

FUNDAMENTALISMS, SECURITY CRISIS AND TOLERANCE IN GLOBAL CONTEXT: THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE*

Abstract

In recent times, the resurgence of critical security questions has gained prominence in global tabloid, consciousness and discourse. From Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Yemen to Syria; the Nigerian experiences of the Golden Jubilee Independence bombing, for which MEND claimed responsibility, the *Boko Haram* incendiary that has gravitated into suicide bombing, among others are extant. The causes of these 'security crises' can be traced squarely to fundamentalisms: religious fundamentalism or religious nationalism; hegemonic fundamentalism, capitalist fundamentalism, ethnic fundamentalism, existential fundamentalism, ethical fundamentalism, etc. These explain the deepening and proliferation of conflicts in countries around the globe. The response to this state of affairs has been 'sermon' on tolerance in the face of aggressive terror. Tolerance may not have been properly conceptualized. The thrust of this paper, therefore, is to stimulate interest in the conceptualization of these terms so that their understanding would pave the way for long lasting solutions. In so doing, the paper will employ historical and philosophical approaches to situate the arguments.

Keywords: Boko Haram, religion, fundamentalism, securitization, bastard child, violence.

Introduction

The history of humanity is replete with incidence of violence even from pristine time. The contemporary world only continues with it, and adds various dimensions and weaponry that now ensure mass destruction of lives and property. What makes violence unique in recent global history is not just the ability to effectively destroy large population of humanity at once but its continuous de-

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*The earlier version of this paper was presented at the ISA/RC 22 Abuja Mid-term International conference on the theme: "Religion, Conflict and Tolerance in Global Perspectives" held at 3J's Hotel between 27th and 30th January, 2012.

velopment and creativity in violent ideas, application and deployment of strategies and very efficient and light-speed network services to achieve it. These, again, are no longer the exclusive preserve of a particular segment of the globe. The First and Second World Wars seemed to be only a foretaste of human capability to further endanger its specie and the ecosystem. The examples of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Auschwitz and Buchenwald, Vietnam, Bosnia-Herzegovina, post-Russian-Tajik Civil War, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, September 11 2001 attacks on America, July 7 2005 London bombing, Sudan, Somalia, Cote d' Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Dafur, Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Syria, Nigeria, etc. are a clear demonstration of global security challenges. As one ends, another one springs up; sometimes they occur concurrently.

One fundamental point that needs to be made here is that almost all of them are by-products of one form of fundamentalism or the other. It could be political, religious, economic or ideological fundamentalism. Sometimes, a kind of fundamentalism can be veiled while the manifest one might just be a smoke-screen to deploy violence. Importantly, the need for tolerance at all ends has always been stressed at diplomatic, national and transnational levels. While those who advocate tolerance are apparently not tolerant in the positive sense of the concept, the 'recipients' are tolerant only in the negative sense of it. This dialectic between positive and negative tolerance has dominated the relationship between opposing groups at all levels of the society. This, therefore, is the thrust of this essay: opposing fundamentalists holding tenaciously to their traditions; both are not positively tolerant and the consequent security crisis is not only a challenge to global peace in general but also Nigeria in particular.

Understanding fundamentalisms

The contemporary world has come to contend with the 'fundamentals' of the *Fundamentals*, published in the 1920s. That publication – *Fundamentals* – has gone beyond the literary polemics it generated; it has also in significant ways vitiated the positive posture those American Christians who described themselves as fundamentalists assumed with evident pride. The most that is known today is that fundamentalism emits emotive pores and warps sentiments among different groups of people. It has also transmuted from purely religious conceptualisation to encapsulate political, social, economic strands such that it will be difficult to delineate its contents in one piece. However, from the prism of religion, it has come to be closely associated with fanaticism, traditionalism and conservatism.²

Luca Ozzano, relying on the Fundamentalism Project, points out nine

2 Igboin, B. O. "Religious Fundamentalism in a Globalised World" in C. O. Isiramen et. al. (eds.) *Issues in Religious Studies and Philosophy*, Ibadan: En-Joy Press, 2010, p. 420.

characteristics of religious fundamentalism: Reactivity to the marginalization of religion, in which case fundamentalists believe that aspects of their religion are being eroded and that they must be protected; selectivity, here, fundamentalists select aspects of their religion and thus stand “for special attention, usually in the form of focused opposition.”³ The third is moral Manichaeism by which the world or society is dualised into good and bad forces in constant warfare with the belief that the good will overcome the evil. Others are: absolutism and inerrancy; millennialism and messianism; elect, chosen membership; sharp boundaries; authoritarian organization; behavioral requirements: “The member’s time, space, and activity are a group resource, not an individual one.”⁴ Ozzano argues that religious fundamentalism can be better grappled with from national dimension rather than global frontiers.

However, Babs Mala has argued that fanaticism, a sister of fundamentalism involves excessive indulgence in frenzy, unreasoning religious claims. As a consequence, its passion for truth is not only polemical but also contemptuous. Thus, he described fanaticism is “a naughty child of a difficult mother.”⁵ Charles Ryerson describes fundamentalism as a “bastard child.”⁶ For Kepel, fundamentalists are “true children of our time: unwanted children, perhaps bastards of computerization and unemployment or of the population explosion and increasing literacy.”⁷ What these definitions underscore is that even if fanaticism is a naughty child, that is, unruly, stubborn, troublesome, disobedient and heady, mere “don’t be naughty,” “don’t be nasty,” or “be patient with me” by the parent does not cure or stop the child from being naughty.

The child – fanaticism or fundamentalism – must necessarily have a mother. The point needs to be emphasized that fanaticism’s mother’s difficult nature is instructive. The relevant question borders on knowing why its mother is difficult by nature or disposition, and how this can be cured. Could it not be because of the ‘husband’ who has abandoned her to her fate and that of the ‘child’ when they needed him most? This could have led to frustration. And if we stress the bio-genetic knowledge of the relationship between mother and child, then we will begin to articulate how the latter acquired its naughty nature. If, on the other hand, we explore sociological dimension of its acquisition of naughty behavior, we will understand it better, but that does no put paid to the inquiry into

3 Ozzano, L. “Religious Fundamentalism and Democracy” *Politics and Religion*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2009, p. 128.

4 Ozzano, 128-129.

5 Mala, S. B. “Fanaticism in Religion: A Naughty Child of a Difficult Mother” in Orita: *Ibadan Journal of Religious Studies*, XVI/2, 1985, p. 110.

6 Ryerson, C. A. “Faiths and Fundamentalisms: Recipe for Violence” in *Religion and Society*, vol. 47, no. 4, India: CISRS Publication Trust, Dec. 2000, p. 5.

7 Kepel, G. *The Rage of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the Modern World*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994, p. 11.

its difficult mother's nature, which is crucial to the child's behavior. This means then that there must be historical perspective to the origin of fundamentalism and fanaticism, since they are but an effect.

As a bastard child, it is only natural that fundamentalism will always trouble its mother to ascertain who its father is. If fundamentalism is a child born out of wedlock it is only proper that it should be showed its father, its cause, so that there will be peace. This presupposes that the child is not a bastard in the biological sense of the concept. It is only a social construction. In other words, with the science of DNA a child's paternity can be easily deciphered. But the refusal to either go for DNA test or point its father to it is a deliberate social and political decision with predictable outcome: generation of all manners of trouble in the family and society.⁸ As bastard child, fundamentalism will definitely locate its kinds in the society; this testifies to the various forms and manifestations of fundamentalisms: computerisation, unemployment, population explosion, etc.

The descriptions of Mala and Ryerson of fanaticism and fundamentalism present both concepts as impacting negatively on the society. While this is true, that is, their consequences are undesirable; it is equally true that they are effects of a long process of conception. Their troubles on the global society should not be seen as completely negative. This seems to be Kepel's argument. Given that fundamentalists are unwanted children, they are indisputably true children of their parent because of the pregnable processes that gave birth to them. As such, "religious fundamentalism has a singular capacity to reveal the ills of the society," including those of its mother's illicit affairs that resulted in it in the first place. This presupposes that fundamentalism has its positive sides. It is left to the society to deal effectively and constructively with the revealed ills plaguing it. The inability or refusal to curb or contain the ills is only a precursor of fundamentalism's negative manifestations. This is why Kepel states clearly that what the fundamentalists "say or do is meaningful, and does not spring from a dethronement of reason or from manipulation by hidden forces, rather it is the undeniable evidence of a deep malaise in society that can no longer be interpreted in terms of our traditional categories of thought."⁹

Kepel clearly raised fundamental ethical perspective to the nature of fundamentalists' behavior. This has to do with how leaders at various levels of the socio-political strata are handling the challenges of the Internet, population, unemployment, structural or systemic poverty and corruption, education, etc.; the "true children" of our contemporary society, is crucial to understanding the psychological and violent disposition of fundamentalists. From the consequentialist point of view, that is, making ethical judgment from the consequences of

8 Igboin, "Religious Fundamentalism in a Globalised World", pp. 419-420.

9 Kepel, G. *The Rage of God*, p. 11.

an act,¹⁰ Obadare argues, on the strength of data collected from the university setting in Nigeria, that “religion and its literalist defense by an increasing number of students emerges in sharp relief amid the evident civic denudation and dearth of social trajectories of personal fulfillment.” Moreover, “fundamentalism actually constitutes a protest at a more primal, structural *alienation* from the same conversation, rather than a refusal to *engage* in one.”¹¹ So, fundamentalism seeks to provide personal security in the face of social anomie, a platter to vent angst against structural and endemic socio-political injustices as well as an instrument for “negotiating individual safe havens amid the galloping amoral inflation of the times. That being the case, white-collar fundamentalism... is, primarily, an *effect*, rather than a *cause*.”¹²

Origins of specific fundamentalisms

Since fundamentalism is a consequence rather than a cause, it means that its cause must be determined in order to stem the tide of its consequences. This cause can only be fathomed when we delve into particular instances of fundamentalism. For example, Ikenga Oraegbunam undertook a study of the metaphysical foundations of contemporary armed conflicts as a by-product of a long historical-metaphysical process. This process involves absolutisation of ideas and beliefs, cultural predicates as universal standard, which results in domination, colonialism and so on. Where structural violence such as poverty, exclusion, intimidation, oppression, gross lack, fear and psychological pressure abounds, reaction is rife. That accounts for perennial global search for peace, which is constantly eluding it. The reason is that every concept of peace is absolutised and exclusive and therefore, fundamentalist in some sense.¹³

Dukor provides a combination of mystic, philosophical and historical analysis of the rise of fundamentalism. According to him, it is structural poverty and denial of freedom that gave rise to stereotyped responses: Islamic resistance or liberation theology. The critical issues involved are: sacred, secular and freedom, which have tremendous implications for the peace of the world, and particularly for the development of Africa. While freedom is an espousal of agency and responsibility, fatalism has recourse to transcendence. Hence secularism favors freedom and the power of might but determinism legitimizes fundamentalism and the mighty. This scenario is ‘prophetically’ captured by Nostradamus who

10 Barcalow, E. *Moral Philosophy: Theory and Issues*, California: Wadsworth Publishing House, 1994, p. 112.

11 Obadare, E. “White-collar Fundamentalism: Interrogating Youth Religiosity on Nigerian Campus” *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 45/4, Dec. 2007, 532.

12 Ibid, 533

13 Oraegbunam, I. K. E. The Metaphysical Foundations of Armed Conflicts: Implications for Human Dignity and Global Peace” in I. Odimegwu, G. Ezeani and F. Aghamelu (eds.), *Philosophy, Democracy and Conflicts in Africa*, Akwa: Department of Philosophy, 2007, pp. 218-232.

predicted the rise of the Orient that: "The twice lifted to power, twice overthrown, the Orient just like the Occident will weaken, His adversary after numerous struggles, Routed by the sea, in a pinch will fall."¹⁴ Although this prophetic-historical movement of global events has been too loaded with metaphysical import, Dukor believes that "mystically based contrary-to-fact conditions are meaningful and that Islamic fundamentalism, Western imperialism, global terrorism and African unfreedom are understandable from the perspective of Hegel, Nostradamus and history."¹⁵

Islamic fundamentalism or Islamic liberation theology and other forms of its political nationalistic resistance provide some pertinent observations: one, it is perceptibly anti-Western and anti-imperialist. Two, it forms a formidable opposition to Western policies foisted on the world through its agencies such as World Bank, IMF, etc. It is also believed that Islamic fundamentalism fills the gap left open by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Three, Islamic fundamentalism espouses values that are not just of partisan interest but also nationalistic. Four, it has provided the most bellicose resistance to Western domination. In relation to Africa which has become the battlefield for testing the potency of the opposing views – Western and Islamic – fight for freedom becomes urgent. This is because Muslims are apparently fulfilling Nostradamus' prediction that: "The Oriental will go out from his stronghold, He will cross the Apennines to look on Gaul, He will sweep through the sky, across seas and over cloudy summits, His power will smite the countries along his way."¹⁶ In his perspectival presentation of the Muslims, Nostradamus said: "They are fierce and excellent fighters.... The Moslems rush to welcome death in battles."¹⁷

Dukor interpreted the 9/11 attacks as a fulfillment of prophecy and that by 2008 Arab civilization would start to ebb the flourishing of the Western and American powers. This might be the reason behind the increasing Islamic fundamentalist violence across the globe. As Nostradamus predicted, Arabs would traverse "the clouds and the snow of heavens, and everyone will be struck down with his club."¹⁸ And worse for Africa, "The African leader will be trapped in the conflict" between the warring powers of the Western and Islamic extractions. This explains the plight of Africa which has not been able to develop a systematic response to these forces depleting it from every side. Africa tilts towards any policy from either of the two worlds believed to serve its temporal purpose.

That is why for Moyo, Africa must begin to conceptualize beyond the

14 Dukor, M. "Secularism, Fundamentalism and Freedom" in I. Odimegwu, G. Ezeani and F. Aghamelu (eds.), *Philosophy, Democracy and Conflicts in Africa*, Akwa: Department of Philosophy, 2007, p. 69.

15 Ibid, p. 70.

16 Ibid, p. 71.

17 Ibid, p. 71.

18 Ibid, p. 74.

“dead aid” it is receiving from these imperialist and fundamentalist worlds and determine its future through rigorous fight against corruption, disease, poverty and wars. It is these four horses that have ravaged it and must therefore be delivered from them.¹⁹ It must strive for its freedom and dependence on foreign aid. It might only be hoped that Africa would rise from its deep sleep: “Europe does not know the camel of the East, but I have lived beside him long as friend, and fought him as foe. I do know him. Beyond him lie the elephantine hordes of Asia, and there is Africa, which sleeps now, but may someday wake to our sorrow. The one thing that can save Europe is to stop this insane strife, and unite against the common foe. You would think the Pope, as head of Christendom, would be working for this, he is no better than the rest.”²⁰ The import of this is that this prophetic-metaphysical insight is the precursor of Islamic fundamentalism and resistance to Western ideology and Christianity.

In another vein, in the course of trying to determine the root of specific fundamentalism, Brian Glyn Williams traced the history of Islamic fundamentalism in Tajikistan to the Wahhabis. According to him, the Communist fundamentalist regime made the Soviet Muslims liberal in their worldview. Put differently, before the disintegration of the atheistic Soviet government, the Soviet Muslims were cut off from interaction with their counterparts elsewhere. The defunct of Soviet Union was to open the vista of opportunity to both Soviet and other Muslims. The Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia, one of the most fundamentalist groups in the world, undertook the responsibility to provide tutelage to ‘the newly liberated Soviet brethren.’

In the process of offering the ex-Soviet Muslims a new sense of spirituality and a vehicle for opposition to post-Soviet dictatorships, however, the entrepreneurs of Arabic fundamentalist Islam were to threaten the traditional order in this lost Islamic realm. Most alarmingly, the extremists among them were to link this once-isolated Muslim land to the terrorist struggle of the world’s most wanted terrorist, Osama bin Laden.²¹

The consequence was the civil war that claimed about 50,000 lives. The Wahhabis’ position was to purge the Tajik Muslims of their utopian Marxist-proletarian “workers’ paradise” ideology, which they see as secular and un-Islamic. The Wahhabi form of Islam itself was an outgrowth of “a historic process of forced proselytizing that actually began in the late eighteenth century with the founding of Saudi Arabia.”²² The kingdom of Saudi Arabia was established when an Arabian

19 Moyo, D. *Dead Aid: Why Aid is not Working and how there is a Better Way for Africa*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009.

20 Dukor, “Secularism, Fundamentalism and Freedom”, p. 75.

21 Williams, B. G. “Crushing Wahhabi Fundamentalists in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Subplot to the Global Struggle against Al Qa’ida or Suppression of Legitimate Religious Opposition?” P. C. Lucas, and T. Robbins (eds.), *New Religious Movements in the 21st Century: Legal, Political, and Social Challenges in Global Perspective*, New York: Routledge, 2004, p.131.

22 Ibid, p. 131.

Bedouin puritan, Muhammad ibn Saud secured an alliance with another Islamic purifier, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab took over central Arabia. Ever since, the Saudi authority has continued to send out Wahhabi fundamentalists around the world with the aim of purging Islam of “heretical superstitions” foisted by Western secularism. Christianity is also seen as Western and supports capitalism. The triumph of capitalist fundamentalism triggers Islamic fundamentalism.²³

Capitalist fundamentalism

Tariq Ali argues that religious fundamentalism has serious relationship with capitalist fundamentalism. Capitalism has divided the world into two irreconcilable divides: the have and the have-not. According to him, this division underlies the religious fundamentalist principle that resulted in the ambience of the September 11, 2001 attack by Al-Qaeda. His words are apposite here:

Capitalism has created a single market, but without erasing the distinctions between the two worlds that face each other across a divide that first appeared in the eighteenth and became institutionalized in the nineteenth century. Most of the twentieth century witnessed several attempts to transcend this division through a process of revolutions, wars of national liberation and a combination of both. But in the end capitalism proved to be more cunning and more resilient.²⁴

The triumph of capitalism has produced dangerously violent consequences across the world (in Asia, Latin America, Africa, Europe and even inside the hegemonic capitalist states). This has led to widespread disempowerment of people. The natural reaction of disempowered people is their preponderance to violence. Tariq Ali elaborates:

A disempowered people are constantly reminded of its own weakness. In the West a common response is to sink into the routines of everyday life. Elsewhere in the world, the people become flustered, feel more and more helpless and nervous. Anger, frustration and despair multiply. They no longer rely on the state for helps. The laws favor the rich. So the more desperate among them.....begin to live by their own laws. Willing recruits will never be in short supply.²⁵

Interestingly, as the twentieth century was weaning, capitalism emerged as “the dominant, economic fundamentalism along with what is generally called liberal democracy – alleged supremacy of the market and periodic elections where wealthy individuals and corporations control economic and political le-

23 Ibid, p. 133; see also Olorode, O. “Security” Crisis: Implications for National Integration and Development” an unpublished public lecture, 2011, p. 12.

24 Ali, T. *The Clash of Fundamentalism: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity*. London: Verso, 2002, p. 3.

25 Ibid, p. 3.

vers of the world and/of particular elaborate political and economic international institutions (WTO, GB, IMF, World Bank and even UNO) with USA", formed "the single most influential political economic, military and cultural entity."²⁶

Capitalist fundamentalism created a spirit of resistance. It is the capitalist orientation as demonstrated in colonialism that sanctified the spirit of resistance among the disempowered. Such situation has been known to result in anger and hate among the victims. This entrenched hate and anger has renewed various forms of fundamentalisms against the metropolises of capitalism (the imperialist states) their agents, ideological institutions and cultures in the peripheries and satellites like Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Nigeria, Pakistan, etc.

Islamic fundamentalism in the course of history has become one of the most well known, most systematic, of those fundamentalisms against capitalist fundamentalism. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism or any other type of fundamentalism or nationalism needs not necessarily arise as a result of exploitation, marginalization or threats of violence or extermination. Fundamentalism may also arise from a desire or a felt need for a dominant group to remain dominant; such tendencies arise from genuine fears and/or contrived fears of being swamped as among settlers who become politically, demographically or economically dominant in their new "homes" or occupied territories (Jews in Palestine, Europeans in America, Fulani in Ilorin, Europeans in South Africa, Kenya, Zimbabwe etc.).²⁷

Islamic fundamentalism and all its appearances globally need to be understood as one of the responses to globalization and capitalist fundamentalism of the market. "Capitalist fundamentalism builds agencies (Christian and Muslim) around the world and makes victims of global and agency capitalism simultaneously. The resurgence of socialist mass and political movements in Latin America (Venezuela, Bolivia, Brazil etc.), the sporadic violent anti-globalization demonstrations at G8 meetings (at Genoa, Nice, Seattle, Davos, Windsor, Gleneagles, etc.) and even the so-called Arab Spring are, in many ways like Islamic fundamentalism, responses of the victims of market fundamentalism and the allies of those victims."²⁸ This makes Islamic fundamentalism an effect.

Political fundamentalism

In attempting to understand the global and local origins and development of Islamic fundamentalism, it is pertinent to underscore that religious fundamentalism (Christian, Islamic, etc.) entwines with political fundamentalism. This interface has played leading social, political and economic roles in the emergence of

26 Olorode, *"Security" Crisis: Implications for National Integration and Development*, p. 15.

27 Ibid, p. 16.

28 Ibid, p. 17.

many modern states. For instance, these fundamentalisms have been critical to the creation of United Kingdom, America, Saudi Arabia, apartheid South Africa, Libya, Iran, etc. Religious and political fundamentalisms have been pivotal in the partitions that produced Israel, Pakistan, Sudan, and in the Balkans, etc. The birth of Israel and Pakistan rested largely on exclusively religious fundamentalist platforms, namely, Zionism and Islam, supported by Western political fundamentalist imperialism.²⁹ Tariq Ali notes as follows:

Conceived in a hurry and delivered prematurely – a last minute caesarean by doctors tending the British empire – Pakistan emerged in August 1949, its birth accompanied by massive loss of blood. In its first year, the new state was deprived of a limb (Kashmia) and then lost its father (Mohammed Ali Jinnah). Then, like its tougher more ruthless confessional twin, Israel, it decided to accept the offer of a permanent nurse. It was assumed that the only route to survival was to become a Cold War patient under the permanent supervision of Western imperialism. As the British Empire faded, the United States assumed responsibility for Pakistan.³⁰

In Africa, conflicts between Christian and Islamic civilizations can be traced back to the rapid spread of Islamic religio - economic principles and military conquests in the 7th and 8th centuries in North Africa and Southern Europe, the Crusade response, the institution of the Ottoman (Muslim) Empire and the triumph of European (Christian) imperialism since the 15th century. However, the victory of European colonialism did not put paid to consistent anti-colonial resistance which, in the Muslim world, combined nationalism with religious fervour. It is this age-long spirit of resistance that culminated into various manifestations of secular and religious statecraft that resulted in the revolutions in Egypt, Algeria, Turkey, Libya, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Of course this ferment is being brewed elsewhere, especially in Nigeria, where political fundamentalism in the disguise of religious fundamentalism is taking place.

For example, Sudan before its bifurcation on 9th July, 2011, was involved in long drawn civil wars between the north and the south. The fundamental cause of those wars was political fundamentalism garbed in religious fundamentalism. It has to do with the economic resources of the south and the political power of the north. The Christian south and the Muslim north could not live in peace especially since the introduction of the Sharia law in a pluralist country. The Christians have continued to be subjected to second rate citizens, a situation akin to Nigeria.³¹ Falola draws out the stark similarities clearly.

29 Ibid, p. 19.

30 Ali, T. (2002), *The Clash of Fundamentalism*, p. 166.

31 Hiiboro, K. E. *Human Rights, the Church and the Post-war Sudan*, Nairobi: Pauline Publications, 2008, p. 34.

In countries where Islam and Christianity compete as the case of Sudan and Nigeria, the problem of stability and identity have been compounded by rivalries for religious ascendancy resulting in the desire for religious contest or even the turning of the state into a theocracy and imposition of religious ideology.³²

This captures the turmoil Nigeria is presently undergoing that goes in the name of Boko Haram.

Paradox of fundamentalism

The paradox of fundamentalism, however, is that while it rejects modernity, it utilises its products to advance its course. Its militant anti-modernist epistemology underscores that the scriptures must remain relevant to the modern world in literal ways just as they were several hundreds of years ago.³³ Obadare corroborates this view when he argued that “the paradox of how the forces of modernity are accentuating, rather than depleting, religious sensibilities” demonstrates “how fundamentalism is enclosed within the very process of modernity, as opposing to being outside it.”³⁴ This means that, contrary to widespread thought that fundamentalism is anti-freedom and non-cognitive or emotive; it is the case that it systematically defends its truth by combative force and its notion of freedom, which sometimes may not be expressed in physical violence. Blaufuss captures it this way:

Fundamentalism can be therefore viewed as a cognitive concomitant with that of modernism, not an alternative to it. It is prompted not by social change, but by the pace of the transformative process... it represents a widespread worldview that is frequently held in the wane of other, more adequate means of comprehending the magnitude and the pace of the processes of social change.³⁵

Even though religious fundamentalism rejects secularism and the freedom it affords, it apodictically defends its understanding of it. Secularist fundamentalism espouses freedom as a function of free will but the religious version of it is deterministic, if not fatalistic. The latter has recourse to God as the ground of freedom. It is for this reason that the offer and pursuit of freedom from both contesting kinds of fundamentalisms are dialectical to each other but with much

32 Falola, T. *The Power of African Culture*, Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2008, pp. 57-58.

33 Appleby, R. S. “Religious Fundamentalism as a Global Phenomenon” in *The Struggle Over the Past: Fundamentalism in the Modern World*, Vol. 35, Lanham: University Press of America, 1993, p. 3; Guinan, M. D. *Fundamentalism: Perspectives on the Problem*, Nairobi: Paulines, 1994, pp. 9-10; Marty, M. E. “Fundamentalism” in *Dictionary of Ethics, Theology and Society*, London: Routledge, 1996, pp. 334-338.

34 Obadare, p. 521.

35 Blaufuss, M. S. “Countering Religious Violence: The Power of Symbols” in *Religion and Society*, vol. 47, No.4, India: CISRS Publication Trust, Dec. 2000, p. 22.

security challenges for the world as it is being experienced now. Fabian depicts this sense of freedom thus:

If freedom is conceived not just as free will plus the absence of domination and constraint, but as the potential to transform one's thoughts, emotions, and experience into creations that can be communicated and shared, and if 'potential', unless it is just another abstract condition like absence of constraint, is recognized by its realizations, then it follows that there can never be freedom as state of grace, permanent and continuous. As a quality of the process of human self-realization, freedom cannot be anything but contestatory and discontinuous or precarious. Freedom, in dialectical parlance, comes in moments.³⁶

Fundamentalism and security crisis

We have tried thus far to show that fundamentalism is an effect of a cause beyond itself. However, the effects of fundamentalism, i.e. terrorism or global insecurity, as it is being conceived are an end rather than a means. This end in itself has been shown to have ethical-eschatological fundamentalist spirit. In this perspective, the very act of terrorism is justified as an ethical and divine duty with eternal reward. So, when for instance Osama bin Laden called on Muslims to kill Americans and their allies and plunder their property with promise of heavenly reward to those who would obey the *fatwa*, he was actually invoking ethical-eschatological fundamentalism. Former American President George Bush's, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair's and Barrack Obama's continuous reprisal attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq, and hunt for, and the killing of, Bin Laden and his al-Qaeda members cannot be thought less in that prism. It is partly for this reason that George Bush is regarded as a terrorist by radical Muslims. Both sides hold on to exclusive moral imperatives and 'proselytise' "competing ideologies of justice, revenge and righteousness."³⁷ For the Muslims, especially the young ones, the British and American fight against al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups is a war declared on Muslims and Islam because al-Qaeda are true "sons of Islam." For them, the "arrogant western attitudes," "Briton's moral standards" and that "British values threaten Islamic way of life" call for violent resistance. To tolerate these attitudes will mean to compromise the Islamic way of life. Therefore, there must be armed struggle to defend their belief; those who die in the course are re-

36 Fabian, J. *Moments of Freedom: Anthropology and Popular Culture*, Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia, 1998, pp. 20-21.

37 Field, C. D. "Young British Muslims since 9/11: A Composite Attitudinal Profile" *Religion, State & Society*, 39/2&3, June/Sept. 2011, 166; McDonald, L. Z. "Securing Identities, Resisting Terror: Muslim Youth Work in the UK and its Implications for Security" *Religion, State & Society*, 39/2&3, June/Sept. 2011, pp. 77-189; Oh, I. "On Democracy, Violence, and the Promise of Islam" *Journal of Church and State*, 53/1, 2011, 50-58; Ilesanmi, S. O. "Sharia Reasoning, Political Legitimacy, and Democratic Vision" *Journal of Church and State*, 53/1, 2011, 27-36; Johnson, J. T. "Tracing the Contours of the Jihad of Individual Duty" *Journal of Church and State*, 53/1, 2011, 37-49; Mandel, D. R. (2002), "Evil and the Instigation of Collective Violence" *ASAP: Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy* 2/1: 101-108.

garded “as martyrs.”³⁸ This is the renewed spirit or ideology behind the ‘new terrorism’ conceptualization, which has a dose of religious underpinning. According to Dimitrij K. Beznjuk, “considering the fact that imperilment of national security of the states in the East, especially of Belorussia, has been continuously going on from direction of the USA and the EU, through claims that freedom of opinion and religious beliefs has been violated in this state.”³⁹ For Natalia Vlas, religion is capable of security and threat to peace.⁴⁰

Ever since 9/11, the term “new terrorism” has dominated literature on terrorism. Even though it is difficult to define adequately, it is however predicated on a strong attachment to Islamic theology. Spalek explains that new terrorism differs from the older normative conceptualization that was national- and ethnic-based. New terrorism is “unbounded and uses indiscriminate targeting, and interpretations of Islamic texts and concepts are said to be used not only as a moral foundation, but as sacred motivators and legitimisers.”⁴¹ The specific drivers – “violent extremist theology” – of new terrorism must be located within the prism of identity crisis among young Muslims who are more susceptible to terrorism. This situation is stimulated by their awareness of “clash of civilizations”, which Samuel Huntington argued would provoke future conflict. The fault lines of civilization that will be the battle line of the future, according to Huntington, will be between the world major civilizations namely, Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and possibly African. This means that the fundamental problem will not be between the West and radical Islam or Wahhabism but with Islam itself. As he appositely puts it, “the underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people is convinced to the superiority of their culture and is obsessed with the inferiority of their power.”⁴² In faith-prone context, when “two kingdoms clash” i.e., the kingdom of God and the kingdom of the world, it is only reasonable for those who believe they belong to God’s kingdom to identify and defend the God’s kingdom.⁴³ So, “problematising young Muslim identity and lo-

38 Field, p. 166.

39 Beznjuk, D. K. “National and Religious Security of Belorussia” *Politics and Religion*, pp. 83.

40 Vlas, N. “Is Religion Inherently Violent? Religion as a Threat and Promise for the Global Security” *Politics and Religion*, Vol. IV, no, 2, 2010. pp. 297-314.

41 Spalek, B. “New Terrorism’ and Crime Prevention Initiatives involving Muslim young in the UK: Research and Policy Contexts” *Religion, State & Society*, 39/2&3, June/Sept. 2011, p. 194.

42 Huntington, S. P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996, pp. 217-218. For application of this thesis see for instance, Marsden, L. *For God’s Sake: The Christian Right and US Foreign Policy*, New York: Zed Books, 2008; Hackett, R. I. J. “Rethinking the Role of Religion in the Public Sphere: Local and Global Perspectives” in Ostein, P., Nasir, J. M. and Kogelmann, F. (eds.) *Comparative Perspectives on Shari’ah in Nigeria*, Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 2005, pp. 74-100; Vertigans, S. “British Muslims and the UK Government’s “War on Terror” within Evidence of a clash of Civilizations or Emergent De-civilizing Processes?” *The British Journal of Sociology*, 61, 2010, pp. 26-44.

43 Shenk, C. E. *When Kingdoms Clash: The Christian and Ideologies*, Ontario: Herald Press, 1988, p. 82.

cating it as a central theme in the opposing rhetoric of western states and AQ," i.e. al-Qaeda, must be viewed within securitization.⁴⁴

Philip Ujomu opines that youth problem of security and society cannot be isolated from the broad spectrum of securitization. Fundamental to this are their nature and culture, which make them prone to acts of terrorism. This sometimes can be traced to the failure of the state to provide proper framework to meet their needs, and integrate them to the mainstream of the society. Therefore, when a sizeable number of them are lost to anti-social values the tendency that there will be high rate of security challenges for the whole society cannot be under-estimated. He exemplified from the Nigerian perspective that a situation where youth no longer have respect for life and see death as a virtue as demonstrated in necrophilia and suicide bombing calls for swift, prompt and focused response.⁴⁵

Basia Spalek argues that where there is "a distrust of government policy in relation to countering terrorism" there is the urgent need to understudy the dynamics behind it. The problem may be worse when "increased counter-terrorism powers" 'otherise' their targets. It can be complex as in Nigeria when there is "a fifth column enemy within by the media, politicians, the security services and critical justice agencies."⁴⁶

The Nigerian government has noted that Boko Haram members have infiltrated every arm of government. In fact, there are stark incidents to justify this claim: a serving Senator is alleged by a member of Boko Haram of being their sponsor but the Senator denied it; a suspect was arrested in a governor's lodge; prime suspect escaped from Police detention with active collaboration with top Police officers; a general in the military allegedly freed suspects etc. One consequence of such infiltration is that security intelligence and strategies become porous and ineffective. In this scenario, counter-insurgency measures i.e. "all measures adopted to suppress an insurgency" where insurgency means "a struggle to control a contested political space, between a state ... and one or more popularly based, non-state challengers"⁴⁷ can neither be systematically articulated because of suspicion nor effective if deployed, assuming they are mature for execution. This explains why Boko Haram is striking its targets with huge success and unchallenged.

Despite the large annual budgets on security intelligence (e.g. Nigeria's budget on security has consistently toppled the list for the past five years or so), there seems to be no visible amelioration of insecurity. But Hertskovits, Olorode

44 McDonald, p. 178.

45 Ujomu, P. O. "Youth Securitization and the Moral Foundation of Social Order and Security in a Developing Society" *JAPHIL: Journal of Applied Philosophy*, 1/1, 2006, pp. 71-91.

46 Spalek, pp. 194-195.

47 Kilcullen, D. "Counter-insurgency", *Survival*, 48/4, 2007, pp. 112-113.

and Duff argue that global promotion of fear and focusing on insecurity and violent activities as an excuse for “security” spending, and the focus on Islamic fundamentalism by Western imperialism is paralleled in Nigeria by the focus on *Boko Haram*.⁴⁸ However, EU’s 2010 Terrorism Situation Trend Report states that “only one (1) of the 294 terror attacks in Europe in 2009 was by Islamic fundamentalists; in 2010, only three (3) of 249 terror attacks were attributed to Islamic fundamentalists. It is clear that the forces which neo-liberalism itself a fundamentalism, actively have also become avenues to enrich crony security consultants, private security companies, weapons manufacturers and suppliers, propagandists, etc.”⁴⁹ Therefore, this can be interpreted as a confirmation of “conspiracy theories.” Muhammad Sa’ad Abubakar, the Sultan of Sokoto and President-General of the Nigerian Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs (NSCIA) further confirmed this. According to him:

The fourth dimension of Nigeria’s crises ... is the poor leader and governance usually associated with their management. Many of those charged with authority in the states where these conflicts occur are also parties to the crisis. They make feeble efforts to control the violence and do so when much of the damage has been done. They show little interest in initiating any genuine and meaningful process of dialogue and reconciliation. Much worse, they show no concern for the welfare and wellbeing of those individuals outside their immediate ethnic group.⁵⁰

However, Spalek argues that while funding of security intelligence is necessary, it should involve a holistic concept of securitization, “where securitization might be thought of as the instigation of emergency politics: a particular social issue that becomes securitized is responded to above and beyond rules and frameworks that exist within what might be termed ‘normal politics.’”⁵¹ This means that securitization, with particular reference to Nigeria, should, as a matter of logic and necessity, be concerned about prioritization of security challenges. It must be focused, determined, resolute and transparent. These characteristics cannot in themselves be isolated from the broad spectrum of securitization.

Spalek suggests that in a situation where new terrorism or insurgency becomes a security challenge – which is often embroiled in fear, suspicion and distrust between government and fundamentalists – “there is a space for critical

48 Hertskovits, J. “In Nigeria, Boko Haram is not the problem” <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/02/opinion> accessed 3rd January, 2012; Olorode, O. “The Nigerian Crisis: Problems of, and Programme for, Revolutionary Transformation” 8th Chief Gani Fawehinmi Annual Lecture/Symposium under the auspices of the Nigerian Bar Association, Ikeja Branch at Air Port Hotel, Ikeja on 15th January, 2012; Duff, G. “Nigeria: Targeted for destruction” *Daily Trust*, Dec. 27, 2011, p. 64.

49 Cited in Olorode, O. “The Nigerian Crisis: Problems, p. 23.

50 Abubakar, M. S. “*Islam and Peace-building in West Africa*” lecture delivered at The Samuel L. and Elizabeth Jodidi Annual Lecture at Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, USA, 9th October, 2011), p. 7.

51 Spalek, p. 192.

scholarship, not only to challenge those state-led agendas that are inappropriate but also to consider ways in which communities can be empowered within the context of a response to 'new terrorism' exploring dynamics between communities and the state that can be characterized as being based on trust and partnership, where these exist."⁵² Where these do not exist, it logically follows that they should be urgently established. Even though there is a complex mix in "the negotiation between politics, policy and practitioners" dealing "directly with the safety and security of state and citizen,"⁵³ continuous enhancing of "interfaith networking and less sensationalist media reporting... mutual respect and understanding between Muslims and non-Muslims... is ultimately a matter for individuals and communities to achieve through active citizenship, especially by the young."⁵⁴

The implications for Nigeria and why tolerance is insufficient

What do these suggestions hold for Nigeria? Against the popular notion that Boko Haram is anti-education, it is the case that it was founded by some educated young men. According to Senator Ibrahim Mohammed Ida,

it [Boko Haram] is a sect that was set up by educated youth, some of them are more educated than you and I. They had thought that going to school will take them out of poverty but what they realized is that there are people who were their classmates, who by sheer luck of birth, have risen. They started reading the literature and saw that Islam has outlined a way by which society should be run, an egalitarian society wherein the rich take care of the poor.⁵⁵

According to Slavoj Žižek, aggrieved and disempowered parties and victims of dominant parties and ideologies simply regarded as intolerant or extremist groups who need to be persuaded through the use of "carrot and stick" (which end up being largely "stick" as it is now in Nigeria) to embrace tolerance, cannot but continue to cause insecurity. Žižek's words are apposite here:

Why are so many problems today perceived as problems of intolerance rather than as problems of inequality, exploitation, or injustice? Why is the proposed remedy tolerance rather than emancipation, political struggle, even armed struggle? The immediate answer lies in the liberal multiculturalist's basic, ideological operation: the "cultur-

52 Ibid, p. 192; see also Spalek, B. "Community Policing, Trust and Muslim Communities in relation to New Terrorism" *Politics & Policy*, 38/4, 2010, 789-815.

53 McDonald, p. 186.

54 Field, p. 171.

55 See, *Daily Trust* Saturday July 9, 2011, p. 55.

alization of politics". Political differences – differences conditioned by political inequalities or economic exploitation – are naturalized and neutralized into 'cultural' differences, that is into different ways of life which are something given, something that cannot be overcome. They can only be "tolerated". These demands a response in the terms that Walter Benjamin offers: from *culturisation of politics* to *politicisation of culture*. The cause of this culturisation is the retreat, the failure of direct political solutions such as the welfare state or various socialist projects. Tolerance is their post-political ersatz.⁵⁶

Muhammad Sa'ad Abubakar does not agree less when he argued recently that Boko Haram is not against education but that it is involved in political fundamentalism. Even though he emphasizes tolerance, he believes that the Nigerian situation is an "intense competition for power and influence especially among the Western educated elite" because "we witness the primacy of politics"⁵⁷ over and above other national considerations.

Tolerance appears to have become mis-used, abused and suspect. People are believed to preach tolerance when the situation on the ground favors them. Tolerance is inherently and unavoidably judgmental. Zoran Matevski, for instance demonstrates this in the following submission:

Conscious of its existing in multi-ethnic community, Macedonian Orthodox Church has always shown certain level of practical tolerance. But, the fact that Macedonian Orthodox Church is established as national church (church of the Macedonian nation) and it exists in that way in its national frames is doubtless. Somehow it limits its tolerance, but we can not say that Macedonian Orthodox Church doesn't show evident manifestations of practical religious tolerance. It practiced tolerance as much as it was needed, suited to the time and space in which it functioned.⁵⁸

Jane Smith's interrogation of many definitions of tolerance lead to one possible conclusion: tolerance is problematic. Tolerance speaks of individuals' freedom to choose their course of action; choose a particular religion, or remain neutral without necessarily provoking tension. While this understanding is a credible development on its etymology as Smith demonstrates, it does not seem to align with what operates presently in Nigeria. This is because tolerance and toleration have legal tone that comes from an authority. In a purely secular state, it may be thought that toleration means permission, or to allow another, say, religious tradition to subsist, without necessarily giving approval to its subsistence.

56 Zizek, S. *Violence*, London: Profile Books, 2009, p. 119.

57 Abubakar, p. 6.

58 Matevski, Z, "Religious Dialogue and Tolerance – Theoretical and Practical Experiences of Differences and Similarities" *Politics and Religion*. p. 54.

The approving authorities, by either consenting to permit or approve, or not, are in themselves intolerant of others' traditions. The refusal to grant permission is a consequence of fear of abandonment of the essential elements of their "belief and the ultimate dissolution of faith."⁵⁹

In practical sense, what has been seen as tolerance in Nigeria is acquiescence, which does not arise from willingness but impotence. In other words, tolerance works when non-state actors feel they cannot challenge the powers of the state. But as soon as they believe they can do so, they confront the state and abandon acquiescence. This has been demonstrated by Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Boko Haram, etc. in Nigeria.⁶⁰ This is why Hulmes concludes: "tolerance and understanding are insufficient even when elevated and institutionalized into an ideological commitment."⁶¹ Tolerance does not put paid to the quest of the bastard child in constant search for its father. In Nigerian as well as in the global context, the search for the father of the bastard children must begin earnestly.

Conclusion

The global and Nigerian search for security and peace must go beyond mouthing platitudes. This is because, as we have shown above, fundamentalism is an effect, a bastard child in avid search for its paternity. In human society, a bastard is not expected to remain calm, obedient and co-operating the very moment it knows that there is something amiss. Given this universal position, telling the already naughty child to be tolerant is begging the question. Some practical steps must be undertaken with the child to search for its father. Its involvement in the search is significant because it must know that the search is genuine and the commitment unwavering. It must be put into cognisance that the difficult, uncompromising and exclusive nature of its mother can be a barrier to the success of the search. Therefore, it becomes imperative that its mother must be 'cured' of her difficult nature so that she can co-operate with the rest of the global family in search of peace.

With particular regard to Nigerian context, we must note that the European Union and USA that advise the Nigerian government not to negotiate with

59 Smith, J. I. "Religious Tolerance" in *Journal of Islam and Christian Muslim Relations*, online edition.

60 Oke, M. (Oct. 2002) "A Philosophical Approach to Positive Tolerance" *Asia Journal of Theology*, 16/2, 2000, 359-362; Kukah, M. H. "Boko Haram: Some Reflections on Causes and Effects" S. O. Anyanwu, and I. Nwanaju, (eds.), *Boko Haram: Religious Conflicts and Dialogue Initiatives in Nigeria*, Owerri: Edu-Edy, 2010; Igboin, B. O. "The Need for Religious Tolerance in Nigeria" *JAPHIL: Journal of Applied Philosophy*, 1/1, 2007, 155-156; Igboin, B. O. "A Philosophical Reaction to the Conceptual Ambiguities in the Use of Tolerance by Inagbor, Enuwosa and Ubrurhe" *IRORO: Journal of Arts*, 12/1&2, June 2007, pp. 106-117; Igboin, B. O. "The Need for Religious Tolerance in Nigeria" *JAPHIL: Journal of Applied Philosophy*, 1/1, 2007, pp. 155-156; Akinade, A. E. "The Precarious Agenda: Christian-Muslim Relations in Contemporary Nigeria" in *Journal of Islam and Christian Muslim Relations*, online edition, 2002.

61 Hulmes, E. *Commitment and Neutrality in Religious Education*, London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1979, p. 5.

Boko Haram⁶² may not be addressing the situation correctly. After all, the same government granted amnesty to Niger Delta militants. At least, the government was able to identify those behind the so-called criminality in that part of the country. If it is true that “the European Union and USA are negotiating with the insurgents in Iraq, and the Taliban in Afghanistan”⁶³ the Nigerian government’s doing the same is commendable; it is a part of searching for the father of the naughty, bastard child, and healing the difficult nature of its mother. The government must also tackle squarely the social problems of education, unemployment, widespread corruption, and respect the rule of law. In do so, it is addressing a particular strand of fundamentalism, which should be a challenge to other countries faced with the same problem.

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62 See The Punch 9th July, 2011: 7. See also Olorode, O. (n.p.) “Boko Haram: Wrong Questions, Wrong Answers” an unpublished paper.

63 Olorode, O. “Security Crisis: Implications for National Integration and Development” an unpublished public lecture, 2011. See also Olorode, O. “The Nigerian Crisis: Problems of, and Programme for, Revolutionary Transformation” 8th Chief Gani Fawehinmi Annual Lecture/Symposium under the auspices of the Nigerian Bar Association, Ikeja Branch at Air Port Hotel, Ikeja on 15th January, 2012.

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ФУНДАМЕНТАЛИЗМИ, КРИЗА СИГУРНОСТИ И ТОЛЕРАНЦИЈА У ГЛОБАЛНОМ КОНТЕКСТУ: НИГЕРИЈСКО ИСКУСТВО

Резиме

Оживљење питања критичке сигурности је у последње време истакнуто у глобалним таблоидима, свести и дискурсу. Од Туниса, Алжира, Египта, Либије, Јемена, до Сирије; нигеријско искуство бомбардовања на Златни јубилеј независности, за који је Покрет за ослобођење делте Нигера (МЕНД) преузео одговорност, бомбаштво Боко Харам које је ескалирало у бомбашко самоубиство – опстају између осталих. Узроци ових „криза сигурности“ директно могу да се припишу фундаментализмима: религијском фундаментализму или религијском национализму; хегемонистичком фундаментализму, капиталистичком фундаментализму, етничком фундаментализму, егзистенцијалном фундаментализму, етичком фундаментализму итд. Наведени фактори објашњавају продубљивање и пролиферацију конфликта у земљама широм света. Одговор на овакво стање ствари бива „проповед“ о толеранцији упркос агресивном терору. Могуће је да толеранција није исправно концептуализована. Покретац овога рада је, дакле, стимулисање интересовања за концептуализацију ових појмова, како би њихово разумевање утрло пут за дугорочна решења. Притом, овај рад ће да примењује историјске и филозофске приступе постављању аргумената.

Кључне речи: Боко Харам, религија, фундаментализам, секјуритизација, копиле, насиље.

Примљен: 30.3.2012.

Прихваћен: 25.4.2012.