The historical process of modernisation of western European countries culminates in a specific form of relationship between collective identity and political legitimacy. This article is an attempt to analyse the particularities of the Spanish case. The author uses the analytical instruments provided by the social differentiation theory and historical sociology, which allows removing any teleological pretence from the secularisation theory. In relation to the Spanish case, the author shows: the late but swift character of the population’s subjective secularisation; the unfinished character of the separation between Church and State; and finally, the contemporary coincidence of the last process with the loss of the cultural religious roots of the autochthonous population and with the arrival of population whose religion is not so differentiated from their culture.

Key Words: Religion, Politics, Culture, Secularisation, Social Differentiation, Political Legitimacy, Religious Plurality, Spain

1. Introduction

In the long process of construction of the European States system (Tilly, 1992), two outstanding milestones can be pointed out when we look at the historical relationship between religion and politics. The Augsburg Settlement (1555) established the principle *cuius regio eius religio*, which implied a certain submission of religion to the prince’s or the king’s will; and the Peace of Westphalia (1648), consecrated the condensation and centralisation of the political territorial power attempting to secularize politics and make it more autonomous from religious matters. But these societies had symbolic religious matrices, and therefore, power and its legitimacy still had a divine origin.

The modernisation of European politics, that is, the State’s nationalization and
democratization is the final stage of a process where politics becomes independent from religion. Politics produces its own national symbols that are no longer connected to religion. This long and complicated process has its ups and downs and every country acquires it in a different manner. The process of construction of the democratic-national formula of political legitimacy tends to produce a biunivocal relation between the democratic political power and national identity: a territorial centre of power has its corresponding collective identity, which thus acquires a political function; and a collective identity with a political projection has its corresponding unique centre of legitimate political power. When this process culminates successfully, the relationship between collective identity and political legitimacy is so tight that it can be affirmed that this collective identity becomes the only source of political legitimacy, while excluding all others. Thus, the role historically played by religion in legitimizing political power enters a crisis. The advent of democracy meant the symbolic empowerment of politics with regard to religion. Power does not come from God anymore; it is immanent in the nation. The State nationalization is the secularization of power legitimisation; this in turn means a certain degree of sacralisation of the Nation.

A variety of secularisation models for political legitimacy occur in the western world. In some countries democratic nationalism competes to impose itself socially and politically with other currents that intend to keep the characteristic formulae of the Ancien Régime; or attempt to formulate and spread the idea of nation as a religious essential identity, rather than the daily plebiscite or the population’s general will. Both models, as we will see, correspond for example, to different times in the history of Spain. In other countries, democratic nationalism coexists with an official national religion; but this religion progressively withdraws to the private sphere, as happens in most European countries of the protestant tradition.

The secularisation of the legitimacy of political power is part of the general process of secularisation, which is complex and multidimensional (Pérez-Agote, 2014). Secularisation involves three dimensions (Dobbelaere, 2002) which are in turn, interrelated. Societal secularisation, the first dimension, refers to the relations between society and religion, to the process by which different spheres in social life - politics, knowledge and science, culture – gradually free themselves from the religious guardianship they were submitted to. This process of work division and instrumental rationalization also reaches the internal life and the organization of the religious institution, causing what Luckmann (1973) called internal secularisation, and constitutes the second dimension of the process of

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2 The current ethnic nationalisms that demand a territorial secession are the proof of less successful processes: Catalonia, the Basque Country, Scotland...

3 The case of the United States may represent another model, as democratic nationalism coexists with a great religious plurality as a result of the different migration flows. This leads the State to have in a sense, its own religion, with a God who is not identifiable with any specific religion.
secularisation. Finally, the third dimension is the individual; it refers to the process by which beliefs and religious practice of individuals decrease substantially, as does the capacity of religion and the Church to determine their behaviour. The decadence of religion in the individual sphere implies a loss of importance of the particular historical religion and its corresponding Church; but it does not necessarily imply a fall of religiousness (belief in God, religious experience, etc.); if religiousness remains while religion and the Church fall, the individual will have to build their meaning of life and verify it intersubjectively to the extent possible, or keep their feelings and beliefs in the most hidden place of their personal intimacy.

In a recent article I tried to highlight the scientific limitations of the secularisation theory, whose primitive version established incompatibility between religion and modernity (Pérez-Agote, 2014). The fundamental conclusion of the limits I establish in this study does not necessitate abandoning this theory, but rather stripping the evolutionary and predictive pretention of it; thus the important analytical instruments that the theory offered—and still offers—sociologists are kept. Limits come, in the first instance, from the fact that economic modernisation and religion have shown to be highly compatible in some areas; they have been in the USA and they are at present in many areas of Asia Pacific. Nowadays, there is a convergence (Berger, 1992, 2001; Martin, 1996; Hervieu-Léger, 1996, 2001; Davie, 2001, 2007) towards considering Western Europe “as the only geographical and cultural area (maybe along with Canada) where the ideal-typical scheme of secularisation as the expulsion of religion can be applied, as opposed to the other continents, including the USA.” (Hervieu-Léger, 2001, 7). Secondly, the most recent reviews of the modernisation theory converge towards the idea, explained some time ago by Eisenstadt (1998, 2000 and 2001), that the paths through which modernity is attained may be multiple; it follows that modernity with certain features considered inherent to traditional society of Europe can co-exist or even be complementary with features proper of modernity4. And thirdly, the migration processes into Western European countries of populations coming from other parts of the world have increased the cultural and religious heterogeneity in countries that had gone through a secularisation process; a big part of this immigrant population have brought along ways of life in which religion occupies a different place than within autochthonous populations. From the point of view of the place that religion occupies within social life, populations from European countries are increasingly less homogeneous5.

Among the population of immigrant origin, religion may also acquire a vital usefulness beyond its purely spiritual and religious functions; especially when we analyse within second and third generations, and even more so when performed

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4 The case of Japan and the re-appropriation of traditional elements—such as family type relations and the sense of honour—within the modern companies is a very clear one (Dore, 1992).

5 All the limits pointed out would equally take us to the need to revise the notions of modernity and tradition society.
at a time of economic recession, when these generations, after having been educated within the public educational system, experience forms of exclusion when attempting to enter the labour market. These phenomena started being noticeable towards the end of the 1970s, and especially during the following decade, as an effect of the so-called oil crisis, entry into the labour market became harder. This led to the outbreak of deep social unrest. Young people from immigrant origin attempted to find alternative sources of self-esteem and also social esteem, such as their culture, religion and the language of origin. Thus, religion becomes an option rather than a legacy, but lacking the wrapping of the original culture for these young people. Moreover, the differences between the autochthonous population and the population of immigrant origin need to be taken into account in terms of differentiation between culture and religion, which is key to European countries. In a recent work I defined these differences as follows:

For immigrants in general, religion offers an added social value in terms of social refuge and a source of identity, self-esteem and pragmatic solidarity. The more severe the dysfunction of the public social mechanisms for integration (education system, labour market and the correspondence between them) in this population, the greater their need to achieve social and self-esteem by their own means. (…)

Immigrant populations have not—at least to the same extent as in Europe—undergone a process of differentiation of religion in relation to other spheres such as culture and politics. This difference in the level of differentiation of religion has on many occasions been—and continues to be—a source of socio-cultural conflict. We can recall the controversy over the Islamic veil in France and the Stasi report of 2003, which recommends the prohibition in schools of “tenues et signes religieux” (Stasi, 2003, 68). The report’s only mention of the significance of the veil is that it may conceal “différentes significations. Ce peut être un choix personnel ou au contraire une contrainte….” (Stasi, 2003, 57). It is evident that the Stasi Commission reached its conclusions from a single viewpoint, that of the autochthonous French population, which holds the veil to be a religious symbol. From a different cultural perspective in which there is no clear separation between culture and religion, and where there is no differentiated religion, the veil is a religious-cultural-family symbol, and on certain occasions can also even be said to be political. The commission took an ethnocentric stance based on the belief that France was a culturally homogeneous society, and by 2003 it already clearly was not. (Pérez-Agote, forthcoming)

2. The Spanish case

Within the Western European exception, we find three countries of Catholic tradition in the South: Italy, Portugal and Spain, who have followed the path of
secularisation much more slowly. Individual secularisation in Spain took place very late as a generalised process, in comparison to the countries in the North. The separation between the Church and the State is today still far from completed. The complexity of this situation has increased with the massive arrival of transnational immigrant flows that question the –always relative- cultural and religious homogeneity in Spain. Since its unification as a state in the late 15th Century, the Catholic religion has always been the reference religion, but there have always been other religious and non religious options, more or less secluded. The new confessions and new Catholic trends brought by the new immigrants put forward other forms of relation between religion and politics, between the Church and politics, between Churches (in plural) and State.

2.1 The waves of individual secularisation

We could safely talk about a certain secularisation of the 18th Century Spanish society; but this phenomenon acquires relevance for sociology when it reaches mass level. Hence to name the wave in the 19th Century and beginning of the 20th Century up until the Spanish Civil War, I suggest we talk about a first wave of secularisation of consciences. Important secularising forces represented by intellectual and political currents proper of the modern age took place during this period. Freedom of thought grew among certain modern urban elites, and industrialisation of certain areas entails the development of socialist, communist and anarchist ideas among the working classes in the city and even in rural areas. This certain secularisation of Spanish society, for which we do not have statistical data, follows the prototypical model of Western European countries of catholic tradition (Martin, 1979). Lacking the secularisation of religion itself, individuals with an interest in the world in general and the changes entailed by modernity in particular, need to do this against religion and the Church. The reason is that this institution is eager to perpetuate its monopoly on the truth, with the firm endorsement of the State. This is the phenomenon known as anticlericalism. The first wave of secularisation in Spain was dramatically interrupted by the Civil War and the ensuing Franco dictatorship.

The second wave of secularisation has its origins in the generalisation of the economic development and access to a mass consumption society that commenced in the 1960s, and continued until the 1980s. Unlike the first wave, the position and attitude of individuals in the second wave is not in opposition to the field of religion; it is rather a progressive distancing caused by indifference,

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6 For a comparative approach of the situation of religion in these three countries, plus Belgium and France: Pérez-Agote (dir.), 2012.
7 That is, in the absence of a process of religion interesting itself in the world, like the one followed by Calvinism described by Weber in The protestant ethics (1979).
8 The first data on religious indicators available in Spain are from that time precisely.
without a reactive or virulent opposition to religion or the Church.

During this second wave, a very important part of the population still defines itself as catholic. However, this definition does not involve a practice defined as obligatory by the Church; or a concern about the teachings of the Church in different areas of life (sexual, economic, professional, political behaviour, for instance); or concern about orthodoxy of one’s beliefs. Besides this, catholic rituals still have great social value, without entailing adhesion to the ecclesiastic institution.

Table 1: Religious self-definition. Total population. Percentages. 1965-2015

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<td>74</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
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<td>38</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indifferent</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other religion</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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Source: Díaz-Salazar, 1993, 133; for 2008, Study CIS 2752, question 4. For 2015: Study CIS 3052

The most prototypical secularisation in the second wave is reflected in the fact that the decrease in the percentage of practising Catholics is compensated by the increase in the percentage of those who define themselves as non-practising Catholics. This is a stage in which the Church oriented religion (Luckmann, 1973) declines, and social behaviour liberates from Church discipline. This process does not involve the disappearance of religion, but rather its mutation into a sort of religious culture (Hervieu-Léger, 2003). Religion withdraws to the private sphere, so we’re probably witnessing private forms of syncretism, individual bricolages. Religious Catholic contents mix and become attached to contents of scientific, political, literary origin, etc., giving place to a series of ideas and sensations, a largely individual syncretism.

During this second wave, there has been a loss of importance of religion in the lives of Spaniards and a loss of strength and density of their ties with the ecclesiastic institution. The loss of importance can be seen by the withdrawal of religion from behaviours within political, work and sexual relations. The weakening of the ties is at the root of the drop in practice and the conformation of a set of personal beliefs that do not take the Catholic credo as a whole, but accept certain elements and easily ignore others. The theoretical notion of religious culture is stronger, from an analytical point of view, than the idea of believing without belonging (Davie, 1990, 1994):

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9 For a detailed view of the data from this period, see: (Pérez-Agote, 2012)
We need to distinguish between maintaining beliefs and maintaining a coded set of beliefs, since the latter implies a greater degree of practice and belonging than the first.

What lies at the heart of the meaning of the expression ‘believing without belonging’ is the issue of orthodoxy. A religious creed, controlled by an institution called ‘the Church’, requires, in order to maintain itself without any substantial modifications, the attendance of believers at its rituals of maintenance; the increasing drop-off in attendance by believers at these rituals leads to an increasing heterodoxy in the original creed. Thus the expression ‘believing without belonging’ is misleading, as it may lead to the impression that belief (its maintenance in terms of orthodoxy) is independent of practice.

An alternative formulation to the juxtaposition of belief and belonging derives from the notions of ‘religious culture’ and ‘exculturation’ (Hervieu-Léger, 2003). Some European countries with a Catholic religion have gradually evolved into countries with a Catholic culture. Religious practice is declining in these countries, and the orthodoxy of the creed is being eroded to the point that belief in certain elements of the Catholic creed is dying out, while belief in others persists. What is disappearing is the belief in the creed as a total entity; and this creed is the symbolic capital of the institution we call the Church, which therefore guards it zealously. Religion, a specific religious creed, has an institutionalization, whereas culture – understood here as the plurality of a series of shared meanings within a social reality – has a much weaker level of institutionalization.

There is no single visible institution charged with safeguarding the maintenance of culture, although there are many concerned with safeguarding the maintenance of parcels of culture. Culture, in general, is maintained by the pure and simple use that individuals make of it. For this reason, in France or Spain, for example, the preserved beliefs that derive from the Catholic creed, insofar as they are maintained without reference to the ecclesiastical institution, have now become part of the culture, without ecclesiastical mediation; and they are as much a part of the culture as other elements that come from science, politics or other spheres of society (Pérez-Agote, 2014: 893-894)

Therefore, the second wave is not a secularisation through opposition and denial of religion and the Church, like the first was. In the first wave the individual had to turn away from religion in order to have an interest in the world, and even had to fight it. This second wave is not a late adoption of a protestant type model (Weber, 1979; Martin, 1979), which would imply an interestedness in the world from religion: religion is interested in the world, and the religious person is too. The second wave is about an interestedness in the world that involves disinterestedness in religion and, above all, in a closed Catholic credo and the institution that maintains it. Religion now becomes part of the system of beliefs and culture alongside elements from a different origin, such as political ideology, science, etc. This culture is not ruled by the Church, and neither is the sphere of beliefs,
that progressively belongs to the private and individual, even intimate spheres. We can nowadays observe a new phenomenon that can only be interpreted in terms of socialization and intergenerational relations within the new Spanish generations. It is the third wave of secularisation. In the 1990s new forms of self-identification among young people begin to emerge, which are genetically separate from religion. In the second wave, the decrease in the proportion of \textit{practising Catholics} was compensated by the increase of \textit{non-practising Catholics}. In the third wave we can see how the decrease of \textit{practising Catholics} and \textit{non-practising Catholics} is compensated by a strong increase, among 15 to 24-year-old young people, in the furthest positions from religion: they grow indifferent and agnostic, and even more strongly, atheists (\textit{Fundación Santa María}, 2006, 241-303). This phenomenon is particularly relevant in the Basque Country, Catalonia and Madrid, the most developed communities in Spain, in which two thirds of the young people are atheist, indifferent or agnostic. The form of the second wave still predominates in the rest of communities (non-practising Catholics) over the form of the third wave (atheists, indifferent and agnostic); but the percentages of the two least religious options are significant, which indicates that the third wave is already operating, although less intensely than in those three communities mentioned. (Tables 2 and 3)

\textbf{Table 2:} Percentage of young people aged between 15 and 24, per religious self-definition.

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<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Practising Catholic</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>39</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-believers</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indifferent</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>Other religion</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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Source: (\textit{Fundación Santa María}, 2006)

\textbf{Table 3:} Percentage of young people aged between 15 and 24, per religious self-definition and per Autonomous Community. 2005.

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Andalucía</th>
<th>Castile &amp; León</th>
<th>Catalonia</th>
<th>Galicia</th>
<th>Madrid</th>
<th>Basque Country</th>
<th>Valencia</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Practising Catholic</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Practising Catholic</td>
<td><strong>48</strong></td>
<td><strong>40</strong></td>
<td>29</td>
<td><strong>40</strong></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
<td><strong>42</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indifferent and agnostic</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td><strong>35</strong></td>
<td>24</td>
<td><strong>38</strong></td>
<td><strong>35</strong></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atheist</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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In bold, the highest percentage within every community. Source: (\textit{Fundación Santa María}, 2006)
This third wave is a new form of secularisation. The first socialization in environments where the second wave had taken place has lead young people to a situation of ignorance regarding institutional religion and the Church; the latter two would be relegated to something strange, remote, ignored, beyond the boundaries of what is habitual and everyday life, for those affected by this third wave. This third wave is not an opposition or battle with regard to institutional religion and the Church, like the first one. It isn’t a process of disinterestedness from something known and near, like the second one. This is a distancing from and ignorance of religion and Church. It is not about young people abandoning religion, it is about their origins being outside it. In a quantitative and qualitative research I showed how in the main these young people didn’t come from left wing radically anti religious families, but rather from families disinterested from religion in the second wave. As a consequence, this has a certain de-dramatisation of the problem: The new atheist young people, for example, are tolerant, generally because they don’t have an interest in the religious definition of their contemporaries (Pérez-Agote, 2012: 322-340).

The scope of this third wave can be very profound in two areas, which are separable analytically but tightly interconnected. On the one hand, because it can mean not only a decrease in importance of the institutional religion and the Church in beliefs and behaviours; it may also affect the very roots of religiosity; it may be not only a crisis of the religion oriented towards the Church, but a crisis of the religion tout court; it might be not just a crisis of the response which is the institutional religion, but a crisis of the religious question itself, of religiousness. In the second wave, the crisis of institutionalised religion left the question intact, religiousness; and to answer it, individual bricolage appeared, along with the search for a confirmation or intersubjective corroboration of the answer or with its occultation in intimacy.

On the other hand, this third wave may have deep cultural effects in the Spaniards’ collective representations in culture. The second wave meant shifting from a country with a Church controlled catholic culture to a country with a catholic culture not controlled by the Church any more. Religion would have done a “civilisation work” (Hervieu-Léger, 2003), having shaped collective representations of individuals, their visions of family, nature, etc. The crisis of religion oriented towards the Church, characteristic of the second wave, would have left this religious shaping of culture unharmed. Opposed to the decatholicization (Hervieu-Léger, 2003), characteristic of the second wave, exculturation would be the characteristic of the third wave (Hervieu-Léger, 2003).

Exculturation is a process in which culture, in the sense of shared representations, gradually loses its religious roots; religion has permeated a society’s culture; culture has become detached from its strictly religious nature, but this culture continues to be infused by religion. The next step is the progressive loss of the Catholic roots of that culture. The notions of religious culture and exculturation
have also been applied in the Spanish case, where the notions of family, work and profession, and the representation of death itself, have lost their religious roots in young people of recent generations (Pérez-Agote, 2014, 894)

2.2 The difficult secularisation of politics

It is not easy to understand how with such a strong and swift individual process of secularisation initiated in the 1960s and after the longest period of democracy in the history of Spain, the Catholic Church still today has such an important bearing in the public arena.

The victory of Franco’s army in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), which was called the Crusade, entailed the establishment of a political regime that has been called national-Catholicism. This denomination indicates the strong ties between Catholicism and State in a regime that lasted, although with some variations through time, until November 1975.

With National-Catholicism Franco continued an old Spanish tradition\textsuperscript{10}, the origin of which can be traced to the end of the 15th Century, when the Catholic Monarchs, after melting a variety of territories into a political unit that still exist to this day, signed the expulsion decrees—of Arabs and Jews—and constituted the Tribunal of Inquisition. From that moment, the Spanish Monarchs decreed a set of attributions within the ecclesiastic area, such as the right of presentation and patronage of ecclesiastic positions.

The 18th Century was the \textit{century of reforms} because of the enormous reformation task undertaken by Spain’s new dynasty, the Bourbons. As Alvarez Junco states, this new dynasty planned a triple offensive against the Church: to reinforce the rights of \textit{regalism} with the aim of weakening the ties of the Church with Rome, divert part of the Church’s income towards the public purse and reduce the bearing of the Church in cultural and educational issues (Álvarez Junco, 2001, 360).

The Church at that time did not have a solid structural cohesion. Some religious writers from the 18th Century refer to the Spanish \textit{churches}; bishops had little power, since they were at the behest of chapters, canons and religious orders; besides this, they had little contact between them, which caused problems for them in obtaining independent power from the King or the Pope. Without any collective means of expression and without a cohesive structure, the Church accepted the role given by the Bourbon monarchy (Callahan, 1989, 16-17). Moreover, partly thanks to the universal patronage that the Concordat put in the hands of the King, the clergy became a kind of religious administration, used by the monarchical reformers to modernise the popular mentality. (Callahan, 1989, ch.1).

The crisis of the Ancien Régime in Spain started later, and finished much

\textsuperscript{10} About the historical relations between the Church and the State in Spain, see cfr. Pérez-Agote, 2012, 50-111.
later than in France. The reasons for this delay can be found in a late and less developed capitalism – a motor for change – and in the geographically peripheral character that the financial and industrial development had in Spain, which involved the absence of a powerful, national bourgeoisie. Behind the successive political options opposing a modernizing change there was always the landowner aristocracy and the Catholic Church, who controlled an agrarian and deeply religious Spain until very recent times. The relations between the Church and the State were always at the core of the conflicts and instability in the history of Spain during the 19th Century and a large part of the 20th Century; to the point that we talk about the traditional Spanish confusion between right wing and Catholicism (Jutglar, 1973, volume 2, 119ff).

As stated by Carlos Moya, the progressive establishment of Capitalism in the 19th Century accelerated the crisis of the el Ancien Régime principles at the basis of the Spanish State. It was not a revolutionary crisis, “but rather a conflictual political dynamics”, a dynamic of latent civil war which resulted in successive restorations, being each of them an attempt to recover the impossible and mythic order of the Ancien Régime, socially legitimated in religious terms (Moya, 1975, 65-66). One of the results of these restorations was the growth of the already enormous influence of the Church in the Spanish educational system.

During the 19th and 20th Centuries, up until the Spanish Civil War, the legitimation of power oscillated between two extremes. On one was the absolutist idea that the power is given to the King by God, and on the other, the national democratic idea that power comes from the nation, the people. The political and constitutional ups and downs of the 19th Century and beginning of the 20th that range between the two standpoints have a correspondence with the ups and downs in the relations Church – State. We find a variety of formulae: ranging from the State confession to the separation between Church and State with the establishment of the Republic in 1931, via other more pragmatic definitions of this relationship, and religious tolerance, meaning that the State was confessional Catholic, supported public worship and the clergy, but private worship of other religions was tolerated (Solé Tura and Aja, 1977). In the same way, the history of the process of disentailment of Spanish Church property during the 19th Century is long and full of ups and downs.

During the first half of the 19th Century, the idea of nation could not be accepted by the conservative thinking; monarchs and aristocrats kept the results of the French Revolution in their collective memory. Nation and Catholicism were antithetical elements for them. However, during the second half of the Century, traditionalist sectors achieved the term ‘nation’ within their catholic tradition: they adopted the idea of nation, but not its democratic meaning. The matrix was still religious; the idea was a Spanish nation, not as a general will or popular sovereignty, but rather as Catholic vocation (Álvarez junco, 2001, ch VII). In certain sectors of the contemporary Spanish society this idea hasn’t disappeared yet.
Francoism was the last restoration of the traditional order. This time a war was necessary to establish it. Franco’s main economic resources came from the financial aristocracy (Moya, 1975), and he found resources for symbolic legitimation from the Catholic Church. But the tight relationship between Church and State would not remain unscathed during the entirety of the regime’s life. Being a restoration, the new regime would increase the already decisive bearing of the Church in the educational system (Cámara Villar, 1984, 255 y 258)

Since its establishment, Franco’s regime placed the Catholic Church in a preponderant situation, from the religious point of view –before other churches- and from the point of view of the very same state’s power structures. The era of the National-Catholicism and its 19th Century and early 20th Century monarchic precedents are characterised by the following:

The Church and the State are two different structures.

The Church is subordinated to the State, which can be organised as an absolutist monarchy, a restorationist monarchy or a dictatorship.

Religion and the Church are used by the State as political legitimation of its power.

The Church is controlled by the State through regalism in general, through the right of patronage and through the State funding of its coffers in particular.

Thus, the Spanish Church also sees its temporal power increased, as a highly placed institution receiving prebends and commissions from the political power.

The Spanish Church is subject of dual power, Rome and the State. Hence, the often tense relations between the State and the universal Roman Church, generally regulated through successive Concordats.

The moment when ties between the Spanish Church and the State were at their tightest was doubtlessly during the National-Catholicism regime. We could even talk about a National Spanish Church.

The establishment of democracy is obviously incompatible with National-Catholicism, being democracy, the democratic nation, a form of secularisation of political legitimacy.

Before Franco’s death and the arrival of democracy, the incarnation of National-Catholicism within the State entered a crisis: the relations between the Church and the State stop being a perfect communion. Besides this, during Francoism there was a transformation within the Spanish Church, as it opened up slightly to the universal Catholic Church and the initiatives from Rome.

Still during Franco’s regime, the Second Vatican Council already allowed Christian reform groups to adopt more open and challenging positions against a hierarchy -still anchored in the National Catholic fervour- and against the very same political regime. Another consequence of the Council was the constitution of the Spanish Episcopal Conference (SEC) who in March 1966, elected to most of its key positions, bishops of National-Catholic observance (Piñol, 1999, 269). At the end of the Council the problem in Spain was that the Concordat in force
–regulating the relations between the Catholic Church and the State– became totally at odds with the Council’s conclusions: the pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes affirmed the absolute independence that was to reign between the political community and the Church; and the Council Decree Christus Dominus was even more explicit, as it called upon civil authorities with rights or privileges to elect, nominate, present or designate positions for the Episcopate to relinquish them. Spain was one of the few countries that had this privilege of presentation; but Franco in principle did not respond to the Council demands.

Guy Hermet says “the deep deterioration of relations between the Church and the State provoked by the Council aggiornamento and aggravated by the Fronde of the clergy and the militants of the Catholic left wing resulted in the two powers being fractured since 1969. (…) The opposition to Franco’s regime by priests and Catholic militants, already evident some years after the Council, gained importance after 1969 when it became the main source of conflict between the Church and the State” (Hermet, 1986, 416 y 423). At the beginning of the 1970s a process of independence of the Spanish Church from the designs of the regime started, to the point where some started to talk about those years in terms of Church transition (Piñol, 1999, 395).

The Church’s position of greater independence would give it the possibility to contribute to the so-called political transition to democracy. A document of the Permanent Committee of the SEC, dated February 1977, in the phase of political transition, contains one of the major aspects of the Spanish ecclesiastical hierarchy’s political position during the period of transition: “the Church does not seek political power, or resting its pastoral action on it. Therefore, it does not enter into the game of party politics”.

But this position of independence and respect with regard to the new democratic political power would soon disappear. The Spanish Church became independent from political power in the 1970s, but was re-founded as a political actor per se, and after a short time was constituted as a lobby group, still active today through the pulpit, the media, meetings with the Government and, occasionally, behind the banners in street protests against a socialist Government.

The first transitional Government (December 1975 – July 1976), presided over by Arias Navarro, made attempts to repair the poor relations between the last Government of the dictatorship and the Holy See. After overcoming the initial formal difficulties, the situation was unblocked through a letter from the King to Pope Paul VI in 1976, relinquishing the privilege of presenting the bishops. On July 28th of the same year a revision of the Concordat was signed which included the aforementioned relinquishment and the Spanish Church’s relinquishment to the ecclesiastic privileges.

The new agreements were signed in 1979, thus the institutional and political relations between the State and the Church diminish in quantity and quality. On the one hand, the Concordat still exists, but not as a general and global agree-
ment; a symbol that bound the two institutions is no longer global. On the other hand, the 1978 Constitution made an attempt to decrease, not annul, the asymmetries of the relationship State - Catholic Church compared to the relations held with other religious creeds.

Besides this, the progressive closeness of the SEC to the main right wing political party and the growing deterioration of its relations with the Socialist Party are remarkable. The November 2006 Pastoral Instruction, “Moral orientations to Spain’s current situation”11, establishes that the national reconciliation is under threat and talks about the Government’s belligerent secularism, the threat to Spain’s unity, etc. On November 29th 2006 the SEC’s spokesman declared that national unity “is an asset that cannot be auctioned off”12. In the same way, the Church hierarchies mention that Catholicism is a founding element of the Spanish National identity; a typical approach of the conservative sectors from the second half of the 19th Century.

Unlike the evolution of the Spanish Catholic population which, since the arrival of democracy, has become progressively more flexible and permissive in its attitudes to abortion, the SEC has maintained a uniform, unequivocal, orthodox and unwavering position. Furthermore, in recent decades, the divergences between the positions of the Catholic hierarchy and the current legislation in ethical matters – a case in point is the controversy surrounding the different legislative proposals to decriminalize to varying degrees the practice of abortion – has emerged as one of the most recurrent sources of conflict within the framework of the relations between the Church and the State in Spain. In synthesis, we could point out that in general terms, the SEC has come out against any legislative changes involving the deregulation of abortion, although in different ways and to different degrees depending on which party is in government. The main conflicts have derived from the deployment by the Spanish Socialist party (PSOE) - with the support of various parliamentary groups – of an ideology of reform during its various periods at the government of the nation. During Socialist governments, the SEC has made intensive use of its powerful institutional resources, particularly with regard to the mass media, initiating campaigns aimed at obstructing the various legislative actions of the Socialist government; however, these campaigns all but disappeared when the Partido Popular came to power (1996- 2008, 2011-...). (…) This is in spite of the fact that the PP, on coming to power in 1996, did not ultimately revoke the 1985 law on abortion that it had previously appealed before the Constitutional Court during the legislature of the first Socialist government. (Pérez-Agote, Santiago y Montañés, 2015, 172-173)

The asymmetry in the attitudes and behaviour towards the same law during the socialist mandates and the right wing mandates has a complex explanation. The SEC has ways of silently influencing the Government’s policies when Partido

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11 Cfr.: www.conferenciaepiscopal.es
12 El País, 23rd and 30th November 2006. ABC, 5th December 2006
Popular (PP) is in power, but it's not so easy when the socialist rule. The socialist governments during the contemporary democratic period have passed liberalization acts with regard to abortion, same-sex marriage, etc. In opposition, the SEC mobilized the Catholic population, in the media and in the streets; sponsoring and even presiding over street protests; to ensure the success of these mobilizations it openly uses the Catholic educational network as a mechanism of logistics for participation. The political right wing and the SEC have strong elective affinities. Nevertheless, PP contains the whole spectrum of right wing ideological positions, from the modern liberal right wing to more traditional and virulent tendencies; that is to say, it has strong ideological conflicts within. The result of the SEC pressure has not been conclusive regarding the laws mentioned, promoted by socialist governments and rather ignored by right wing governments. However, the taxing treatment received has been more positive during the last period of socialist government.

The Church has become a political lobby, and for this purpose, the SEC has been monopolising the Church's public image on the one hand, and getting more homogeneous within, thanks to the liaison policy with the Vatican in the scrupulous selection of bishops from centralist and conservative positions to minimise the possible tension between the SEC and the former, sovereign in their dioceses.

2.3 The new cultural and religious plurality

Since the turn of the Century, Spain has received strong migratory flows. Spain has shifted from being a country of old emigration up until the 1970s, to being a country of immigration. According to the National Statistics Institute census data, Spain has increased its percentage of foreign population from less than 2% at the end of the last Century to about 12% in recent years. Such a growth has entailed the increase of some religious creeds. The Catholic creed itself has increased too, due to the strong contingent of Latin American population that arrived; although part of the population from this origin belong to the Evangelic creed, which together with the remarkably massive conversion of the Spanish Gipsy population to this creed, has caused it to spread far and wide. Besides this, the strong Moroccan immigration has caused the spread of the Muslim religion, fostered by the population arriving from other African and Asian countries. In

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13 To read further about this, cfr. Pérez-Agote, Santiago and Montañés, 2015.
14 Without any connivance with the Basque and Catalan Peripherals nationalism.
15 Let us remember that according to the Canon Law, every bishop is sovereign over his diocese; the Episcopal Conference of a country has no prevalence over dioceses in the field of the Magisterium. Only the bishop from Rome, the Pope, has prevalence over a bishop.
16 According to data provided by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (Study num. 2664, 2006), we could say that about 50% have joined Evangelism, but these data need to be considered with caution.
recent years, immigration from Eastern European countries has also increased, causing a strong development of the Orthodox creed. It is not possible to know the exact numbers of worshippers within these creeds, as census data do not gather religious information, but we can safely say that, according to calculations carried out along with experts about five years ago (Pérez-Agote and Santiago, 2009, 29-30), there could be about one million people in each of these other confessions.

The centrality of religion is much stronger among immigrant than among autochthonous population. Autochthonous population has seen an acute process of secularisation that immigrant population has not experienced. It is not easy to know the differences between immigrant and autochthonous population in terms of religious indicators (Pérez-Agote and Santiago 2009; Study CIS nº 2752 February 2008)\(^{17}\). In the CIS Study num. 2759 (based on the centres of worship of non-Catholic creeds) we can see the enormous quantity of activities often carried out in the centres of worship of non-Catholic creeds: collective religious practices; training courses; individual prayer; reading of sacred texts; moral counselling; festive activities; gatherings and fraternization; help and pragmatic solidarity for immigrant population (housing, work, “papers”, language teaching, health, etc.)

For immigrants religion presents a strong social added value in terms of social refuge and as a source of esteem, identity and pragmatic solidarity. When we see the reasons why immigrants go to their places of worship, we can state that religion plays a social role beyond the strictly religious, although of course, these are still central. In the place of worship they find peace and quietness in a likely difficult life; moreover, in this place they find advice about their everyday problems and they meet with people from their country (CIS Study nº 2759, April 2008).

In a democratic society which is not culturally homogeneous but maintains a dominant religious tradition, the separation between Church and State is put forward in a different way as it was when the State, legitimised by the dominant religion, needed to separate from the Church to initiate national, democratic, political legitimation. New religious creeds today are maintained by socially minoritised sectors, to which religion offers a mechanism of social integration.

Spain is a clear case. The process of subjective secularisation in Spain has taken place late – compared to France, for instance – and very fast; the difficult process of separation between the Catholic Church and the State started with the democratic transition (1975-1978). Without still being clearly established, a strong immigration flow started with the current Century\(^{18}\) and highlights a new religious diversity that progressively needs religion as a mechanism of community identity and integration; especially with the new economic crisis that

\(^{17}\) On the one hand by lack of information about religion in the Spanish Census, and on the other, by the low participation of immigrant population in surveys.

\(^{18}\) There is an increase from less than 2% to more than 12% foreign population in only ten years.
starts around 2007. Without a solid tradition of separation Church-State, with the Catholic Church still holding great political power, and with the arrival of strong contingents of non-Catholic population, the State, through its changing Governments has put into practice a pragmatic model of relations with the new religious confessions. Progress has been made on their legal recognition and in cooperation with them, especially through the Ministry of Justice and the Foundation Pluralismo y Convivencia\(^\text{19}\), at the initiative of this agency, whose work has been highly efficient\(^\text{20}\) despite their scarce resources.

Religious plurality in Spain is an old and very important issue which is taking on new forms these days. We can make a quick and brief detour on a series of axes to observe the difficulties of this non-Catholic plurality today, composed by non-religious people, people from non-Catholic creeds and –even, for the sociologist- by Catholics from other latitudes who find difficulties in integrating in some local Catholic communities.

In the history of Spain, the only long democratic period is the current one, started by the 1978 Constitution following the death of Franco. This text “guarantees the freedom of religion, ideology and creed” (article 16), but also, within the strict separation between State and Church, an asymmetry of the Catholic Church with regard to any other religious creed; as Linz states, the Constitution allows, in the same article, “cooperation with the Church and acknowledges the special position of Catholicism in society” (Linz, 1993, 40).

Nowadays, the Spanish Catholic hierarchy – after a period during the last years of Francoism and the first years of democracy, when it continued modernising political positions– does not seem to accept the cultural and religious plurality or, at least, the principle that freedom should prevail over truth within the public-political arena. There are several truths in this arena and, therefore, there is no unique authority to impose the same truth on everyone. It is a pending issue that this Spanish Catholic hierarchy accepts, like many Catholics have already done\(^\text{21}\), on the one hand that this is a plural country and non-religious people, Catholic people and non-Catholic religious people coexist; and on the other hand, that the laws of the Spanish Parliament do not need to be submitted by this democratic institution for external blessing.

\(^{19}\) www.pluralismoyconvivencia.es

\(^{20}\) Especially from the Observatory of Religious Plurality in Spain: www.observatorioreligion.es

\(^{21}\) As a sample of the dissidence of many Catholics from the SEC -and a very important one- see the following webpage, with a large number of Catholic networks and associations: www.redescristianas.net
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Алфонсо Перес-Аготе

РЕЛИГИЈА, ПОЛИТИКА И КУЛТУРА У ШПАНИЈИ: ПРЕМА ИСТОРИЈСКОЈ СОЦИОЛОГИЈИ ЊИХОВИХ ДИФЕРЕНЦИЈАЦИЈА И ОДНОСА

Сажетак

Историјски процес модернизације земаља Западне Европе је кулминирао у специфичном односу између колективног идентитета и политичког легитимитета. Овај чланак ће анализирати овај однос на примеру Шпаније. Аутор користи аналитичке инструменте друштвене диференцијације и историјске социологије који дају могућност да избегнемо све телеологичке варке теорије о секуларизацији. На случају Шпаније аутор показује промену у карактеру субјективне секуларизације народа, незавршен процес одвајање цркве од државе и на kraју, савремену коинциденцију између процеса губљења културних корена у вери код аутотохне популације са доласком популације чија религија није толико диференцирана од њихове културе.

Кључне речи: религија, политика, култура, секуларизација, друштвена диференцијација, политички легитимитет, верски плурализзам, Шпанија

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