly accessible can be considered and debated upon by many, which may give rise to different courses of action, even if the members of the religious elite position themselves as the only valid interpreters of the words of God. In this latter case, the legitimacy of the system may be more difficult to maintain, notwithstanding the profits stemming from the institutionalization of power, which charismatic prophetic leadership lacks.

Joseph Smith, the founder of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, had from the very beginning asserted himself as the only valid receiver of messages from God. It was through direct inspiration that the *Book of Mormon* was written, or, as the Mormons believe, translated by Smith from golden tablets given to him by an angel-figure Moroni. The *Book of Mormon* itself contains numerous passages stressing the importance of prophecy as the standard channel of communication between God and his people. Lehi, Nephi, Alma, Mosiah, Aaron, Samuel, Abinadi are among the protagonists of the *Book of Mormon* who possess this gift. Old Testament prophets are highly esteemed, too – extensive passages from the second book of Nephi are quotations or paraphrases of Isaiah. Nephi warns against ignoring the words of prophets (their persecutors will perish) and Mormon shows how their prophecies come true.³⁵

The doctrine of continuous revelation is proclaimed explicitly in another

34 This first aspect of prophecy, foretelling the future, played vital role especially in the early history of the Mormons, when the promise of Zion, associated with a number of places where the Saints managed to settle for a longer while, kept their motivation high, despite the persecution and hardships they suffered before finally finding the safe haven of Utah.

35 2 Nephi 26:3, Mormon 1:19, 2:10.

holy text of the Church, *Pearl of Great Price*. Article 9 of the Articles of Faith included therein makes it quite clear: "We believe all that God has revealed, all that He does now reveal, and we believe that He will yet reveal many great and important things pertaining to the Kingdom of God".³⁶ Yet another scripture of Mormonism, *Doctrine and Covenants*, is composed of revelations received by Smith (and a few by later leaders of the Church), which regulate nearly all spheres of life, from religious doctrine to ethics to family life.

In narrating its early history, the Church makes a point of showing that the elevation of Joseph Smith to the leadership position was infused with divine sanction. During encounters with various holy figures he is announced his election for the task of re-establishing the true Church of Christ. All stages of his progression are meticulously documented (baptism, ordination to Aaronic and Melchizedek priesthoods, first revelations) and the more miraculous and incredibly-looking events, such as the translation of the *Book of Mormon* from mysterious ancient Egyptian language with the assistance of two magic stones, Urim and Thummim, are supported with the evidence of a number of witnesses.³⁷

The importance of prophecy in Mormonism is also evident from the fact that all Smith's successors as Presidents of the Church, until now, have borne the titles of – and, more importantly, are believed by the majority of the faithful to be – the revelators, seers and prophets. A statement by Ezra Taft Benson, the president of the Church, that the "living prophet is more vital to us than the standard works" seems quite radical, especially that the "standard works" are simply the Mormon scriptures, but, in fact, it is quite consistent with the logic of God actively reacting to the troubles that befall his chosen people, correcting their behaviour as the situation demands.³⁸ One ought not doubt the truth of prophecy, for, as Wilford Woodruff, late 19th century president of the Church once said, "The Lord will never permit me or any other man who stands as President of this Church to lead you astray [...] If I were to attempt that, the Lord would remove me out of my place".³⁹

The political significance of prophecy is well illustrated by the way Smith handled his gift and used it as an instrument of power. Not all revelations were communicated to the believers immediately; rather, a most expedient moment was chosen to authoritatively close a dispute, remedy a problem or introduce a new practice within the community. For example, a revelation concerning plural marriage, announced publicly in 1852, well after the Prophet's death, was record-

36 *Pearl of Great Price, The Articles of Faith*, art. 9; available, along with other Mormon scriptures, at <http://lds.org/scriptures?lang=eng> (accessed 4.01.2013).

37 In the Bible, Urim and Thummin are the stones from the breastpiece of Jewish high priest and play a similar role. See e.g. Exodus 28:30, Numbers 27:21.

38 Benson Ezra Taft, *Fourteen Fundamentals in Following the Prophet in: Speeches of the Year 1980*, Brigham Young University Press, Provo, UT, 1981, p. 26.

39 *Doctrine and Covenants*, Official Declaration 1.

ed secretly as early as 1843 and received by Smith, as the Church claims, already in early 1830'.⁴⁰

The issue of polygamy is worth looking at in more detail, since it illustrates very well the point we are trying to make about the functionality of a religious doctrine, in this case that of continuous revelation, for the stability of a political regime. The introduction of this practice, so squarely in the face of traditional American model of family and morals in general, had met with some resistance within the ranks of Mormons.⁴¹ The news of plural marriage being practiced secretly by some members of the leadership of the church had led to disputes and opposition even within the First Presidency, the highest governing body of the Church; the dissenter, William Law, has been excommunicated and established the church of his own.⁴² Finally, in 1852, the Church announced publicly its endorsement for the practice of plural marriage. Importantly, however, polygamy was not offered as a new social policy, but a religious doctrine revealed by God to Joseph Smith back in the 1830'. It was supported by biblical precedents (the patriarchs) and promised eschatological gratification for both men and women engaged in plural marriage (polygamist husbands, unlike monogamists and singles, will eternally reign in kingdoms peopled by their wives and children). This doctrinal statement, legitimized by the unquestioned trust in God's decisions revealed through prophets, even if they seem to contradict earlier doctrines, had successfully quieted the unrest over polygamy and helped restore the social equilibrium very much needed by the community still settling in in their intermountain Zion.

At the same time, however, despite their relative isolation, the pressure began to grow on Mormons from outside. Many gentile Americans considered polygamy morally hideous, a sort of formalized adultery or, even worse, slavery. The anti-Mormon press campaign finally resulted in legislative action by Congress which, in a 1862 bill called the *Morrill Act*, outlawed bigamy in US territories (of which Utah was one), making it punishable with 5 years' imprisonment. In 1879 US Supreme Court affirmed its constitutionality in *Reynolds vs. United States*, a case appealed by a Mormon leader practising plural marriage on the grounds that, since plural marriage is an article of the Mormon faith, enforcing

40 Introduction to section 132 of *Doctrine and Covenants* reads: "Although the revelation was recorded in 1843, it is evident from the historical records that the doctrines and principles involved in this revelation had been known by the Prophet since 1831". See also Thomas O'Dea, *The Mormons*, p. 62.

41 The number of followers of the LDS Church engaged in the practice of polygamy (or, technically more correctly, polygyny) is difficult to establish, but it was, according to various estimations, between 10–11% (O'Dea, *The Mormons*, 246) and 15–20% (Kern Louis J., *An Ordered Love: Sex Roles and Sexuality in Victorian Utopias*, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1981, p. 171). Ivins Stanley S., Notes on Mormon Polygamy, in: *The New Mormon History. Revisionist Essays on the Past*, D. Michael Quinn (ed.), Signature Books, Salt Lake City, 1992, pp. 170–171, estimates the number of polygamous families at 15–20%. Anyhow, they were a distinct minority, due to both economic and emotional hardships this model of family entails.

42 On internal conflict over polygamy in the ranks of the Church elite see O'Dea, *The Mormons*, 64. *The Book of Mormon* explicitly condemns polygamy in a number of passages, e.g. Jacob 2:27–28, 3:5, Mosiah 11:2.

anti-bigamy law against him violates his freedom of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment. The Court disagreed, offering a narrow interpretation of religious freedom as non-discrimination rather than allowing for exceptions on religious grounds from generally applicable laws.⁴³ The decision contained a good deal of anti-polygamy sentiment, too, largely inspired by the rhetoric of the “twin relics of barbarism” (drawing analogy between the fate of Southern slaves and Mormon plural wives). The Court might have sought to distance itself from the still infamous *Dredd Scott* decision.⁴⁴

The *Morrill Act* was supplanted by still more rigorous *Edmunds Act* of 1882, making not only plural marriage, but mere cohabitation with more than one woman an offence. When, finally, the *Tucker Act* of 1887, whose constitutionality was upheld in *Romney vs. United States*⁴⁵, permitted the confiscation of the Church’s assets, the situation of Latter-day Saints got quite serious. With their leaders in jail or in hiding and federal troops in readiness, the Church’s survival was gravely threatened. It had to compromise, and compromise it did. In the now-famous *Manifesto* of 1890, the Church President Wilford Woodruff renounced the practice of polygamy and withdrew any support for it.⁴⁶

From the inner Mormon perspective, the by now relatively well established model of family, declared, by God’s decree, a religious duty and a gateway to the highest eschatological status, had suddenly become obsolete. Justification of this turn required more than invoking the political circumstances. The only credible way to legitimize going against the Joseph Smith’s revelation was by means of a new revelation.⁴⁷

That is precisely what Woodruff – the prophet, seer and revelator, just as every other President of the Church – claimed to have received. It matters little that an outside observer may view the whole situation as a glaring example of using the prophecy as an instrument of political expediency in the face of mounting pressure from the United States government. As long as the believers themselves regard it genuine, as most of them did in this case, the legitimacy of the system remains largely unaffected. For legitimacy is, when all is said and done, a belief in legitimacy on part of the subjects⁴⁸, which, with time, becomes

43 *Reynolds v. United States*, 95 U.S. 145 (1879). On the bearing of this ruling on the constitutional doctrine of freedom of religion see Potz Maciej, *Granice wolności religijnej*, Fundacja Nauki Polskiej, Wrocław, 2008, pp. 73–74.

44 Gordon Sarah B., The Mormon Question: Polygamy and Constitutional Conflict in Nineteenth-Century America, *Journal of Supreme Court History*, vol. 28, issue 1, 2003, p. 24.

45 *Romney v. United States*, 136 U.S. 1 (1890).

46 For a discussion of anti-Mormon campaign from legal perspective: Noonan Jr. John T., *The Believer and the Powers That Are*, London and New York, 1987, pp. 199–201. “*The Manifesto*” has been included into the *Doctrines and Covenants* as Official Declaration 1, thereby gaining the status of revealed will of God.

47 A piece of evidence suggesting that the institution of plural marriage had in fact stroke root in the Mormon society is the reluctance of many Saints, even among the ruling quorum of the Apostles, to give up the practice after 1890. On post-*Manifesto* polygamy see Cannon II Kenneth L., *After the Manifesto: Mormon Polygamy 1890–1906*, in: *The New Mormon History*. . .

48 This Weberian view of legitimacy was challenged by Beetham who stated certain objective criteria for determining whether

internalized as a normative structure, a source of moral obligations.⁴⁹

From the perspective of the Mormon political system, such handling of prophecy by the leadership proved an excellent survival strategy, providing the system with enough flexibility to quickly adapt to the external pressure and recover from the crisis. The theological concept of continuous revelation helped Mormons understand their history in terms of a series of interventions of an active God in the affairs of His people. Such flexibility would be harder to achieve in a theocratic system based on a concept of closed revelation (with, consequently, less weight attached to prophecy) and a vision of more distant, transcendent and unchanging God.⁵⁰

As a general thought, the complex of continuous revelation-prophecy is functional for theocracy by making the revealed pronouncements of the rulers difficult to challenge. On the other hand, power based on prophecy tends to be more charismatic and less institutionalized and, in this respect, potentially less stable than power based on traditional procedures and institutions. Perhaps the success of Mormonism can be explained by the balanced combination of these two elements. While religio-political power of the LDS church did institutionalize with time, it never underwent a typical routinization of charisma leading to its complete demise. The charismatic element has been retained in the function of the President– Prophet. It is, perhaps, a good contemporary example of what Weber referred to as the charisma of office.⁵¹

5. Conclusion

Both of the empirical examples discussed above represent a different strategy in using religious doctrine to maintain the equilibrium of a political system. In each case, the strategy was adapted to different external conditions. The New England Puritans, as the first white settlers of the area, did not have to confront themselves with a powerful enemy threatening the very existence of their colonies, minor wars with the French and Indians notwithstanding. The real danger came from within: the disruption of religious unity that could undermine the legitimacy of these theocratic systems. This danger, identified by our theoretical framework as the existence of alternative sources of goods (here competing re-

a political system is legitimized: 1) power is acquired and performed according to rules; 2) these rules are justifiable in terms of norms and values prevailing in the society; 3) consent of subjects is publicly expressed (Beetham David, *The Legitimation of Power*, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills and New York, 1991, ch. 3). I do not consider this critique convincing. All these factors are important conditions of legitimacy only if their social perception is not distorted. The objective fact that power was seized with the breach of rules and procedures (e.g. through a secret *coup d'état*) has no bearing on legitimacy, unless the public learns of that fact. The present analysis seems to corroborate a more subjective understanding of the term, too.

49 Gelot Ludwig, Secularization as an International Crisis of Legitimacy, *Politics and Religion*, vol. VI, no 1, 2012, p. 65.

50 Six years later, in 1896, Utah was admitted to the Union as a state; nowadays the Mormons constitute the majority of its citizens.

51 Weber Max, *Economy and Society*, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 1978, p. 1139; see also Potz, Legitimation Mechanisms..., pp. 400, 402–403.

ligious doctrines) was met by the leaders, as stipulated by the exchange theory, by eliminating these alternative providers. The idea of covenant, viewed here as the central theological idea of New England Puritans, proved well-suited for the task: it allowed to present religious intolerance as necessary to fulfil the contract with God, on which the welfare of the people depended. At the same time, the relatively closed character of the Puritan theology, grounded in Bible and tradition and hostile to inspiration and prophecy, made it easier to dismiss all alternative ideas as unscriptural and new-fangled, thus decreasing the probability of an effective challenge to the legitimacy of the system.

In the case of Mormons, the external conditions were quite different. Faced by a powerful enemy, US federal government, they had to dramatically change not only their lifestyle, but also the very doctrine of their religion. The problem before the leaders was how to justify this radical shift in the eyes of their subjects. As has been shown, the doctrine of continuous revelation provided the much needed flexibility to prevent the looming crisis of legitimacy and allow the system to adapt. Even though the way the leaders had led their flock was winding and full of U-turns, they had been vindicated as providers of ultimate rewards, precisely because in the logic of continuous revelation all these turns were directly inspired by God. Put differently, the existing conditions of exchange with the resulting power relations were upheld and the system survived, albeit in a profoundly altered form.

On a more general level, the theoretical framework used here could probably be applied, with necessary modifications, to some aspects of contemporary theocracies. For instance, two of the conditions of stability formulated above, namely the elimination of alternative providers of religious goods and the need to retain firm control over the use of force, may help explain authoritarian form that virtually all contemporary theocratic regimes, mainly Islamic ones, assume. It would, further, be an interesting empirical research question whether these authoritarian forms actually coexist with high level of regime's legitimacy, as the theory stipulates. There need not be a contradiction here, since the authoritarian measures might serve to maintain the coherent religious worldview – a necessary condition for the legitimacy of a theocracy – by constricting a free flow of alternative ideas, explanations and justifications, thereby preventing delegitimation of a theocratic regime.

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Мацеј Потц

**РЕЛИГИЈСКА ДОКТРИНА КАО ФАКТОР СТАБИЛНОСТИ
ПОЛИТИЧКИХ СИСТЕМА.**

СТУДИЈА ДВЕ СЕВЕРНОАМЕРИЧКЕ ТЕОКРАТИЈЕ

Резиме

Овај рад се бави теократијом – политичкој моћи заснованој на верској легитимацији – у погледу теорије друштвене размене, која произилази из неједнаког приступа и контроли над верским добрима. Након тога рад идентификује факторе стабилности система као акције које владалац мора да покрене да би се успешно суочио са различитим покушајима оних над којима се влада да неутралишу неједнаке услове размене на којој је његова моћ заснована. Два емпиријска примера су предложена да се прикаже употреба верске доктрине у заштити стабилности система. Идеја савеза је кориштена од стране власти државе Масачусетс у 17. веку да се оправда прогон дисидената као средство за очување чистоте и јединства заједнице, као нужан услов за успостављање савеза друштва и Бога. Доктрина непрекидног откровљења, са друге стране, је дала вођство Мормонима кроз 19. век, посебно током кризе о полигамији, али и потребну флексибилност да се адаптирају на спољне притиске без угрожавања легитимитета њихове Богом дане моћи и стабилности система.

Кључне речи: теократија, теорија размене, политичка моћ, Мормони, Пуританци

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