THE CHURCH AND CONGRESS: RELIGIOUS AFFILIATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY VOTING IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Abstract

Recent literature in the religion and politics area has focused on the effect of various measures of religious affiliation on the political behavior of the mass public. Here we add to the evolving literature examining the influence of religious orientation on political elite behavior, focusing on the U.S. House of Representatives. Method. We use data on the religious affiliations of U.S. House members and National Journal scores of foreign policy voting to test the influence of religion on foreign policy ideology from 1998-2003. Our findings indicate that even after controlling for traditional political factors, religious identity influenced foreign policy voting in the House. African-American Protestants, Latter-day Saints (Mormons), and Evangelical Protestants present the most distinctive patterns. Conclusions. From this analysis we see further indications that religion influences legislative behavior in a way that, although intertwined with political partisanship, appears distinct from traditional political factors.

Keywords: Legislative Behavior; Religion; Foreign Policy; U.S. House of Representatives; U.S. Congress.
Introduction

Scholars of history, philosophy, psychology, and sociology have all acknowledged the impact of religion in shaping our world. In the social sciences, psychologists and sociologists led the way, following the insights of Karl Marx (1844), Emile Durkheim (noted by Nisbet, 1974) and Max Weber (see Johnstone, 1988) in the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, eventually establishing journals such as *Sociology of Religion*, *Review of Religious Research*, and *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* devoted to studying the relationship between religion and society. Political scientists noted the importance of Roman Catholic and Jewish voters for the Democratic New Deal coalition, but have been slower in recognizing the impact of religion. It took the rise of the Religious Right, subsequent battles over cultural issues, and the partisan realignment of the South to bring renewed attention to religion in explaining political attitudes and behavior.

The burgeoning contemporary research on religion and politics has focused primarily on the attitudes and behavior of the mass public (Layman, 2001; Olson and Warber, 2008), as well as on social movements like the New Religious Right and their organizational offspring (Rozell and Wilcox, 1996; Wilcox, 1996). In contrast, scholars have spent little effort delineating the influence of religion on American political elites and have focused on domestic politics rather than foreign policy. Yet, in the post 9-11 era many important international actors are identified by religious affiliation (e.g., “Islamic fundamentalists”), and American religious institutions are increasingly active on a range of foreign policy issues (Hertzke, 2004; Rock, 2011).

There is also mounting evidence that religion influences public attitudes on international issues. Of course, ethnoreligious factors often played such a role in the past. The hostility of Irish-American Catholics toward Great Britain, the isolationism of German-American Lutherans and Catholics in the 1930s, and Catholic anticommunism during the 1950s all shaped U.S. foreign policy (Hero, 1973). Today, American Jews and Evangelical Protestants are strongly supportive of Israel and African-Americans closely monitor American policy toward Africa (Uslaner, 2007). Some scholars, in fact, fear that ethnoreligious groups wield an unhealthy influence over U.S. foreign policy (Huntington, 2004), while others hope that the growing heterogeneity of American religious groups has fostered a new kind of cooperative internationalism (Guth, 2009b). In either case, we expect that such influences may increasingly shape public opinion on foreign policy.

In addition to ethnoreligious influences, religious beliefs may have an effect. Some researchers have argued that dispensationalist eschatology or other traditionalist Protestant theologies produce militarism and unconditional support for the state of Israel (Barker, Hurwitz, and Nelson, 2008; Baumgartner, Francia,
and Morris, 2008). Others think that religious exclusivism, moralism, or dogmatism may play a similar role (Guth 2009b). Mainline Protestants and Roman Catholics, on the other hand, may be influenced by a communitarian social theology (Leege and Kellstedt, 1993; Guth et al. 1997) and by support for religious pluralism (Hoge, Johnson, and Luidens, 1994; Tipton, 2007; Guth, 2009b). These perspectives may well combine to produce more “cooperative” policy preferences. Jewish beliefs such as *idedakah*, the obligation of charity and justice, are also associated with propensities for internationalism and liberalism (Greenberg and Wald, 2001). Finally, Black Protestant “liberation theology” envisions a foreign policy that provides American support for “underdogs” around the world and is reluctant to use military options. All these religious groups differ as to whether the United States has a special (“exceptional”) role to play in world affairs (Guth 2012).

The verdict is still out as to whether these influences are shaped by religious leaders or derive directly from religious affiliations and values (Hero, 1973; Quinley, 1974; Wald, 1992; Guth et al. 1997), but religious leaders do pronounce on foreign policy issues, providing potential cues for the laity. Evangelical Protestant organizations, such as the National Association of Evangelicals and the Southern Baptist Convention, have often endorsed a strong defense policy and have been skeptical of multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (Marsh, 2007). Mainline Protestant bodies, on the other hand, have criticized U.S. military adventures and supported international organizations and actions to alleviate world poverty (Tipton, 2007). The Vatican and the American Catholic hierarchy have espoused reducing military tension and fostering internationalism, peacekeeping, and international economic development. For African-American churches and the Jewish community, religious leadership may serve a lesser role on such, as civil rights organizations and Jewish civic groups provide alternatives to clergy cues, but even here clergy play a role (Sokhey and Djupe 2006). Whatever the success of religious elites in shaping foreign policy attitudes, it is clear that both ethnoreligious affiliations and religious beliefs help shape public attitudes. In a democratic society, political elites may well respond to such influences among voters—or perhaps be shaped themselves by the same ethnoreligious or theological perspectives.

**Elite Religion and Foreign Policymaking**

Although the theory of realism that dominated analysis during the Cold War era (Walt 1998) certainly discounts religious considerations, contemporary international relations scholarship has “brought religion back” into the study of world affairs (Kratchovil, 2009). Perhaps reflecting this new recognition, there has been a growing interest among American and European scholars in how religion influences presidential policy. As the president has a much stronger hand
in dealing with international issues than domestic ones, the question of religious influences here seems especially crucial. Indeed, recent historical studies have asserted the importance of religious factors in presidential decision-making (Preston 2012).

For example, William Inboden (2008) demonstrated from archival evidence that both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations consciously and consistently used religious appeals, alliances with religious groups, and even religious perspectives in constructing their foreign policy during the Cold War. More recently, scholars have argued that Jimmy Carter’s policies on human rights, the Mideast, and other issues were shaped in varying degrees by his religious beliefs (Merkley 2004; Glad 2009). His successor, Ronald Reagan, not only made frequent use of religious rhetoric in foreign policy pronouncements, but “brought a Christian frame of mind to issues ranging from foreign aid to nuclear arms” (Kengor 2004, 180), alarming many liberal critics. And while Bill Clinton sometimes fell back on his religious training when confronting Middle East issues (Oren 2007, 574ff), it was George W. Bush who was most often portrayed as subject to religious influences, whether in waging the “War on Terror” against Islamic radicals, initiating the invasion of Iraq, or fighting AIDS in Africa. Indeed, a veritable library of works has elaborated on that theme (see, for example, Phillips, 2006; Marsden, 2008; Guth, 2009a). Even Barack Obama’s foreign policy is often described as “Niebuhrian” (after his favorite theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr) or as too sympathetic to Islamic movements, because of a supposed Muslim heritage from his father’s family.

Of course, such interpretations are just that—interpretations of the available historical and empirical evidence. Religious influences may indeed have shaped presidential policy, but only in the context of many other forces, including ideology, partisanship, and unfolding events beyond presidential control. And in delineating the influence of religious factors on presidential policymaking, we face the “small N” problem, having only a very limited number of cases for analysis, preventing us from generalizing more broadly about the influence of religious factors. From an analytic perspective, then, Congress provides us with a more promising opportunity to discover how religion may shape policymaking in the international arena. Not only are there many more decision-makers, but they are required to cast “yea or nay” votes on numerous foreign policy issues over the course of a single Congress.

Disentangling the causes of individual legislative behavior is, of course, a daunting task. Scholars have suggested partisanship, constituency pressures, and interaction with peers are major influences (Kingdon, 1989). But along with these political factors, individual traits such religious affiliation may provide the “personal roots of representation” (Burden, 2007). Congressional scholars, however, have paid virtually no attention to religious factors. Nevertheless, the litera-
ture about religious influence on national legislators is slowly growing, with most of the contributions coming from students of politics and religion and or social scientists in other disciplines who study religion. Although a quick search reveals only a few books (e.g. D’Antonio, Tuch and Baker, 2013), there are an increasing number of conference papers, journal articles and book chapters addressing the topic. There are still large gaps in the literature, however. Most studies are confined to comparing members’ religious affiliations with those of the mass public, or to analyzing the religious influence on a few issues, such as abortion, gay rights, or support for Israel (Oldmixon, 2009; Smith, Olson, and Fine, 2010). Others focus on legislators from one religious tradition, such as Catholics (Oldmixon and Hudson, 2008) or Latter-day Saints (Cann, 2009). Only a few scholars have argued that religion plays a broader role in shaping legislative behavior (Guth, 2007; D’Antonio, Tuch and Baker, 2013).

Even fewer researchers have tested religion’s effects on the foreign policy votes of American legislators. In a study of roll-calls in the U.S. House from 1997-2003, Guth (2007) found that religious factors were strong predictors across a range of issues, including foreign policy. A few studies of specific issues, such as Middle East policy and the Darfur genocide, have also identified religious influences (Rosenson, Oldmixon, and Wald, 2009; Uscinski et al., 2009). Finally, religious differences have also appeared on votes for defense appropriations, obviously key to international affairs (D’Antonio, Tuch and Baker, 2013).

In a previous study, we showed that the religious affiliation of U.S. House members influenced the 2003 vote to fund the war effort in Iraq (Collins et al., 2011). Religious affiliation was a significant predictor even after controlling for ideology and partisanship, the number of military veterans in districts, and district partisanship. Roman Catholics were consistently less likely than Mainline Protestants to support the war effort, as were African-American Protestants. Secular legislators or those from “Other Religions” (mostly Christian Scientists) were also significantly less likely to favor the legislation than were Mainline Protestants. Latter-day Saints (Mormons) were less likely to vote “yes” also, although the coefficients were not statistically significant. Evangelical Protestants were more likely to vote in favor of the war effort than were Mainline Protestants, although the coefficients became much weaker (still positive, but not statistically significant) when the party or ideology of the representatives was included. Thus, Evangelicals’ support for militarism was apparently channeled through their Republican affiliation and general ideological conservatism.

While this analysis found interesting religious influences, there may well be special factors influencing votes on a Middle East war; a wider array of votes on foreign policy may tell a different story. Given the increasing evidence that ethnoreligious affiliations, specific religious beliefs, and clergy leadership cues may be linked to specific foreign policy stands among the mass public, we ex-
pect similar effects among national legislators. Unfortunately, however, we do not have detailed surveys of all the relevant religious traits of U.S. House members. As a result, we must use religious affiliation as a proxy for other aspects of religious faith, as religious traditions do vary systematically in belief, practice, and leadership cues.

Here we follow the religious classification scheme used with minor variations by political scientists (Collins et al. 2011) and sociologists (Steensland et al., 2000). This coding system combines denominations into distinct traditions based upon historical development, doctrinal emphases, and organizational ties. For our purposes, we create eight traditions: Mainline Protestants, Evangelical Protestants, African-American Protestants, Catholics, Jews, Latter-day Saints, Secular (non-religious) members, and a residual category including those of “Other Religions.”

In many cases, this coding is quite straightforward and can be derived from standard biographical sources. But, the correct classification of the large contingent of “white Protestants” in the House as either “Evangelical” or “Mainline” Protestants is more problematic. Evangelical Protestants are differentiated from Mainline Protestants by their emphasis on a high view of Scripture and traditional Christian doctrine, on pietism (as opposed to ritualism) in religious practices, and their emphasis on millennial eschatology. They are less accommodating in their attitudes toward the broader American culture than Mainline Protestants, have historically valued evangelism over social action, and have been less accepting of other religious faiths. Evangelical denominations include the Southern Baptist Convention, Assemblies of God, the Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod, Holiness groups such as the Church of the Nazarene, Seventh-Day Adventists, Pentecostals, several small Presbyterian bodies, smaller white Baptist denominations, and a host of nondenominational churches. Mainline denominations include the United Methodist Church, the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., the United Church of Christ, the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), the Episcopal Church, the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, the American Baptist Churches and a few much smaller bodies.

The main problem becomes immediately apparent: a “Baptist,” “Lutheran,” “Presbyterian” or “Protestant” might fall into either Evangelical or Mainline camps. To classify such members we went beyond such imprecise statements of religious affiliation found in the Congressional Directory. We identified the members’ precise affiliation by using their websites (often listing their home church), on-line editions of Project Vote Smart, local newspaper stories, special-

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5 Members falling into this category included Christian Scientists, members of the Unitarian Church, and the Orthodox Catholic Church. While these groups may have distinct traits, they were not represented in such numbers in our data to warrant individual groupings (Guth 2007).

6 Project Vote Smart is a non-partisan, non-profit education organization that started in 1988 and provides detailed information on...
ized religious publications, biographies and autobiographies of members, and interviews with legislators or staff. Thus, for example, every effort was made to determine whether a “Christian” or “Protestant” was really a Mainline Protestant, an Evangelical, or a Secular based on his or her actual church membership or attendance. This strategy substantially reduces measurement error and enhances our findings (Guth, 2007).

During the period of this study (1998-2003), Mainline Protestants made up the largest group in the House (197 representatives), and were split between parties, but were mostly Republican. Catholics constituted the second largest group (156 representatives) and were slightly more Democratic. Evangelical Protestants were the third largest group (92 representatives) and overwhelmingly Republican. There were 35 African-American Protestants, overwhelmingly Democratic. Among other religious traditions were 31 Jewish members (almost all Democrats), 16 Latter-day Saints (mostly Republican), 12 members of “Other Religions” (mainly Republicans), and 10 “Secular” members having no religious affiliation (almost all Democrats).

Given the findings in the emerging literature on religion and foreign policy attitudes in the mass public and the dominant direction of leadership cues in each tradition, we generated several hypotheses. As Mainline Protestants have historically dominated Congress and are also generally in the middle of the distribution on foreign policy votes, they serve as the omitted reference category (Collins et al. 2011). Thus, Mainline Protestants provide the baseline against which we compare other religious groups.

**H1. Evangelical Protestants will be more likely to vote conservatively on foreign policy issues than Mainline Protestants.** Although Evangelical Protestant leaders and laity are more focused on domestic social policy than U.S. foreign policy, they exhibit some marked emphases on certain foreign policy positions (Gushee, 2008). While Evangelical attitudes are far from uniform, some doctrinal tendencies encourage support for military action and concern for the security of Israel. Indeed, in the 1992 and 1996 American National Election Studies (ANES), white Evangelicals were more in favor of higher military spending and more willing for the U.S. to employ military force to attain foreign policy objectives than were other religious groups (Kohut, et al., 2000; Wilcox, 1996). Pew surveys in 1994 and 1996 also showed “committed” Evangelicals were among the most likely to favor military strength as opposed to relying on diplomacy to achieve foreign policy objectives; they were also least sympathetic to claims of conscientious objection (Kohut, et al., 2000).

Other attitudinal patterns are more complex. On the one hand, Evangelicals are skeptical of U.S. involvement with international organizations, particularly on global environmental and sexual health issues (they are staunchly opposed to election candidates and is available at http://votesmart.org/).
abortion and stem cell research, for example). On the other hand, they support “compassionate” humanitarian aid designed to attack the problems of famine, forced slavery, and debt held by smaller foreign nations. They are particularly warm toward promoting democracy and human rights in countries with minority Christian populations, especially in the Muslim world, viewing these as religious liberty issues (Gushee, 2008; Marsden, 2008). These tendencies among the laity are very consistent with the attitudes of Evangelical elites and clergy (Guth et al. 1997; Marsh, 2007).

H2. Catholic representatives will be less likely to vote conservatively on foreign policy issues than Mainline Protestants. The communitarian bias of the Catholic tradition, combined with the “just war” doctrine and a preference for multilateral international action, would seem to militate against pre-emptive military action. This posture was exhibited in the Vatican’s condemnation of American military action in 2002 and frequent statements by the U.S. Catholic bishops (Allen, 2002; Catholic News Service, n.d.; United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2002).

H3. African-American Protestants will be less likely to vote conservatively on foreign policy issues than Mainline Protestants. Recent empirical evidence of mass political behavior is ambiguous, but would generally support the hypothesis presented here. In the 1992 ANES, African-American Evangelicals were more in favor of increased defense spending than were Mainline Protestants (22% to 19%) but a smaller percentage of African-American Protestants (18% to 21%) were “very willing to use [military] force” (Wilcox, 1996, 50, 54). When the same questions were asked in the 1996 ANES, Black Protestants were on the more conservative end of the spectrum on willingness to use military force, but “committed “Black Protestants were more in the middle (Kohut, et al., 2000). Pew data from 1994 and 1996 illustrated that Black Protestants, both “committed” and “other,” were among the groups least likely to favor military force over diplomacy and to force conscientious objectors to fight (Kohut, et al., 2000).

Another observer of “black evangelicals” has identified “right,” “left,” and “center” wings, but notes that African-American churches and leaders are more concerned with social justice in domestic and foreign policy and have a more Afro-centric view of the world than their white Evangelical counterparts. Even conservative African-American Evangelical leaders, such as Bishop Harry Jackson, see the need to engage in social action to solve moral crises such as world hunger and poverty, the AIDS epidemic, and the crisis in Darfur, as well as asking questions about the morality of war (Gushee, 2008, pp.38-41). More liberal African-American leaders such as Rev. Jese Jackson and Professor Obery Hendricks criticized George W. Bush for what they perceived to be an immoral war in Iraq, and the former has also added U.S. actions against illegal immigrants to his list of immoral government acts (Gushee, 2008, pp. 72-75). Nincic and Nincic (2002) also note the liberationist emphases of the Black church and the
overwhelming opposition of African-American religious leaders to the Iraq war, as well as the public opinion research on minority views of militarism (Nincic and Nincic, 2002). Thus, we think that African-American Protestants will exhibit less conservative voting patterns than Mainline Protestant representatives.

**H4. Latter-day Saints will be more likely to vote conservatively on foreign policy issues than Mainline Protestants.** Although Latter-day Saints (Mormons) are theologically distinct from Evangelicals, they have much in common politically. Like Evangelicals, Mormons are most concerned with domestic moral issues such as abortion, school prayer, and pornography. But they also share Evangelicals’ tolerance for use of military force (Kohut, et al, 2000) and the strong conviction that the United States has a special role to play in the world, a part of “American Exceptionalism” (Guth 2012). Furthermore, as evangelism abroad is very important to Latter-day Saints, they duplicate Evangelical Protestants’ desire for U.S. foreign policy to pursue democracy and religious liberty everywhere. The Mormon Church has also worked with the Christian Right to ensure that U.S. foreign policy has a pro-family, pro-marriage, and pro-life bent (Marsden, 2008). Based on these observations we expect that they will also exhibit more general conservative voting in our pooled analysis.

**H5 Jewish members of Congress will be less likely to vote conservatively on foreign policy issues than Mainline Protestants.** Again, as prior research found that Jewish members tended to vote liberally on foreign policy issues during certain years, we expect these trends to continue in the present analysis (cf. Spiegel 2001).

**H6. Members of “minority religious traditions” and “seculars” will be less likely to vote conservatively on foreign policy issues than Mainline Protestants.** Evidence from mass public surveys show religious minorities are more inclined to oppose American military action, especially when taken unilaterally. Prior research on Congress also supports this contention.

In addition to religious variables, we include control variables which have previously been shown to influence Congressional foreign policy voting:

**Military Service.** Prior studies suggest that military veterans may view foreign affairs differently than those who have not served, perhaps being socialized to view national security in military terms, discounting economic or diplomatic resolutions (Walt, 1987; Sagan, 2003). Others argue that veterans are reluctant to use force, but once force is applied, they are more willing to escalate war efforts or give the military a free hand (Gelpi and Feaver, 2002). On balance, we expect that veterans will vote more conservatively on foreign policy. We code this variable as follows: experience in the active military (1), service in the reserves (0.5), or no prior service (0). During these years, most members had no military experience, but several dozen had served in the active military and a few dozen had spent time in the reserves.
Partisanship. The literature on legislative voting is dominated by the influence of party membership (Bullock and Brady, 1983; Patterson and Caldeira, 1988; Cox and McCubbins 1993). The size of the respective majorities when party voting takes place, known as “party unity,” has been very high in recent years, often in the range of 85% (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). Since the 1980s, ideological polarization and party divisions in the electorate and legislative parties have increased. We expect that Republican members will vote more conservatively on foreign policy.

The inclusion of controls for partisanship raises critical questions for our analysis of religious influence. If religious tradition influences voting after controlling for partisanship, we can be confident that religion has at least some direct influence on behavior. However, given that the partisanship of political elites, like that of the electorate, is increasingly characterized by religious differences, a lack of findings for the religious variables may indicate that religious factors are so interrelated with partisanship that direct influences may not be distinguishable. We seek to better understand these concepts in this paper and to analyze the relationships among these variables in more detail.

District Partisanship. An important aspect of constituency influence on representatives would clearly be the voters’ partisanship. If Republican voters are more conservative on foreign policy, this should move a representative to support a conservative foreign policy agenda. We predict that the higher the percentage of the Republican two-party vote for Robert Dole in the 1996 election (for votes in 1998, 1999, and 2000), and the higher the percentage that supported George W. Bush in 2000 (for votes in 2001, 2002, and 2003), the more likely a representative is to vote conservatively on foreign policy.

Gender. Gender differences may also influence representatives’ votes. In the mass public women are consistently less militaristic than men (Conover and Sapiro, 1993). Baker, Hurwitz, and Nelson (2008) also find that women are less likely than men to support militarism, nationalism, or the state of Israel. Thus, we hypothesize that male House members should generally be more conservative. Most legislators are males, but our data include between 50 and 57 female lawmakers per year in the House.

Presidential Partisanship. As commander-in-chief, head of state, and chief diplomat, the President is largely in charge of foreign policy. Administrations usually initiate foreign policies and determine their purpose and scope. Given that foreign policy legislation is often closely advanced by the administration, congressional votes may represent support for a president of one’s own party as much as the member’s personal views. Therefore, we include a variable for Republican incumbency in office and also interact this variable with member partisanship. As our data includes votes from both the Clinton (Democratic) and George W. Bush (Republican) administrations, for practical purposes this variable distinguishes those two.
Religion and Foreign Policy Voting: Data and Analysis

Although several measures of congressional ideology have been used by scholars, including DW-Nominate scores (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997) and ADA scores, these ratings are weighted toward votes on economic and social issues. The annual *National Journal* scores, on the other hand, have the advantage of providing separate measures for foreign policy votes. *National Journal* staff members begin with all roll-call votes in Congress in a given year and identify votes that illustrate a strongly ideological pattern. Then, those votes are categorized as being focused on economic policy, foreign policy, or social policy. An ideological pattern is identified using principal components analysis. Votes in the three policy areas are then weighted accordingly to their fit with the common pattern. Representatives casting at least half these key votes in a given year were included; abstentions and non-votes were not counted.

Representatives were then ranked ideologically and assigned percentile scores relative to the position of other members (*National Journal*, 2013). In 2012, for example, 116 votes provided the scores for the three categories of policies. The *National Journal* foreign policy scores are typically based on from 20 to 40 votes that illustrate ideological divisions. It should also be noted, however, that because not all foreign policy votes in a congressional session are included in *National Journal* ratings, the behavior of representatives on certain less controversial votes are excluded from analysis. For example, there may be some votes on human rights issues—particularly on support for freedom of religious practice and opposition to slavery and human trafficking—that would be supported by Evangelicals, more conservative Mainline Protestants, and more conservative Catholics who otherwise might be less favorable toward other types of foreign aid or international cooperation. Thus, the *National Journal* ratings by definition include controversial votes where ideological distinctions are clear. Table 1 provides examples of these “key votes,” drawn from *The Almanac of American Politics* (Barone and Cohen, 1998-2003). We use the “conservative” version of the score, so a high number identifies a conservative member and a low score, a liberal member. The scores ranged from zero to 97, with a mean of 48.

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7 NOMINATE scores are a multidimensional scaling method developed by U.S. political scientists Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal (1997) to assess and predict the behavior of members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives. The scores represent an “ideal point” for each member in an ideological “common space” based on a conservative/liberal continuum. The ideal points are based on members’ past roll call voting behavior and allow comparisons between members and across time. The scores are available at http://voteview.com/.

8 The *National Journal* does not provide scores for those representatives that do not record a significant number of votes on foreign policy bills per year. Data for these representatives are therefore not included in our models, although over 96% of the individual representatives are included in our data per year.
### Table 1: A Sample of Foreign Policy Roll-Call Votes Used in This Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House Bill</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Result</th>
<th>Democratic Votes</th>
<th>Republican Votes</th>
<th>Conservative Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HCR 227: Withdraw Troops(^1)</td>
<td>3/18/98</td>
<td>Failed</td>
<td>13-181</td>
<td>180-43</td>
<td>“Yes”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR 4276: End TV Marti(^2)</td>
<td>8/04/98</td>
<td>Failed</td>
<td>142-56</td>
<td>29-195</td>
<td>“No”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR 261: Fast-Track Trade(^3)</td>
<td>9/25/98</td>
<td>Failed</td>
<td>29-171</td>
<td>151-71</td>
<td>“Yes”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR 4444: Trade w/China(^5)</td>
<td>5/24/00</td>
<td>Passed</td>
<td>73-138</td>
<td>164-57</td>
<td>“Yes”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR 4811: Debt Relief(^6)</td>
<td>7/13/00</td>
<td>Passed</td>
<td>189-16</td>
<td>26-194</td>
<td>“No”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR 4871: Drop Cuba Embargo(^7)</td>
<td>7/20/00</td>
<td>Failed</td>
<td>149-52</td>
<td>24-188</td>
<td>“No”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR 3005: Trade Authority(^8)</td>
<td>12/06/01</td>
<td>Passed</td>
<td>21-189</td>
<td>194-23</td>
<td>“Yes”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR 4546: Bar Funds Int. Ct.(^9)</td>
<td>5/10/02</td>
<td>Passed</td>
<td>59-143</td>
<td>204-8</td>
<td>“Yes”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HJRes 114: Auth. Force Iraq(^10)</td>
<td>10/10/02</td>
<td>Passed</td>
<td>81-126</td>
<td>215-6</td>
<td>“Yes”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Vote totals here include the votes of U.S. Representatives who are independent with regard to party affiliation.

\(^1\)HCR 227 was a vote to use the War Powers Resolution to withdraw U.S. military troops from their peacekeeping duties in Bosnia.

\(^2\)HR 4276 was a vote to stop the funding of TV Marti broadcasts to Cuba.

\(^3\)HR 2621 was a vote to allow Congress to negotiate international trade agreements using “fast track” authority.

\(^4\)HConRes 42 was a vote to deploy U.S. forces to Kosovo to participate in NATO peacekeeping missions.

\(^5\)HR 4444 was a vote to allow permanent international trade relations with China.

\(^6\)HR 4811 was a vote to provide debt relief for certain less-developed, heavily-indebted nations.

\(^7\)HR 4871 was a vote to discontinue the enforcement of the economic embargo of Cuba.

\(^8\)HR 3005 was a vote to extend trade promotion authority to the president in negotiating trade agreements.

\(^9\)HR 4546 was a vote to prohibit U.S. funding of the International Criminal Court.

\(^10\)HJRes 114 was a vote to authorize the president to employ military force against Iraq.
What does it mean to be “conservative” or “liberal” on foreign policy? In the contemporary era, conservatives are more likely to favor military intervention in defense of the nation (including votes to fund the War on Terror), less likely to support using U.S. troops in NATO or UN peacekeeping missions, more prone to back Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) activity against governments hostile to the U.S., less likely to favor international organizations in general, less willing to fund debt relief or other financial and humanitarian aid for Third-World nations, and more likely to endorse free trade agreements than liberals are. These contemporary definitions of “conservative” and “liberal” in foreign policy roughly correspond to Wittkopf’s foreign policy categories of hardliners (conservatives) and accommodationists (liberals), as well as Schneider’s categories of conservative internationalists and liberal internationalists. Unlike some members of the public, both conservative and liberal elites favor international engagement, but conservatives are more “militant” while liberals are more “cooperative” (Wittkopf and Maggiotto, 1983; Wittkopf, 1986).

In looking at the dispersion of the National Journal ratings, we see some clear trends. As expected, there are partisan differences: Democrats’ mean rating over the six-year period was 24.3, while Republicans averaged a much more conservative 70.5. Interestingly, there is little variation attributable to the change in presidential administration in 2001 and the subsequent events of September 11. Although one might expect somewhat lower scores for Republicans before 2001, given partisan opposition to President Clinton’s foreign policies, there is little evidence of a substantial shift in 2001. This mirrors partisan patterns seen in measures of general ideology, such as DW-Nominate scores.

More interesting for our purposes, we find clear and consistent distinctions between religious traditions (Figure 1). While we present pooled data for the entire period, average ratings for religious groups are generally stable across all six years. As expected, Evangelicals ranked as the most conservative, averaging 67.5 (Latter-day Saints are almost identical at 67.2). Mainline Protestants averaged 53.7, while Catholics scored about 10 points lower, somewhat more liberal. African-American Protestants were the most liberal group, the lowest bar in Figure 1. Members of “Other Religions” are generally more conservative than Mainline Protestants, while Jewish and Secular members are more liberal. Overall, then, Evangelicals, Latter-day Saints, and those from “Other Religions” are the most conservative, while African-American Protestants, Jews, and Secular members are the most liberal. Mainline Protestants and Catholics hold down the middle, with Catholics leaning slightly in a liberal direction.
While this descriptive data is illustrative, we need further analysis to understand the role that religion plays in foreign policy votes. To accomplish this, we examine individual *National Journal* scores, with our unit of analysis the district seat in Congress per year over a six-year period. Because the analyses are based on pooled (panel) data with repeated observations on fixed units over time, the normal presumption that no serial or spatial correlations exist between units is compromised (Beck and Katz, 1995). Thus, with pooled models we cannot be certain that errors for a particular unit at a certain time are unrelated to errors at other times. Normal OLS produces biased estimations due to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. For this reason, all models are estimated using panel corrected standard errors using the “xtpsce” command in STATA. This strategy accounts for heteroskedastic error structure and uses panel-specific estimates of first-order autocorrelation (Garand, 2010).

We report results of panel corrected estimates of conservative foreign policy voting in each year with religious tradition memberships as the key independent variables. We also control for the military service of the House member, gender, the district support for the Republican presidential candidate, party identification, and the party of the president. Table 2 lists all the variables with the predicted influence, based on our hypotheses above. The reference category for religious tradition (the excluded group) is Mainline Protestants, so the coefficient for each religious tradition variable is in comparison to Mainline Protestants.
Table 2: Listing and Coding of Independent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coding Scheme</th>
<th>Predicted Influence on National Journal Foreign Policy Scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious Affiliations</td>
<td>Dichotomous (dummy) variables for each member, with Mainline Protestants serving as the reference category</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evangelical Protestant</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>African-American Protestant</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Latter-day Saint</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Religion</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Service</td>
<td>1.0 = former/current active military 0.5 = former/current reserve 0.0 = no military experience</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Representative</td>
<td>1= Republican Representative 0 = Democrat or other party</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District GOP two-party vote</td>
<td>Voting percentage for the Republican presidential candidate for the member’s district in the most recent election</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican President</td>
<td>1= Republican President 0= Democratic President</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male Representative</td>
<td>1= male House member 0 = female House member</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican X Republican President</td>
<td>1 = Both the member and the President are Republicans 0 = other</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3 displays three models. The first includes religious variables only, the second adds the controls, and the third includes an interaction between member party affiliation and the party of the President. First, note that all three models explain a substantial portion of the variance, with R-squares ranging from .65 in the “religion only” model to .84 in the two more elaborate models. The proportion of variance explained by the religious variables alone would surprise many congressional analyses. In Model 1, with no controls, all our religion variables are statistically significant and usually in the predicted directions. Evangelical Protestants voted more conservatively than Mainline Protestants: on average an Evangelical would score 15 points higher on the National Journal scores. Latter-day Saints are also significantly more conservative than Mainliners. But the largest differences from the baseline group are shown by African-American Protestants and Seculars, both averaging 35 points lower on the rankings. Roman Catholics and Jews also scored lower than Mainline Protestants, indicating more liberal voting. Only the “Other Religions” category belied our expectations, producing a significantly more conservative ideology than Mainline Protestants.

The second model in Table 3 shows the results for religious tradition after controlling for other factors. Three controls involve partisanship: member party, the district percentage voting Republican in the previous presidential election, and the party of the president. Not surprisingly, two party variables are very strong predictors. Republicans had substantively (39 points) and statistically more conservative scores on average than Democratic representatives. Legislators were also influenced by presidential election results: those from districts with higher GOP votes in 1996 and 2000 had higher conservative ratings. In fact, on average, for every additional 1% in Republican two-party votes, there was a corresponding 0.21% increase in the representative’s National Journal score. On the other hand, the president’s political party had a coefficient in the opposite direction of what one might expect. On average, when there is a Republican president, scores for all representatives are statistically lower. As our data cover only two presidents (Bill Clinton and George W. Bush), this indicates that, on average, representatives showed more liberal voting tendencies during the Bush Administration.

These findings confirming the importance of party are nothing new. Partisanship has long been identified as a major factor influencing the vote choices of members from both houses (Bullock and Brady 1983; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Patterson and Caldeira 1988). For many issues, the two parties take distinct positions and legislators are expected to join their compatriots to oppose the majority of the opposition. In fact, by almost any measure of partisan voting in Congress, such voting is on the increase, if not at historically high levels (Hershey, 2013, chapter 13).

There is a debate in the literature on the effect of constituency opinion on vote choice. Some, like Miller and Stokes (1963), have linked constituency
positions on particular issues directly to vote choices made by representatives. Others, like Kingdon (1977), have noted that constituency opinion is one of many influences, but rather than competing, often acts in the same direction as other forces in the representative’s political world, including the member’s own goals. If a majority of district voters hail from the same party as the representative, then the views of constituency and representative tend to align, rather than conflict. Indeed, in his classic study of House members in their districts, Fenno (1978) found that the partisan nature of districts was well-understood by members, who exploited these partisan ties for all they were worth. Bishin (2000), too, found that Senators cast votes with the partisanship of their state in mind, knowing that they could write off strong partisans from the opposing party, but could not afford to alienate other constituents. Thus, it should not be surprising that two party variables in this study—the representative’s affiliation and the district’s partisanship—were statistically significant and substantively powerful predictors of roll-call votes on foreign policy.

The remaining control variables had mixed effects. Like their counterparts in the mass public, male representatives were consistently more conservative on foreign policy than their female peers. House males scored about three and a half points higher on the National Journal scores than female representatives. Previous military service, however, appears to have little influence, as it missed statistical significance at the 95-percent confidence interval (two-tailed) although it was significant at the .10 level.

The important point for our purpose, however, is that religious tradition variables retain considerable direct impact, even after controlling for these other political and demographic variables. We might not expect this to be the case: in recent decades, party affiliation among both voters and political elites has come to be strongly shaped by and aligned with ethnic and religious factors (Kellstedt and Guth, 2013; D’Antonio, Tuch, and Baker, 2013). Thus, religious influences on voting might be indirect, mediated by partisanship. The reduction in the size of the religious coefficients from Model 1 to Model 2 suggests that this is partially the case. Nevertheless, even taking into account the more proximate influences of party affiliation, religious membership adds explanatory power. Latter-day Saints and Evangelical Protestants display more conservative ratings when compared to Mainline Protestants, even after controlling for partisanship and other factors. The results for African-American Protestants and Seculars are particularly strong, as each group is still significantly more likely to vote the liberal position on foreign policy, even after controls. On the other hand, the influence of Roman Catholic, “Other Religions”, and Jewish affiliations is absorbed by partisanship and other controls, as the coefficients fail to retain statistical significance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>MODEL 1: Religion Alone</th>
<th>MODEL 2: Religion &amp; Controls</th>
<th>MODEL 3: Interactive Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious Tradition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical Protestant</td>
<td>14.88***</td>
<td>4.13***</td>
<td>4.13***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.39)</td>
<td>(0.86)</td>
<td>(0.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>-8.58***</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.72)</td>
<td>(0.84)</td>
<td>(0.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African-American Protestant</td>
<td>-35.71***</td>
<td>-8.88***</td>
<td>-8.84***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.65)</td>
<td>(1.32)</td>
<td>(1.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latter-day Saint</td>
<td>19.28***</td>
<td>8.59***</td>
<td>8.60***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.93)</td>
<td>(1.51)</td>
<td>(1.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>-24.64***</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.63)</td>
<td>(1.46)</td>
<td>(1.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>-34.81***</td>
<td>-10.70***</td>
<td>-10.66***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.02)</td>
<td>(2.82)</td>
<td>(2.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Religion</td>
<td>10.19***</td>
<td>-2.51</td>
<td>-2.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.21)</td>
<td>(2.59)</td>
<td>(2.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Influencing Factors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Service</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.80)</td>
<td>(0.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Representative</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>39.21***</td>
<td>38.87***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.77)</td>
<td>(0.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District GOP two-party vote</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.21***</td>
<td>0.21***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for president</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican President</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-1.13*</td>
<td>-0.74*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.56)</td>
<td>(0.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male Representative</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>3.64***</td>
<td>3.64***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.97)</td>
<td>(0.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactive: Republican X</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican President</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>52.98***</td>
<td>16.01***</td>
<td>16.21***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.00)</td>
<td>(1.44)</td>
<td>(1.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>2508</td>
<td>2508</td>
<td>2508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\text{Chi}^2)</td>
<td>1374.76***</td>
<td>6088.81***</td>
<td>6071.12***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R^2)</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Data examined using panel corrected standard errors (PCSE), using estimates of the first-order autoregressive processes that are panel specific. Dependent Variable = National Journal Rating (Conservative) on Foreign Policy Votes. Mainline Protestants is the excluded category.  

\*** = p < .001, \** = p < .01, \* = p < .05 (two-tailed)
To put this in a better perspective using predicted probabilities, the model predicts that a Republican who is also a Mainline Protestant would have an expected National Journal foreign policy score of 68.9, while an Evangelical Protestant Republican would have a score of 73.9. A Mainline Protestant Democrat is predicted to have a National Journal score of 27.6 while an Evangelical Democrat would have a score of 33.2, an increase of about eight percent. For Democrats, an even stronger effect is seen among African-American Protestants (14.3) and Mainline Protestants (27.6), a drop of almost half. While perhaps not as strong an influence as partisanship, religious affiliation produces additive effects on foreign policy ideology.

Of course, it is difficult to distinguish the effects of a representative being an African-American Protestant from those of being an African-American or from being a Democrat. African-American Democrats are among the most liberal members of Congress, voting even more in line with African-American constituencies than white Democrats on legislation that offers “concentrated” benefits to African-Americans, such as civil rights or affirmative action bills (Whitby and Krause, 2001). However, African-Americans do not vote as a bloc on all issues, and personal attributes such age, religious affiliation, and leadership roles produce some variation in ideological voting. For example, Rocca, Sanchez, and Nikora (2009) found that African-American Baptists were slightly more conservative than other African-American representatives. Likewise, on social or moral issues, such as gender roles, school prayer, and abortion, African-American legislators may not be any more liberal than the typical white Democrat, as they (and their constituents) are cross-pressured to maintain allegiance to the Democratic Party while having some sympathy for more conservative stances (Smith, Olson, and Fine, 2010; Wilcox, 1996). However these differences may emerge on foreign policy issues African-American Protestants were much more liberal than Mainline Protestants.

Finally, as one last check of the robustness of our findings, we add an interaction term multiplying Republican representative by Republican president (last column of Table 3). This variable tests whether GOP members are more likely to vote conservatively than usual when a Republican occupies the White House. (This variable will equal 1 if both the legislator and the president are Republican and 0 otherwise.) We find, essentially, that there are no interactive effects. Republican representatives were no more prone to vote conservatively under George W. Bush than under Clinton. Including the interaction term does not improve the overall fit of the model, and does not affect the influence of the other variables.9

In addition to the multiplicative model, we also attempted a model including a variable measuring if the president and the representative were of the same party. Thus, Democrats would be a “1” during the Clinton Administration and “0” during the Bush Administration and vice versa for Republicans. This model produced essentially the same results, suggesting that the results for religious affiliation were not conditioned on partisanship concordance between the legislator and the president.
Thus, we conclude that partisanship matters, but so does religious affiliation, even after taking partisanship into account. Certainly, Republicans are more likely to take the conservative stance on foreign policy, and representatives of both parties vote more conservatively when Republican presidential candidates do well in their districts. But even so, several of our religion variables remain a significant factor in legislative behavior.

**Discussion and Further Research**

The analyses reveal distinct voting patterns for different religious traditions. Our hypotheses were generally supported for Evangelicals, African-American Protestants, Seculars, and Latter-day Saints when compared to Mainline Protestants. Evangelical Protestants, in many ways, are distinctive from Mainline Protestants and most other religious groups. Heavily Republican, they exhibit very conservative foreign policy voting patterns, as do Latter-day Saints. African-American Protestants and Secular members tend to be slightly more liberal than Mainline Protestants, even above and beyond their strong ties to the Democratic Party.

While we think this analysis adds to the literature, there are several reasons to continue examining these issues. First, we need to study House voting patterns over a longer time frame, as there is some evidence that the impact of religion may have changed (Rosenson, Oldmixon, and Wald, 2009; D’Antonio, Tuch and Baker, 2013). In addition, the impact of other presidential administrations might be different than those of Presidents Clinton and Bush, the incumbents during the period under study. Second, we need to incorporate more sensitive religious measures in the analysis, as religious affiliation is at best a partial measure of a representative’s beliefs and commitment. Some evidence indicates that the nature of the legislator’s religious belief system and the level of commitment to those beliefs are far more powerful predictors than mere affiliation (Guth, 2007). Indeed, for one representative religious beliefs may have a very pronounced impact, while for another religion may have little influence. Thus, better measures of legislator belief and commitment might produce even more impressive results than those reported here.

Another potentially significant area of research would be to focus more closely on those religious groups for which party identification mitigates the effect of religious affiliation on foreign policy voting. For example, while the findings for most groups we analyze are similar even after we employ political control variables, this is not the case across the board. As can be seen by comparing the three columns in Table 3, the strong findings of foreign policy ideological voting for Roman Catholics, Jews, and “other religions” fade after inclusion of the political control variables. In part, this may result from the rather different
theological perspectives of Republicans and Democrats in these traditions (Guth 2007). In such cases future research using qualitative methods would be valuable to discover how members transact the unique exchanges between religion and partisanship (e.g. see Oldmixon and Hudson, 2008).

Despite its limitations, we believe this analysis adds to the developing literature on religion and legislative behavior. Although our findings should be of special interest to scholars, this analysis has implications for voters as well. Voters assess candidates on ideology (or positions on certain issues), partisanship and personal traits, such as political or governing experience, charisma, and occupational background. Our analysis suggests that religious affiliation perhaps warrants their attention as well. We do not suggest that voters judge candidates on religious considerations alone, but like scholars, voters should recognize that religion may have a role in the legislative process and understand something about the nature of that influence. Thus, citizens may derive significant policy information from knowing the religious traits of candidates (Jacobsmeier, 2013), adding to the “rationality” of their electoral choices.

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ЦРКВА И КОНГРЕС: ВЕРСКА ПРИПАДНОСТИ И ГЛАСАЊЕ О СПОЉНОЈ ПОЛИТИЦИ У АМЕРИЧКОМ ПРЕДСТАВНИЧКОМ ДОМУ

Резиме

Скорија литература из области религије и политике се фокусира на мерење разних ефеката верске припадности на политичко понашање јавности. Ми додајемо овој растућој литератури истраживање утицаја верске припадности на понашање политичких елита, са фокусом на Америчко представничко тело. Метод. Ми користимо податке о верској припадности чланова представничког дома и податке Националног журнала о гласању о спољној политици да тестирамо утицај религије на идеологију спољне политике у периоду 1998-2003. Наши налази говоре да верска припадност утиче на гласање о спољној политици у представничком дому. Афро-Амерички протестанти, Мормони и припадници Еванђелске протестантске цркве представљају најкарактеристичнији образац. Закључак. Ова анализа показује будуће индикације утицаја верског понашања на законодавно понашање, који се, иако испреплетан са политичким припадношћу, показује различит од традиционалних политичких фактора.

Кључне речи: законодавно понашање, религија, спољна политика, амерички представнички дом, Конгрес

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