RELIGION AND THE SEARCH FOR A NEW COSMOPOLITANISM

Abstract

In a post Cold-War world riven with ‘minor’ conflicts, and a West anxious about the intermittent threat of terrorist attack, human equality and sodality (fraternity and sorority) require urgent review. Among interesting proposals for a theoretical foundation to human equality is Martha Nussbaum’s call for a revived, modern version of Stoicism to teach indifference to race and a neighbourly goodwill. Yet in her concern to avoid ‘teleologies’ Nussbaum denatures Stoicism by disconnecting it from its transcendent foundations. A problem for the modern world is to maintain the authority of states, with their capacity to produce relief for the poor and oppressed along with their capacity to dominate, while having them absorb the ideals of cosmopolitanism into their own policy-formation. It is incumbent on the democratic state, the progenitor of the cosmopolitanism of both Cynicism and Stoicism, to promote the ideals of human dignity and equality. Nussbaum’s Stoicism scarcely helps, but there are globalizing organizations, such as the United Nations and its agencies, and globalized religious organizations, as advanced by Hans Küng, which may supply the institutional foundation.

Key words: cosmopolitanism, Cynicism, Stoicism, religions, Nussbaum, Küng

Ancient cosmopolitanism

Cynicism

In a world fraught with conflict and skirmish in many parts there is some cause for optimism in a growing search for a cosmopolitan ideal. In this quest the
The discipline of the politology of religion has an important contribution to make. For cosmopolitanism, in consonance with religion, embraces the political notion of human equality, regardless of location, race, creed, wealth, level of education or social status.

The term has not yet entered into popular parlance, but warrants serious consideration. It seems to have been coined by Diogenes of Sinope, the model Cynic, who announced himself to be a citizen of the world, although there is an uncertain tradition that Socrates once claimed to be citizen of the world. From Diogenes’s other reflections one would have to think that his reply on citizenship was less an expression of benevolence for all humankind, than a curt rejection of state membership, a specious reason for avoiding the responsibilities of citizenship.\(^3\) Yet his stance is an example. For all his philosophical denunciation of the cant associated with politics and ‘bourgeois’ manners, he could not live without a community.\(^4\) The famous barrel, in which he lived his ascetic life, was placed at the Metroon, the temple of Cybele located in the middle of the Athenian agora. He had been exiled from his native Sinope, presumably because of his eccentric behavior, but found a home in philosophical Athens. He constantly demanded an audience, which he was wont to attract with a blood-curdling whistle, and then abused them in the manner of a modern stand-up comedian. As a performance artist he shocked people by confronting them with his bodily functions. ‘Diogenes does not erode the discourse of power; he launches a frontal attack.’\(^5\) Along with many legendary figures of the ancient world, Diogenes the person may be undiscoverable, but a rich anecdote tradition, captured mainly by Diogenes Laertius (of uncertain date around the second century AD), possibly points to the kind of character he was.\(^6\)

In fact Diogenes stood in a long tradition of Greek philosophers who, from Thales onward, sought a reality behind the mere appearances of things. Heraclitus had postulated a stable logos behind all the unknowable flux and instability of the seen world, while Parmenides challenged this view of radical instability with a theory of absolute permanence of all things in which change was a mere human illusion.\(^7\) Plato had created a complex theory of idea, or forms, giving an interim shape to all visible things, in turn modified by Aristotle’s theories of developmental forms. The whole tradition searched for truth behind appearance. It was little wonder that Diogenes was characterized by Plato as ‘Socrates gone mad’ when he aped the great man’s interrogatory method in order to dis-

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place common understandings about things, particularly in the realm of human custom and behaviour.\(^8\) The Cynics inherited from classical Athens its characteristic of free speech, *parresia*, namely the determination to speak on all subjects, which they expanded into a right to say *really* anything.

Naming their philosophy *kunikos*, dog-like, the Cynics rejected the claims of politics and flouted the decencies of conventional society. Their mission, perhaps inspired by the Delphic Oracle, was *paracharattein ta nomisma*, to ‘deface the currency’, or, as they interpreted it, to bring about a transvaluation of standards.\(^9\) They were agonistic, and combatted other philosophies, inventing along the way the new literary forms of the diatribe and the satire. A mission it was. Diogenes urged his followers to equip themselves with nothing other than a wallet, a staff and a single cloak, and to proceed barefoot to seek audiences and to preach the virtues of asceticism.\(^10\) Diogenes’s performance art was deliberately dog-like. He viewed the world from a dog’s point of view.\(^11\) A dog exhibits no shame, performs all its bodily functions in public, sleeps anywhere, eats anything available, and experiences no sense of deprivation or envy. The simplest life of the ascetic immunized persons from the pains of unsatisfied wants and relieved them of bloating and the inflammations of extravagance. The philosophers’ heroic control of desire kept them from coveting, theft and physical harm to others. Anecdotes about Diogenes show him asking the great Alexander, who had offered him reward, to step out of his sunlight.\(^12\) Seeing a boy drink from a stream by cupping his hands, he immediately discarded his drinking cup.\(^13\)

Pleasures could only come from things nature supplied directly. There were the elements of a preference for the poor in his example. He told rich people to divest themselves of their wealth, and indeed his follower, Crates, was a rich man who gave all his wealth away.\(^14\)

Regardless of his status as cosmopolitan, the figure of Socrates stands behind the tendency of the Cynics. An aristocrat, he himself embraced poverty, went barefoot and wore simple clothes. He spurned the usual accoutrements of a comfortable life. Yet he was radically different from the Cynics because he valued the community of the *polis* and defended its laws and customs. Even then, however, his political approach left conventional politics far behind. In numerous studies, Gregory Vlastos demonstrated Socrates’s concern for all humanity. For Socrates, ‘the criterion of good statesmanship is the ability to assist the people

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9 Diogenes Laertius 6. 20.
12 Diogenes Laertius 6. 38, (trans. Hicks), p. 41: ‘When he was sunning himself in the Craneum [in Corinth], Alexander came and stood over him and said, “Ask of me anything you like.” To which he replied, “Stand out of my light.”
13 Diogenes Laertius 6. 37: “A child has beaten me in plainness of living” (Hicks p. 39.)
14 Diogenes Laertius, 6. 87.
of the city — all of them, not just those who have leisure for the amenities — all
the citizens, including of course, the banausoi [those compelled to do manual la-
bour], and all the non-citizens as well: everyone in the city, including the slaves.15
Accordingly he adjures the statesman to make any person a better person: ‘citizen
or alien, freeman or slave, formerly wicked — unjust, dissolute, intemper-
ate…’16 It is as though Socrates wants to call the sinner to repentance, but the
operative voice is that no person whatsoever is beyond the call of redemption,
and Socrates/Plato places this salvation of souls in the purview of the state (po-
lis). There is a strong element of Socrates in the sort of cosmopolitanism we here
wish to invoke.

The Greek Stoics

The Stoics followed the path of Crates of Thebes, the ‘cheerful Cynic’, who
divested himself of a large fortune and chose to live in poverty. He gravitated
to Athens, became a pupil of Diogenes, and was in turn the teacher of Zeno
of Citium, the founder of Stoicism. The later Stoics admired much in the Cynic
philosophy, particularly in what was regarded as fortification against adverse
circumstances. As Greek cities lost their independent vitality when they suc-
cumbed to the successive empires of Philip of Macedon, Alexander the Great
and of Rome, the mental outlook departed from that of the traditional Greek
philosophers rooted in the polis. ‘To be no longer citizens of an independent city-
state implied the loss of the traditional bonds of Greek ethics.’17 The old ideals of
the polis were breaking down, and life for many became rootless and insecure.18
A powerful response was to seek security in one’s own inner resources, and in
many cases this involved a radical attack on the rules and customs of the sur-
rounding society.

There is a humane tradition in ancient Stoicism to which the modern
ascete is understandably attracted. The idea of freeing oneself from unnatural
desires led to expressing joy in submission to the natural order. This was nev-
er more exuberantly expressed than in Cleanthes’ ‘Hymn to Zeus’. Inner reason
taught that conflict was useless and a demeaning of the human person: ‘what
is necessary for self-sufficiency the wise man already has — so there is no point
fighting over it.’19 The cosmopolitan is at heart a pacifist.

In a new enthusiasm (a very non-Stoic word) for a borderless humanitar-
ian concern for human welfare, Stoicism has continued to undergo successive

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15 Vlastos, Gregory, ‘The Historical Socrates and the Athenian Democracy’, Political Theory, Vol. 11, No. 4, 1983, pp. 495-
516, at pp. 506-507, emphasis added.
16 Plato, Gorgias, 515A4-7, as translated in Vlastos, ibid.
regenerations, as in the eighteenth century with figures like Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson and Viscount Bolingbroke.\(^{20}\) According to Lisa Hill, the Stoics were the first cosmopolitans and the first universalists: ‘we are all fundamentally equal, members of a universal community by virtue of our common humanity.’\(^{21}\) The implication of the Stoic approach is that the lowliest person judged by prevailing values is intrinsically equal to the highest: there are no distinctions of gender, race, religion, wealth, poverty, educational attainment, physical prowess or physical beauty. All such externals are irrelevant to the inner worth of every person. All are endowed with reason, implanted in all by Nature at birth, which in itself is the measure of equality. The Stoics are somewhat ambiguous about this, since they value the ‘wise’ person who has understood the realities of reason; they make room for the ‘proficient’ person, the one striving and ‘progressing’ on the path to wisdom; the ‘fool’ is rather disdained, despite having intrinsic human worth.

There is also a regional ambiguity in Stoicism. The Greeks talked about the sweeping away of the polis, the city-state, as they adjusted to rapidly changing circumstances. They took world citizenship seriously. Zeno, the founder of the idea of the oecumene, postulated a community of the whole world, transcending patriotism: ‘a community embracing all rational beings, without regard to the distinction of Greek and barbarian, or of freeman and slave.’ It is ‘a state to which all [hu]mankind belongs, a state whose boundaries are measured by the sun.’\(^{22}\) As F. H. Sandbach points out, Zeno's lost first book, Politeia, apparently used the term ‘constitution’ in an ironic way, ‘because he swept away all that the Greeks regarded as characteristic of the polis or organized society.’ Plutarch epitomized the book by saying ‘we should not live in organized cities or demes, but should think all men our fellow-demessmen and fellow citizens…’ (Plutarch, Moralia, 329 A). Sandbach says that the intention was not to envision a world state, ‘but that wherever men came together they should be governed by the rule of reason, which would be the same the world over.’\(^{23}\) That outlook was not to last. The very poleis that were devalued in theory were indeed to be swamped by empires, starting with Alexander’s, that ruled ‘the world’.

**Roman Stoicism**

In Rome there was little disparagement of empire, which the statesmen justified as bringing order, security and unity to the known world. Roman phi-

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losophers defended their empire as providing one benevolent fatherland for all the world. In an excellent discussion, Lisa Hill points to the Roman claim, voiced by Cicero following his Stoic mentor Panaetius, that Rome’s dominance over subject peoples was warranted as their protector and bringer of justice.\(^{24}\) It is often hard to see benevolence in Roman rule, which replaced a partially self-governing people with the pervading autocracy of the euphemistically titled ‘principate’. Yet there is a veiled truth in Cicero’s claims, even though he would not live to see the amelioration of ruthless autocracy. Stoicism provided an equally pervasive countervailing moderation of tyranny. C. H. McIlwain, following the German scholar Rudolf von Ihering, who promoted ‘a universalism which implies an essential individualism’, shows how a spirit of justice animated both public and private law in the second century AD.\(^{25}\) As a bearer of rights, the state, \textit{civitas}, is the body of its citizens, and its rights inhere in each person individually. The emperor’s word, formally, had the force of law, but myriad jurists and governors, imbued with the Stoic philosophy, managed to interpret decrees and orders through legal fictions and ‘judge-made law’ so as to protect the privileges of individuals.\(^{26}\) As Acton declared, ‘It is the stoics who emancipated [hu]mankind from its subjection to despotic rule, and whose enlightened and elevated views of life bridged the chasm that separated the ancient from the Christian state, and led the way to freedom.’\(^{27}\)

Nevertheless, each Stoic as a ‘citizen of the world’ had to accommodate this belief to the realities of statehood and empire. Rome was an expansionist state, and the Stoic there had less interest in withdrawing from society than contributing honourably to its good. The Stoic virtue of indifference to pain and individual suffering suited the endurance required of soldier and statesman. Self-denial would require unstinting service to one’s fellow citizens through the offices of the state. The Roman Stoic would still proclaim him or herself a citizen of the world, but that remained a worthy fiction. It is uplifting to read what Roman Stoics wrote, but we need to remind ourselves that the Romans were, republic and empire, unremittingly ruthless.\(^{28}\) What renders both Stoics and Kantian rationalism relevant to our globalizing age is their ambition to transcend confining contexts and parochial interests and to keep their gaze fixed on that rational core that is shared by people at all times and in all places.\(^{29}\)

As arbiter of Roman justice, Cicero was of course a leading statesman of the imperial republic not averse to praising himself for his role as consul in 63

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\(^{26}\) Ibid, pp. 50-52.


\(^{29}\) Ibid., p. 426.
BC. He was intimately attached to the institutions of the republic, which he defended to the last, finally paying for it with his life. Cicero’s philosophical interest continued to be focused on the welfare of the city-state.\(^30\) In his *De Officiis*, ‘On Duties,’ Cicero teaches that it is unjust to harm someone, but it is also equally unjust not to prevent harm to another when it is in one’s power to do so.\(^31\) His precepts echo eerily in the modern world.

**Globalization in the Modern World**

In a strange if distant parallel to the sweeping away of the vitality of the *polis* in the new imperialisms of the Hellenistic Age, globalization in the modern world sets new challenges. Unless we were to stretch the limits of concepts and define America’s global economic and military hegemony as a new empire, the modern global situation is more like a chaotic anarchy. As Benjamin Barber declares,

> It could hardly escape even casual observers that global warming recognizes no sovereign territory, that AIDS carries no passport, that technology renders national boundaries increasingly meaningless, that the Internet defies national regulation, that oil and cocaine addiction circle the planet like twin plagues and that financial capital and labor resources, like their anarchic cousins crime and terror, move from country to country with ‘wielding’ abandon without regard for formal or legal arrangements — acting informally and illegally whenever traditional institutions stand in their way.\(^32\)

To follow Cicero’s pronouncement that to stand by while people or peoples are being harmed when one has the resources to help is injustice; these ‘plagues,’ wherever they may alight, require the attention of the resourceful. A universal commitment to human rights implies intervention on behalf of the international comity of nations into states where regimes have violated their people, as in genocide. Shaun Narine outlines the problem of human rights intervention in ‘subaltern’ states — ‘the weak, overlooked majority states of the international system.’ Often emerging from colonial domination, certain young states are asserting their national sovereignty in the face of external criticism, and there is sympathy for them in that they are still in the throes of nation-building.\(^33\) There is a growing consensus that intervention is acceptable as long as the intention is only to prevent human suffering, that military intervention is used only in the

\(^{30}\) *De Officiis*, ‘On Duties,’ 3. S. 23.

\(^{31}\) Cicero, *De Officiis*, 1. 7. 23.


last resort, that the response be measured and limited, and that it must have a reasonable expectation of success.\textsuperscript{34} In the case of intervention in the ‘subaltern’ states, there is a danger that it would be seen as a return to colonial paternalism. Narine thinks the American non-humanitarian intervention in Iraq, based on the mendacious pretext that America had to protect itself from the illusionary threat of weapons of mass destruction, could well have set back the case for humanitarian intervention a long way. There was no scintilla of Ciceronian justice in that intervention.\textsuperscript{35}

The idea of territoriality reminds us that, however impotent they may be in the face of some threats, states are still the basic components of the international community. And so it must be. The Greek Stoic idea of sweeping away states is not merely fanciful, but morally deficient. None of this is to say that nationalism is commendable, that ‘patriot’ defines the good person, or that the most pernicious of Roman aphorisms — \textit{dulce et decorum est pro patria mori}, ‘sweet and noble it is to die for one’s country’\textsuperscript{36} — is to be admired. First, it is in and through states that power is exercised, either for the detriment or benefit of humankind. Second, that it is in and through local communities that individual persons may take collective action, and that, at least in democracies, they may take a part in guiding the moral compass of the state.

Humane cosmopolitanism instructs us that in each person in the world there is an irreducible human dignity. Hill believes the fellowship of the world-state ‘is morally and ontologically prior to the positive republic of people’\textsuperscript{37} Deontologically, perhaps, but not historically; Socrates, Diogenes, Zeno, were all the products of the cities they lived in, absorbing (even when repudiating) their traditional values. Many of the Roman Stoics, like Nero’s adviser, Seneca, were wedded to the regime of their nation.\textsuperscript{38} Marcus Aurelius himself ruled an empire. In any case, the timeless lessons of great Aristotle should not be lost here. A person’s human dignity is nurtured in close association with other human beings. It is in the concreteness of human relationship that our humanity is formed. Aristotle saw the immediate circumstances of human life to be focused on the family and the household, the village, and the community embodied in the \textit{polis}. The city-state was the pinnacle of association in his world. It did not mean that all other associations were excluded. Aristotle, as we have seen, gave special attention to the \textit{metics}, the resident aliens in Athens, which acknowledged the existence of their homelands. Indeed he was one of them, and in any case the \textit{polis} in his analysis was a generic term. His school famously studied the ‘constitutions’

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid, p. 473.
\textsuperscript{36} Horace, \textit{Odes} 3. 2. 13.
\textsuperscript{37} Hill, ‘Classical Stoicism and a Difference of Opinion’, p. 88.
of some hundred and forty cities. In a limited sense, his *polis* was a cosmopolitan ideal. The polis was at the peak of his system because it was the climactic association that included all types of people, with their different beliefs and their different aspirations in life. Yet it subjected them all to its discipline, enabling them to live together as neighbours and in friendship. That this was an ideal was obvious from the internal divisions and conflicts that took place within the cities, and these in themselves made ‘sovereignty’ (or for Aristotle *to kurion*) necessary. The *polis* was an association of ‘reciprocal and varied parts’, ideal in combining unity with difference. In the *praxis* of building this unity human personality was shaped:

If we hold that behind and beyond the *production* of law by the state there is a *process* of personal activity and personal development in its members, we may go on to say that the production should itself be drawn into the process. In other words, we may argue that the productive effort of the state, the effort of declaring and enforcing a system of law, should also be a process in which, and through which, each member of the state is spurred into personal development, because he [or she] is drawn into free participation in one of the greatest of all secular human activities.39

At this point it is appropriate to introduce the concept of ‘human rights globalization’.40 As already claimed, this does not mean the sweeping away of states. It does imply the education of the peoples and leaders of states into the verities of human dignity and equality, regardless of location and external difference. There is a large number of aid and benevolent associations, ranging from church societies and the International Red Cross and the Red Crescent, UNHCR, UNICEF, Oxfam, World Vision, Plan, and Amnesty International to the organization that colourfully incorporates globalization into its name: Médecins Sans Frontières. The United Nations Organization gives some observers hope for a future trans-national or world government, but in particular, its Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 implants covenants that, when ratified by participating polities, modify political behaviour within those nations.41 Even more topical in this context is the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The ‘ever-growing number of resolutions and covenants, covering almost every aspect of human life and human relations’ testifies to a growing potential for intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Yet it is states that approve and ratify such conventions.

Modern cosmopolitanism

A most interesting project to translate the ancient cosmopolitan ideal into the modern world has been initiated by Martha Nussbaum. A devotee of ancient Stoicism, Nussbaum seeks to induct modern youth into the ways of Stoic thought and being. She has recourse more to the Roman version of Stoicism, including the eclectic Cicero, than to the Greek.\(^42\)

It is to Cicero that she turns to delineate the forms of justice: it is unjust to harm someone, but it is also equally unjust not to prevent harm to another when it is in one's power to do so.\(^43\) Nussbaum criticizes Cicero for not following through the full implications of Stoic cosmopolitanism. His idea of justice clashes with the (mainly Roman) Stoic idea of indifference to externalities. A 'wise' person is indifferent to external pain, and if right within the self, can withstand torture, rape, slavery. Cicero denounces aggressive war, which can only mean that his pride in the extension of Rome's vast boundaries is justified in characterizing Roman aggression as a series of defensive wars resulting in the progressive subjugation of neighbouring territories. Nussbaum charges Cicero with the confusion of failing to recognize that poverty and starvation are harms to people which are preventable, but to which he seems indifferent, even though addressing them is within the power of the wealthy. Moreover, Cicero's duty of care is more powerful towards family, neighbours, friends and compatriots,\(^44\) while help to distant humanity is only approved when there is no cost to the person who assists. Cicero proposes a flexible account that recognizes many criteria as pertinent to duties of aid — gratitude, need and dependency, political and friendly association — but that also preserves flexible judgment in adjudicating conflicting claims. What is clear, however, is that people outside our own nation always lose.\(^45\) Nussbaum could have gone further by noting Cicero's haughty attitude to the plebs of his own country, whose self-help measures he unequivocally labelled sedition.\(^46\) Neal Woods says that Cicero was quite comfortable arguing for human equality while living with human inequality.\(^47\) One also calls to mind the slaveholder author of the Declaration of Independence.

Nussbaum nevertheless invests much hope for the common good

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\(^43\) Cicero, *De Officiis*, 1. 7. 23.

\(^44\) Cicero, *De Officiis*, 1. 4. 12.


\(^46\) Cicero, *De Legibus*, ‘On the laws’, 3. 19: (tribunicia potestas)… pestiferā uidetur, quippe quae in seditione et ad seditionem nata sit; ‘the power of the plebs’ representatives is seen to be pestilential for it was born in treason for the purpose of treason.’

through education in a core Stoic cosmopolitanism as moderated to the modern world by Kant.\textsuperscript{48} The Stoic ideal was to see a common dignity in all humanity through their endowment with reason. To be practical in applying cosmopolitan ideals, Nussbaum argues that, for example, wherever children can be successfully taught indifference to race and to have goodwill towards neighbours, there is a Stoic triumph.\textsuperscript{49} The problem with this approach is that it is rootless, and in a deep sense, groundless. In her care to avoid teleologies, Nussbaum denatures Stoicism by disconnecting it from its foundations. The basis of Stoicism is its discovery of reason in the fabric of the cosmos, and it is directly in response to that universal reason, called Providence, that the Stoic discerns reason in the being of his or her own person and in a neighbour.\textsuperscript{50} As Nussbaum declares: ‘In a sense there is a special dignity and freedom in the choice to constitute our community as universal and moral in the face of a disorderly and unfriendly universe – for then we are not following anyone else’s imperatives but our very own.’\textsuperscript{51} The Stoic might reasonably answer that there is dignity in relating to an abiding certainty in the structure of the created world, which by no means implies a slavish adherence to instruction, but always requires the application of human reason to refine and sift the reason in rerum Natura.

Sandrine Berges echoes in more assertive tones Nussbaum’s reservations about divinity in Stoic thought, addressing the so-called ‘divine breath’ argument for human universalism: ‘it fails to convince a modern reader who does not necessarily buy into the kind of theism which the Stoics believed in — or indeed in any kind of theism.’\textsuperscript{52} This is a spectacular case of historical retrojection. Meeting them on their own terms, why should the ancient Stoics be concerned about convincing a ‘modern reader’? In any case, ‘the modern reader’, here presumably meaning all modern readers (or those deemed to qualify as ‘modern’) to be thoroughly secularized, is surely an overstatement, given the growing prominence of religion in the modern world.\textsuperscript{53} No doubt the Stoics believed in eternal truths transcending time and place, but modern sensibilities and world outlooks were unknown to them. Astonishingly, Berges goes on to claim that such divine fire explanations did not satisfy the Stoics themselves. He manages to bypass in a passage of Epictetus \textit{that he himself quotes} an unequivocal reference to the cen-


\textsuperscript{49} Nussbaum, ‘Stoic Cosmopolitanism’, p. 22.


\textsuperscript{51} Nussbaum, ‘Stoic Cosmopolitanism’, p. 18.


tality of God:
the citizen of the world ‘has observed with intelligence the administration of the world, and has learned that the greatest and supreme and the most comprehensive community is that which is composed of men and God, and that from God have descended the seeds not only of my father and grandfather, but to all beings which are generated on the earth and are produced, and particularly to rational beings — for these only are by their nature formed to have communion with God, being by means of reason conjoined with Him — why should not such a man call himself a citizen of the world, why not a son of God, and why should he be afraid of anything which happens among men?’

Hill understands the indispensability of the divine nature of the cosmos to the Stoics and adduces considerable documentary evidence to the point: the Stoic believed ‘that we are all fragments of divine intelligence with godlike potential.’ More circumspectly, she also questions the likelihood of the modern person’s being persuaded by such reasoning. Nussbaum’s is a worthy humanist position, but it is not that of the Stoic, whose universe was complete and divine. In any case, the assurance of certainty in one’s own intuition, on which Nussbaum relies, is possibly suspect. The _logos_, the principle of reason in the human person, in the universe and in the order of human relationships, is from the first invested with divine fire. As the acclaimed ‘Hymn to Zeus’ of Cleanthes exults:

Chaos to thee is order: in thine eyes
The unloved is lovely, who didst harmonize
Things evil with things good, that there should be
One Word (_logos_) through all things everlastingly,
One Word — whose voice alas! The wicked spurned;
Insatiate for the good their spirits yearn:
Yet seeing see not, neither hearing hear
God’s universal law, which those revere,
By reason guided, happiness who win.

Nussbaum would scarcely be impressed by a recitation of Stoic writers who show that their philosophy is grounded in reason as the principle of all created being. Her approach signifies a modernist disregard for the primitive, which extends to all who allude ‘to providence as at least a practical postulate, a reasonable hope.’ Yet it is an error to imply that the Stoics yielded to providence as some kind of blind instructor. Their approach was philosophical through and

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56 Sandbach, _The Stoics_, pp. 72-73.
through, and their discovery of affinities between human reason and reason in
the universe was the result of unfettered, free inquiry. The postulation of un-
grounded reason in individual persons is an individuating tendency, and argu-
ably less conducive to a cosmopolitan sociality than that afforded by an institu-
tionalized belief system. As Alasdair McIntryre has argued, along with Vico, all
our moral ideals ‘are nowhere to be found except as embodied in the historical
lives of particular social groups’, given ‘expression in institutionalized practice as
as well as in discourse…’⁵⁹ A secular Stoic ‘church’ would seem a remote hope.⁶⁰

**Religion and the cosmopolitan ethic**

Nussbaum would look in vain for an institutional body of Stoic teaching in
the contemporary world, but ready-made institutions holding human life to be
of ultimate and absolute worth are to hand, and are indeed globalizing. Islam is
a global community, and worships Allah who is all merciful and compassionate.
Christianity, worshipping God who is love, is globalizing, as are the other world
religions. The Parliament of World Religions has set an agenda for restoring spiri-
tual ideals to a troubled world. As led by the Catholic theologian, Hans Küng, in
the ‘Declaration Toward a Global Ethic’, they have worked on an account of world
sodality that would match the Stoic ideal but would also be consonant with the
universal teachings of love and tolerance at the centre of world religions. ‘The
indispensable role of religion is to give depth and cohesive power to an ethical
perspective, which is not possible for a humanistic ethos of similar content.’⁶¹

As Küng declares, finding a universal standard requires lifting humankind
out of the contingent: it must be grounded in the unconditional, ‘by an Absolute
which can provide an over-arching meaning and which embraces and perme-
ates individual human nature and indeed the whole of human society’.⁶² Clearly
Muslims willing to invest in the absolute sovereignty of God are already far
down this road, and perhaps would be prepared to concede a similar devout-
ness to those holding parallel views in other world religions. In any view of the
contemporary world order, the Islamic position must be taken into account.⁶³
As Küng asks, do not religions ‘release a quite tremendous dynamic to liberate
people from totalitarian systems, to protect human dignity, to establish human

Belgrade, pp. 3-10.
rights, and to preserve world peace?  

While we may recognize that individual autonomy renders secularization *sine qua non* for democratic politics, for millions of people the secular milieu leaves a void. This is amply evident for Muslims, whose spiritual leaders denounce secularism; but for others, also, ‘demystification, secularization and rationality cannot so easily replace tradition, religion and mystery’.

At the centre of Küng’s endeavours to establish a global ethic is his openness to other religions, and his insistence that the whole enterprise depends upon cooperation among them all. Still deeply committed to his Roman Catholic faith, he strives to render all sound religious commitment as truly ‘catholic’. The security and integrity required for leadership in establishing a global ethic depends upon rootedness in one’s own faith. He argues persuasively that it is at the heart of Christian humility to recognize the ‘lights’ and the ‘words’ of other great religions. He charges his Catholic Church, long established as one of the truly global institutions, with a continuous reformation to moderate its rigid structures, to implement its traditional doctrine of subsidiarity, to underplay its centralized institutions, to reach accommodation with other Christian denominations as a precondition for rapprochement with non-Christian world religions, and to confront civilization with the imperative of peaceful solutions to world problems. Dogmatic Catholicism shares a measure of fundamentalism with other Christian denominations as well as the non-Christian religions.

A sound approach to the creation of a world ethic requires an outright rejection of all forms of fundamentalism. Since the western world is obsessed with Muslim fundamentalists, Küng is at pains to affirm that not all Muslims are radical, and that there is much hope for dialogue with the many Muslims who do not reject modernization. Christianity and Judaism also have their fundamentalists, whose attitude, while exuding an intolerant religiosity, stems from ‘economic, political and social roots’. The expansion of religion is a given in the contemporary world. Many of its new manifestations are hostile responses to modernism, in the form of fundamentalist organizations to which Nussbaum could justifiably object through an appeal to reason. In their submission to the authority of certain established texts kept immune from liberal interpretation, they subordinate reason to a narrowly conceived version of faith. Nevertheless, they are an

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unavoidable given in the contemporary cosmos, and their interaction, often uncomfortable, with social and political institutions constitutes a widespread cause of social disruption urgently in need of addressing by political authorities.\textsuperscript{67}

Of course these ideals are not confined to religious traditions. Michael Ignatieff, for example, insists that Europe has already espoused a global ethic independent of religious teachings.\textsuperscript{68} We have seen that the Greek \textit{polis} explored many of the humane ideas that have endured throughout European civilization. Yet central ideals, like equality, freedom and justice were amplified and intensified by religious teaching, and given, in association with philosophies like the Stoics', a cosmic significance. Küng argues that there can be no new world order of peace without a global ethic. Richard Falk, on the other hand, questions Küng’s approach: how can a new \textit{ethic} produce agency for change?\textsuperscript{69} Moreover, how can a new dynamic be forged from a common ethic that is satisfactory to all the world religions Küng embraces? For the common ground shrinks to contain an ethic only involving humane treatment for every human person and a wide adoption of the Golden Rule, both long available from non-religious sources.\textsuperscript{70}

A more trenchant criticism of Küng’s project comes from the German sociologist, H. J. Krysmanski, who not merely questions the efficacy of a new global ethic, but denounces the ‘conceptual paucity’ of Küng’s enterprise.\textsuperscript{71} The issue for him is that Küng has not fully engaged with the political and economic realities of the current world order. To Krysmanski ‘The global economy is associated not with the production of useful goods, but with the psychology of financial markets, with the chivalry and crockery of corporate mergers, with the cathedrals of consumer culture.’\textsuperscript{72} On a global level, ‘class struggle’ is the unrecognized reality, while ‘immiseration’ of the millions of the poor proceeds apace through the very processes of globalization. Such problems require action other than preaching. Krysmanski sees the whole globalization enterprise driven by the United States, a \textit{nation state} acting in its own interests. He cites Benjamin Barber as one engaged with the problems of globalization. In Barber’s view, capitalism is consumed by its own success, dissolving into a trivial quest to create new markets for unneeded commodities. The wealthy in the industrialized world are cajoled by incessant marketing into purchasing more and more unnecessary luxuries, while capitalism leaves the poorer half of the world to languish without the means to purchase even basic necessities. In the United States, even religion is sold as a consumable commodity, with televangelists marketing themselves

\textsuperscript{67} Cf. Dallmayr, ‘Cosmopolitanism’, pp. 422-425.
\textsuperscript{69} Falk, ‘Küng’s Crusade’, p. 64.
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid. pp. 69-70.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., p. 97.
as products.\textsuperscript{73} The prevailing ideology is to contrast the freedoms of US citizens with the bonds of others.\textsuperscript{74} Along with the increasing commodification goes the ideologically driven outsourcing and privatizing of public activities, together with a persistent denigration of the role of government. ‘Privatization … is about terminating democracy.’\textsuperscript{75} Barber likens the submergence of people beneath pervasive marketing to a communal totalitarianism, an echo of Sheldon Wolin’s powerful exposure of ‘inverted totalitarianism’.\textsuperscript{76}

Krysmanski taxes Küng with taking his message to economic elites and relying on the goodwill of industrial leaders. His view is that there is not much hope in this approach since globalization turns out to be ‘a vast process of commodification,’ and it will never be in the interests of those who benefit from this process to modify their activity in the international economy. Küng’s discourse, he alleges, is mired in moralist teaching, and being locked into the cause of bourgeois civil society, is not suited to engagement with the language of the young, for whom rapid advances in technology have set a new paradigm shift. In any case, Krysmanski charges that a paradigm shift ‘never came down from heaven.’\textsuperscript{77}

Despite a certain impatience with Küng’s cause, such as Richard Falk’s exasperation globalizing ethic, even if ‘reimagined’. Michael Ignatieff acknowledges the existence of a with his falling between ‘an irrelevant piety or a utopian dream,’\textsuperscript{78} there remains a case for a plurality of international ethical positions as embodied in the various organs of the United Nations and other Non-government Organizations, yet there is often a conflict between them, such as between the recognition of state sovereignty and universal human rights. States are accorded their autonomy, but as Ignatieff concedes, even democracies are allowed to go wrong, and in acknowledging local customs and ideals, particular areas are sometimes seen to undermine human rights. The global ethic, such as proposed by Küng, is required to ‘interrogate particularism’ and to engage local regimes in ‘adversarial justification’ of their actions and policies. Ignatieff thus acknowledges sovereignty as responsibility for ethical conduct.\textsuperscript{79} In what is rapidly becoming a ‘postsecular world’, there is a place for ‘faith-based diplomacy’

\textsuperscript{78} Falk, ‘Küng’s Crusade’, p. 77.
\textsuperscript{79} Ignatieff, ‘Reimagining Global Ethic’, pp. 13-17.
in mitigating conflict between rival nations.\(^{80}\) Falk, retains a positive role for religion, promoting an

‘engaged spirituality,’[meaning] stepping forward in moments of crisis, as a matter of religious conviction, to oppose violence and injustice. Such exemplary action has certainly been taken in this historical period, becoming especially salient in the United States and Vietnam during the Vietnam war... Moving more positively in relation to religious institutions, it would seem important for religious institutions to view the forgiveness of debts to Third World countries, an initiative promoted in the Christian West by Jubilee 2000. But there are other opportunities as well to awaken the conscience of secular society and to deliver the message that religion is committed to inclusive ideals of peace and justice: religious leaders placing themselves on the frontlines between potential adversaries in warfare would, or could be, an immensely powerful impetus to celebrate and support the advent of a global ethic of the very kind that Küng is urging.\(^{81}\)

Krysmanski’s secularist mindset obscures the vision that in the rise of the ‘Christendom’ that is his own European legacy, a ‘paradigm shift’ occurred.\(^{82}\) The arguments of the 1990s are in any case somewhat superseded by the worldwide change in consciousness following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in 2001. Though scarcely the work of pious individuals, these attacks were inescapably associated with religious fanaticism; the secular sociological imagination is now forced to place the conflict between religious ideologies and the so-called ‘clash of cultures’ based on religious traditions at the centre of serious analysis. Küng’s project therefore takes on a new relevance and a new force. He himself is well aware of the change in consciousness since 9/11, and that since then he is no longer a voice crying in the wilderness.\(^{83}\) ‘What now seems clear to all is that problems of global terrorism, international crime, ecology, nuclear technology and genetic engineering threaten to overwhelm the world.’\(^{84}\) The global ethic has become the indispensable substructure of interaction between peoples if the earth is to survive its crises.

No case such as this can be blind to the human failings of religion. Christianity must live with a history of crusades, Inquisitions, conquistadors, and interdenominational conflict, clergy abuse of the innocent and too often, neglect of the oppressed. Islam and Judaism also have their moments of shame. Yet, in order to lift the nations beyond petty conflict and hubristic attitudes towards their fellow humans, it would be beneficial to heed the humane teachings

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\(^{81}\) Falk, ‘Küng’s Crusade’, p. 79.


\(^{84}\) Küng, quoted ibid.
of the founders of the religions of the book.

It can hardly have escaped attention that there is an unmistakable affinity between the teachings of Christianity and those of the Cynics and the Stoics. Undoubtedly Jesus Christ was a product of the ancient Jewish law from which he declaimed that not ‘one jot or one tittle’ should be removed (Matt. 5.18). Yet there is a resonance in both style and teaching between the missionary followers of Jesus and the Cynic sages. F. Gerald Downing presents an astonishing array of parallels between the sayings of Jesus’s apostles (from the Sayings Source known as ‘Q’) and Cynic sages, where almost exact replicas are demonstrated. ‘Both Q and the Cynics propose life-styles that diverge radically from established norms, but lifestyles that often turn out to be very similar, and are often expressed verbally in very similar ways.’

These self-same teachings are read week by week by all readers of the gospels and letters of the apostles. What is being urged here is that the Church, for all its failings, has carried forward globalizing teachings with all the humane investment of dignity and equality in all human beings: ‘There is no question here of Greek or Jew, circumcised and uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave and freeman; but Christ is all, and is in all’ (Colossians 3. 11 REB) — a passage that resonates with Stoic sensibilities. As Joseph Camilleri advises, when one makes a salutary distinction between ‘the spiritual culture of religion’ and its material culture, one finds that all the global religions: Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism share with western liberalism ‘a sense of the dignity of human life, a commitment to human fulfillment, and a concern for standards of rightness in human conduct.’

If the prophetic and ethical teachings of the great religions are taken seriously, they supply all the desired attributes of Cynicism and Stoicism. Indeed, there is a close historical affinity between the Cynicism and Stoicism of antiquity and the Abrahamic faiths, and in the latter case, ongoing global institutions are available for exploring these connections, and providing the basis for fruitful dialogue. One impediment to fruitful dialogue between east and west is an obstinate liberalism that, taking the doctrine of the separation of church and state to unnecessary extremes, inhibits potentially healthful channels of communication.

Finally, although this paper acknowledges the continuing responsibilities of states, it is urgent that the cosmopolitan ideal be absorbed into their fab-

ric. The democratic paradigm is founded on the notion of human equality, dignity, autonomy and freedom.\textsuperscript{89} To achieve a truly global ethic, it is necessary that the cosmopolitan ideal radiate from states — particularly the democratic ones — to each other, and to all peoples.

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Грахам Медокс

РЕЛИГИЈА И ПОТРАГА ЗА НОВИМ КОСМОПОЛИТАНИЗМОМ

Резиме

У свету након Хладног рата који је подељен 'мањим' сукобима, и Западом који је забринут наизменичним терористичким претњама, људска једнакост и братство (братство и сестринство) захтевају хитну ревизију. Међу занимљивим предлозима за теоријску основу људске једнакости јесте и позив за ревидирану, модернију верзију стоицизма коју предлаже Марта Нусбаум, а која се заснива на незаинтересованости за такмичење и суседску добру вољу. Али у циљу избегавања „телеологије“, Нусбаум одваја стоицизам од његових трансцедентних основа. Проблем модерног света јесте да одржи власт држава, заједно са њиховим капацитетима да помажу сиромашнима и потлаченима али и капацитетом да доминирају, допуштајући им да усвоје идеале космополитизма у креирању својих политика. Демократске државе имају обавезу да, као претци циничног и стоичког космополитизма, промовишу идеале људског достојанства и једнакости. Стоицизам Нусбаумове јевда да помаже, али ту су глобалне организације, као што су Уједињене нације и њене агенције, али и глобалне верске организации, које, као што истиче Ханс Кинг, могу да пруже институционалне основе.

Кључне речи: космополитанизам, цинизам, стоицизам, религије, Нусбаум, Куенг

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