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RELIGION AND POLISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE XXI CENTURY

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to draw a map of the essential points of contact between religion and foreign policy in Poland during 2001-2020. The analytic studies have shown that the relationships between religion and Polish foreign policy could be observed in all the dimensions mentioned by the theoretical approaches, i.e. in the dimension of influence of religious ideas, religious entities and institutions, in the field of presence of religious elements on the agenda of foreign policy, and with reference to religious diplomacy. The impact of religious ideas was limited to the generally interpreted Christianity. Religious entities would strongly prefer to exert their influence from the level of meta-politics than to do this by direct means. Among all the institutions, only the electoral system played a relatively significant role in the introduction of religious components to foreign policy, yet only in the initial period. The presence of religious elements on the agenda of the foreign policy was not permanent and was actually limited to a few initiatives. Similarly, religious diplomacy does not seem to be a methodology that is deeply rooted in Poland's political culture, and it is not really accepted by the religious entities.

Keywords: Poland, religion, Christianity, religious actors, foreign policy, political agenda, religious diplomacy

Introduction

The research papers in the field of political studies and international relations, published during the recent 10+ years, indicate the growing number and importance of religious actors on the international stage and higher awareness of the fact that religion has established its position for good in certain political circles. Until recently, researchers would focus on studying the role of the religious factor in international relations, military conflicts, building peace and activities of international organizations. For several years, their area of interest has been expanded with foreign policy. The primary point of interest for research in the field is the state and the role of religion in forming the state's foreign policy. Analytic

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studies focus on domestic state and non-state actors, as well as entities located outside the state which affect the state's foreign policy. This research covers all the areas in which a state's foreign policy is created and developed². The following researchers are among the most significant ones working in the field: Thomas J. Carty³, Jeffrey Haynes⁴, Walter Russell Mead⁵, John J. Mearsheimer, Stephen M. Walt⁶, Jack Miles⁷, Carolyn M. Warner, and Stephen G. Walker⁸. Their studies focus on those states where religion has a significant effect on foreign policies: United States, India, and Iran.

The presence of the religious factor can also be noticed in Poland's foreign policy. Studies on this fact are, however, at a very early stage right now. The only papers in the field which can be referenced here are the studies by Alicja Curanović, aimed at defining the role of religion in the development of the geopolitical frame of reference used by Poland in its relationships with Russia⁹, and the papers by Piotr Pochyły and Jarosław Macała. The former focused on the declarative expressions of religious affiliation of the Polish state in the field of foreign policy¹⁰, the latter on the role of religion in the Polish geopolitical codes functioning in foreign policy¹¹. This paper expands the field of research, with the objective of answering the following questions: what impact religion had on the Polish foreign policy; which measures were implemented within the framework of that policy involving religion as their objects; and which measures met the criteria of religious diplomacy. Through the achievement of that goal, we will arrive at a map of the key points of contact between religion and the Polish foreign policy. The analytic studies cover the period of 2001-2020, i.e. the time during which, following the 11 September 2001 events, the religious factor increased in significance, until the present day. In this paper, the religious factor should be interpreted as the impact of religious ideas, the activity of religious institutions (organizations) and people with religious motivations who act individually or in

- 2 Nukhet A. Sandal, "Religion and foreign policy", in: *Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics*, Jeffrey Haynes (ed.), 2nd Edition, Routledge, London & New York, 2016, pp. 284-285.
- 3 Thomas J. Carty, John Kennedy, religion, and foreign policy, *The Review of Faith & International Affairs*, No. 4, Vol. 9, 2011, pp. 51-59.
- 4 Jeffrey Haynes, "Religion and foreign policy", in: *Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics*, Jeffrey Haynes (ed.), Routledge, London & New York, 2009, pp. 293-307.
- 5 Walter Russell Mead, God's Country?, *Foreign Affairs*, No. 5, Vol. 85, 2006, pp. 24-43.
- 6 John J. Mearsheimer, Stephen M. Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2007.
- 7 Jack Miles, Religion and American foreign policy, *Survival*, No. 1, Vol. 46, 2004, pp. 23-37.
- 8 Carolyn M. Warner, Stephen G. Walker, Thinking about the Role of Religion in Foreign Policy: A Framework for Analysis, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2011, pp. 113-135.
- 9 Alicja Curanović, „Geopolityka religii w stosunkach polsko-rosyjskich”, in: *Geopolityka w stosunkach polsko-rosyjskich*, Stanisław Bieleń, Andrzej Skrzypek (ed.), Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa, 2012, pp. 123-143.
- 10 Piotr Pochyły, „Deklaratywne wyrazy religijności III RP w exposé ministrów spraw zagranicznych”, in: *Polityka jako wyraz lub następstwo religijności*, Ryszard Michalak (ed.), Wydawnictwo Morpho, Zielona Góra, 2015, pp. 401-410.
- 11 Jarosław Macała, Religia w polskich kodach geopolitycznych w latach 1990-2017 na przykładzie informacji ministrów spraw zagranicznych o polityce zagranicznej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, *Przegląd Religioznawczy*, Vol. 265, No. 3, 2017, pp. 23-43.

groups. Foreign policy is defined here as the state's formal policy concerning the military, economic, humanitarian, social and cultural dimensions of its relations with other countries and with international actors. The studies were carried out on the basis of Government documents, official statements by representatives of the Polish Government, documents issued by various religious entities, press coverage, and literature on the subject. Following the theoretical context presented in Section 1 of the article, the following sections will analyze the ways in which religion influences the Polish foreign policy, religion as the object of that policy, and measures constituting the Polish foreign policy which meet the criteria of religious diplomacy.

Theoretical perspectives

Within the framework of political studies, research of the links between religion and a state's foreign policy focus on the three following issues: the impact of religion on foreign policy; religion as the object of foreign policy; and religious diplomacy. Research on the impact of religion on foreign policy¹² are aimed at demonstrating that religion is relevant as a variable that helps the explanation or understanding of the state's foreign policy (why certain decisions were taken regarding specific goals, measures, etc.); moreover, they try to discover the mechanisms of the impact of religion and the circumstances in which the process operates. Interesting studies in the field were conducted by Carolyn M. Warner and Stephen G. Walker, who proposed an analytical frame applicable on the grounds of the four international relations theories: realism, liberalism, institutionalism, and constructivism. The frame encompasses the following six dimensions of analysis: foreign policy; agents (subjective causality); power; interests; institutions; and ideas (culture). Warner and Walker came to the conclusion that if religion is expected to produce a visible effect in foreign policy, its influence, whether direct or indirectly, via culture, must encompass the beliefs and intentions of agents operating in that policy's domain. Moreover, the impact of religion on foreign policy can be mediated by institutions (organizations, state structures) or interests (of political parties, groups, the general public); it can be integrated with the force the state has in its specific geopolitical position¹³.

On the grounds of realism, where an anarchic nature of international relations is presumed, meaning that every state is pursuing its survival, i.e. protection

12 The impact of religion can be presented in either of the two ways: in terms of cause-and-effect relations (whenever a specific religious factor occurs, a specific result must emerge) and in terms of constituting (a specific religious factor makes specific properties of the given entity cease to exist without it). The first type relates mainly to religious entities, or to religious ideas when they are used instrumentally, while the second type only applies to religious ideas, as long as they are not used instrumentally. See: Craig Parsons, "Constructivism and Interpretative Theory", in: *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, David Marsh, Gerry Stoker (ed.), Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2010, p. 87.

13 Carolyn M. Warner, Stephen G. Walker, Thinking about the Role of Religion in Foreign Policy: A Framework for Analysis, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2011, pp. 117-118.

of its own territory and sovereignty, Warner and Walker opine that the religious heritage of the state can be treated as a condition of perceiving certain parties as enemies or allies of the state. Moreover, realism shows that states sharing common values, with religion at their source, can be less prone to fight each other, and more prone to collaborate. Constructivism, on the other hand, represents the assumption that the essence of a state is its identity, formed on the basis of its culture. As religion is an aspect of culture and hence, as a component of the state's identity, it is capable of forming its institutions, which in turn influence the way the state defines its interests in foreign policy. In certain narrower variants of constructivism, it is assumed that culture is the source of logic used to rationalize and prioritize interests. Within the framework of liberalism, the assumption is that ideas existing within institutions provide concepts and beliefs relating to foreign policy. They are promoted on state level by interest groups and political parties having access to the actors defining the state's policy. Moreover, ideas of domestic political leaders affect the choices made by the state. In the perspective of liberalism, religion should be perceived as a set of ideas that together constitute the theological doctrine. It offers guidelines for living a moral life, while the political theology existing within its framework defines the goals and measures undertaken by the state which are permitted in relation to other states. Like other ideas, religion must have its advocates in the field of foreign policy in order to be able to influence such foreign policy. Institutionalism emphasizes that the effect of ideas, including religion, on foreign policy is enforced through a complex process in which diverse forces of society groups and institutional structures of the state's political system decide on whether or not such an effect will occur and to what extent. In order to gain force, ideas need organizational means of expression and institutional channels of access to the actors determining the policy. Furthermore, Warner and Walker draw attention to the decision-making process in the foreign policy domain, particularly to the role of the system of beliefs represented by the decision-making actors. They emphasize the impact of the leaders' religious beliefs which, albeit restricted by state structures, is capable of defining their operating style (e.g. to what extent they are dogmatic or pragmatic) and put certain matters in the range of their focus. Leaders can revive certain elements of religion, or they can be forced to incorporate them into their policies¹⁴. Studies on the impact of religion on foreign policy also include reflections on the circumstances conditioning that impact, which can include the position religion has in a specific society, the religious actors' ability to translate the potential capacity into actual impact, the actors' ability to influence foreign policy otherwise than being able to get attention of the decision-makers in the government¹⁵.

As regards the second area of research on the religion to foreign policy re-

14 Ibidem, pp. 124-125.

15 Jeffrey Haynes, "Religion and foreign policy"... p. 295.

relationships, or on religion as the object of a state's foreign policy, studies in this field are firstly focused on answering the question about the reasons for states to treat religious issues seriously and about the extent to which religion is an autonomous object of foreign policy. Certain hypotheses are being verified, claiming that initiatives relating to religion are mainly undertaken on the basis of the perceived increasing importance of religion on the global scene, on traumatic events, on the intention to manage fear emerging in the society in light of certain threats, and on imitating powerful states and international institutions. However, states do not tend to treat religious issues as matter of primary importance; instead, interests prevail¹⁶. Secondly, the research is focused on explaining the purpose for which states introduce religious matters to the agenda of their foreign policies. According to one of the hypotheses, some states treat religion as a threat to safety, others - as a resource to be used to the advantage of promoting democracy, development and safety assurance¹⁷. The examples which are available here are the studies on states promoting the religious freedom right, as it is perceived as a frequently essential measure to prevent or resolve conflict¹⁸.

The third area of study on the relationship of religion and foreign policy concerns religious diplomacy, which is an activity of the state that consists of using the religious factor in its foreign policy. This type of diplomacy encompasses multiple mechanisms of cooperation between the state and religious organizations, as well as the use of religious institutions' international activities, the use of religious ideas and symbols (with their appropriate interpretations, so that they are in accordance with the current political objectives), and the use of religion as diplomatic leverage in negotiations with other states. All measures undertaken as part of religious diplomacy are aimed at pursuing a pragmatically defined national interest. As an example, we can refer to the activities of Russia, which has set itself a goal of initiating and moderating interfaith dialogue in the international realm to accomplish mutual understanding among the followers of the different religions. This kind of activity is closely linked to Russia's safety, as Russia has defined religious extremism and erosion of national identities as a consequence of globalization as a threat. Moreover, through such type of activity, Russia is building its positive image and soft power, in order to strengthen its international position¹⁹.

16 François Foret, How the European External Service Deals with Religion through Religious Freedom, *EU Diplomacy Paper*, No. 7, 2017, pp. 22-23.

17 Anne Jenichen, A Transatlantic Secular Divide? The Representation of Religion in EU and US Foreign Policy, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2019, p. 465.

18 Mariano Barbato, "Religious Freedom. A European Contribution to an American Debate", paper delivered to the General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), Montréal, Canada, 26-29 August 2015, available at: <https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/87e43de4-7932-40bb-b506-fc4ff1ae358.pdf> (access date: 2020-08-10).

19 Alicja Curanović, *Czynnik religijny w polityce zagranicznej Federacji Rosyjskiej*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa, 2010, pp. 218-229.

The impact of religion on foreign policy

The impact of religious values and ideas

Firstly, the impact of religion was that it has defined a certain way of perceiving entities to which the Polish foreign policy referred. The state of Poland would perceive those who were sharing the same values - specifically, the Christian axiology - as closer to itself. The Strategy of the Republic of Poland regarding non-European developing countries (2004) makes an express claim to the effect that civilizational and cultural proximity, including Catholicism, is the foundation for collaboration between Poland and Latin America countries²⁰. In their official positions, Ministers of Foreign Affairs would frequently express the opinion that Christianity was defining the way to relate to entities in the international realm. Minister Sikorski emphasized that the religious minority protection measures apply particularly to Christians²¹. Minister Schetyna stated that Christians are specifically persecuted among all religious minorities²², and as he spoke of helping victims of religious persecution, he specifically mentioned the Christians and the Yazidis only²³. He also mentioned Poland having funded university grants for Iraqi Christians²⁴. Minister Waszczykowski said it straight that the values constituting the European heritage, particularly the ethics of Christianity, were the foundation for shared interests for Poland. He also mentioned that among all the religious minorities, Christians deserve special protection²⁵. A similar explanation applies to the reasons why Ministers Cimoszewicz, Sikorski and Czaputowicz were emphasizing the top priority of Poland's relationships with Vatican²⁶.

Secondly, the impact of religion showed in which international actors were perceived as enemies or "aliens". The former category included radical Islam, as

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- 20 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Strategy of the Republic of Poland towards non-European developing countries, Warszawa, November 2004, available at: http://www.kenya.com.pl/pdf/Strategia_kraje_roz.pdf (access date: 2020-08-11).
- 21 Radosław Sikorski, Information from the Minister of Foreign Affairs about the goals of the Polish foreign policy in 2014, 8 May 2014 (information from all the Ministers of Foreign Affairs retrieved from the archive of the Sejm website at: <http://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm9.nsf/page.xsp/archiwum>, access date: 2020-08-09).
- 22 Grzegorz Schetyna, Information from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the objectives of Poland's foreign policy in 2015, 23 April 2015.
- 23 Grzegorz Schetyna, Information from the Council of Ministers of the objectives of Poland's foreign policy during 2014-2015, 6 November 2014.
- 24 Grzegorz Schetyna, Information from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the objectives of Poland's foreign policy in 2015, 23 April 2015.
- 25 Witold Waszczykowski, Information from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the objectives of Poland's foreign policy in 2016, 29 January 2016.
- 26 Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Government's information about Poland's foreign policy in 2003, 22 January 2003; *ibid.* Information from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the objectives of Poland's foreign policy in 2004, 21 January 2004; Radosław Sikorski, Information from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the goals of Poland's foreign policy in 2013, 20 March 2013; Jacek Czaputowicz, Information from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the objectives of Poland's foreign policy in 2019, 14 March 2019.

it threatened the values adopted by the Republic of Poland. The Strategy of Poland's Foreign Policy 2017-2021, drawn up by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, includes a claim that radical Islam is striving to destroy the European civilization through terror²⁷. A similar thought was expressed by Minister Schetyna by stating that Muslim fundamentalists were a threat to the Western values²⁸, while Minister Waszczykowski argued that Poland would defend the values constituting the European heritage, including the ethics of Christianity²⁹. Religion was also the criterion used by Minister Sikorski to set the demarcation line between Poland and the 'aliens'. In the latter category, he included "the world of eastern Slavic Orthodox Christianity", specifically Russia, which in his opinion did not belong to the "European world"³⁰.

Thirdly, the impact of religion was exercised through a specific construction of the identity of the Polish state, and the consequences of this construction. In the official positions expressed by the individuals and institutions responsible for Poland's foreign policy, Poland is presented as a state with a lay identity. It is stated in the Strategy of Poland's Foreign Policy 2017-2021 that the following factors are defining for the identity of the state of Poland: freedom, the principle of peaceful coexistence among the nations, respect for human rights and dignity of the individual. Even though these values are universal, the Strategy and some of the Ministers (e.g. Minister Sikorski³¹) derive them from Christianity as their source. The theory of constructivism will be helpful here with the concept of understanding of a state's own identity being a filter through which representatives of that state perceive certain foreign policy activities in a certain way. This phenomenon seems to be present in the Strategy for Poland's Foreign Policy 2017-2021 and in what the Ministers have said. With the identity of the Polish state perceived as rooted in Christianity, it has been considered natural for Poland to take an orientation on the Western world in its proceedings, as the Western world has Christian roots and Poland wanted to belong to the European Union, the formation of which was inspired by Christian democrats³².

Fourthly, the impact of religion showed as the provision of concepts and guidelines for foreign policy implementation. The Catholic Church certainly played that role, as it introduced the idea of Europe as a spiritual community

27 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Strategy of Poland's Foreign Policy 2017-2021, available at: <https://www.gov.pl/web/dyplomacja/strategia> (access date: 2020-08-12).

28 Grzegorz Schetyna, Information from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the objectives of Poland's foreign policy in 2015, 23 April 2015.

29 Witold Waszczykowski, Information from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the objectives of Poland's foreign policy in 2016, 29 January 2016.

30 Radosław Sikorski, Information from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the goals of Poland's foreign policy in 2013, 20 March 2013.

31 Radosław Sikorski, Information from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the goals of Poland's foreign policy in 2008, 7 May 2008.

32 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Strategy of Poland's Foreign Policy 2017-2021, available at: <https://www.gov.pl/web/dyplomacja/strategia> (access date: 2020-08-12).

based on higher values ('Europe of the Spirit') into public debate in Poland and, consequently, into Poland's foreign policy; that idea originated from the entire resource of shared traditions and culture ('to breathe with both lungs', i.e. to refer to the traditions of the East and of the West)³³. These ideas can be found in official documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, e.g. in the above-mentioned Strategy. Moreover, the effect of religion as a source of guidance for policy implementation is pronounced in official statements and documents to the effect that the Republic of Poland is guided by Christian ethics³⁴. We can also quote Minister Cimoszewicz stating that the Pope's message on mercy is valid in the field of international relations as well³⁵. Minister Schetyna, in turn, concluded that the key message of the 1965 letter from the Polish bishops to the German bishops, which was a call for forgiveness and reconciliation of the nations, should be the guideline for Poland's foreign policy towards its European partners³⁶.

It has been demonstrated that the impact of religion did not fully depend on the political option to which individual ministers of foreign affairs or governments were affiliated. It was pronounced in the case of governments and ministers from the Left (Cimoszewicz) as well as the Centre (Sikorski, Schetyna) and the Right (Waszczykowski, Czaputowicz). Yet with the right-wing governments, the presence of the religious factor was definitely more prominent. Another notable issue is that the impact of religion is dependent on internal and external political events, primarily such as the terrorist threat and the fight with terrorism, as well as the process of Poland's accession to the EU³⁷.

The impact of religious entities

Of all the religious entities, the Catholic Church undertook the most measures attempting at defining the shape of Poland's foreign policy. Two types of its initiatives can be distinguished: appeals addressed at State authorities, and messages to believers or to the general public. During the period under review, the Catholic Church addressed the government directly five times. In 2004, the Presidium of the Polish Episcopal Conference called to the government to ratify the Convention on the prohibition of anti-personnel landmines³⁸. In the same

33 Józef Życiński, *Europejska Wspólnota Ducha. Zjednoczona Europa w nauczaniu Jana Pawła II*, Wydawnictwo Fundacji ATK, Warszawa, 1998, pp. 9-10; Piotr Mazurkiewicz, *Oddychać dwoma płucami. Tożsamość Europy Środkowej, Społeczeństwo*, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2003, p. 207.

34 Witold Waszczykowski, Information from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the objectives of Poland's foreign policy in 2016, 29 January 2016.

35 Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Government's information about Poland's foreign policy in 2003, 22 January 2003.

36 Grzegorz Schetyna, Information from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the objectives of Poland's foreign policy in 2015, 23 April 2015.

37 Jarosław Macała, Religia w polskich kodach geopolitycznych w latach 1990-2017 na przykładzie informacji ministrów spraw zagranicznych o polityce zagranicznej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, *Przegląd Religioznawczy*, No. 3 (265), 2017, pp. 34-41.

38 Letter of the Presidium of the Polish Episcopal Conference regarding the Nairobi conference on the prohibition of use of anti-personnel landmines, 13 September 2004.

year, the Presidium of the Polish Episcopal Conference presented a statement to the Government, including a claim to the effect that a reference to faith and to the Christian heritage should not be missing in the Preamble of the Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe³⁹. In 2005, the Secretary-General of the Polish Episcopal Conference appealed to the Senators of the Republic of Poland not to ratify the Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence⁴⁰, and ten years later the Chairman of the Polish Episcopal Conference Council for Lay Apostolate sent an open letter to the President of the Republic of Poland, calling for not signing the ratification of that Convention⁴¹. In 2017, as the Polish Episcopal Conference workgroup responsible for contact with the German Episcopal Conference were concerned about the crisis in the Poland-Germany relations (mainly caused by the Polish counterpart demanding reparations for war), they called the government to use their diplomatic efforts to maintain a relation of mutual trust and confidence between Germany and Poland⁴². It should be noted that the vast majority of the Church initiatives aimed at influencing the Polish authorities concerned legislation enacted by international institutions, and only in one case it was about relationships with a particular other state. These initiatives were undertaken by narrow groups within the Church and as such, they presumably did not represent the opinions of all the bishops. Of all the measures enumerated above, only the appeal regarding the Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence did not receive a positive response from the government.

The Catholic Church would much more frequently try to affect foreign policy indirectly, by forming public opinions through messages to the followers or to the whole society. In 2002, considering the pending wars and violent acts, specifically in the Holy Land, the bishops raised an appeal for peace all over the world⁴³. In 2002, 2003 and 2004, they presented their positions on the European integration and Poland's accession to the EU. They called for Poland's presence in the EU not to threaten Polish national and religious identity, respect to variety and diversity, and protection of fundamental values (life, marriage, family). The bishops asked the audiences to deeply consider John Paul II's words as he supported Poland's accession to the EU. They called the people to express their opinions in the accession referendum and to subsequently take part in the election to

39 Statement by the Presidium of the Polish Episcopal Conference regarding reference to the heritage of Christianity in the wording of the EU Treaty, 12 May 2004.

40 Statement by the Secretary-General of the Polish Episcopal Conference concerning the CAHVIO convention of the Council of Europe, 3 March 2015.

41 Open letter of the Chairman of the Polish Episcopal Conference Council for Lay Apostolate regarding the resolution on ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, 9 February 2015.

42 Appeal by the Workgroup for Contact with the German Episcopal Conference, 8 September 2017.

43 Appeal of the Polish Bishops about peace, 30 April 2002.

the European Parliament⁴⁴. In 2003 and 2007, the Polish Episcopal Conference issued a statement expressing its concern about non-existence of any reference to God or the role of Christianity in the formation of Europe, and of any mention of the principle of solidarity, subsidiarity, and the idea of brotherhood in the Treaty to establish Constitution for the EU. Also, they expressed their positive assessment of the Treaty provisions regarding respect to the legal status of churches, and their appreciation for those in power for their support for the above mentioned claims of the Church⁴⁵. In 2014, the Polish Episcopal Conference Council for Family Problems issued a statement concerning the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, where they stated that the Convention could not be accepted as it was redefining the concept of gender as a social and not a biological phenomenon, and it unreasonably holding the family, marriage, tradition and civilizational heritage responsible for violence. The bishops expressed their appreciation for the individuals and organizations emphasizing the threats that may arise from the ratification of the Convention⁴⁶. In 2015, the Polish Episcopal Conference issued a communication concerning refugees, stating that the world's key effort should focus on extinguishing the conflicts as a consequence of which people are forced to resort to fleeing their own countries. For that reason, according to the bishops, it was necessary to help those suffering from war in their countries of origin⁴⁷. In the 2015 pastoral letter, the Episcopate expressed their concern with the persecution of Christians worldwide⁴⁸, and in the 2017 letter on patriotism, they defined nationalism and hostility against other nations to be inconsistent with the principles of Christianity⁴⁹. As it is shown above, the subjects covered by the appeals by the Church to the government and by their messages to the society were diverse, corresponding to the current political events. The moral aspect was inherent in these appeals and messages, albeit not always easily noticeable (e.g. in the case of Poland's accession to the EU), and sometimes it would be contested (e.g. in the case of the Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence).

The churches of other denominations, gathered in the Polish Ecumenical Council, were also vocal on matters concerning Poland's foreign policy. Yet

44 Polish Bishops vs. European integration, 21 March 2002; Remarks by the Polish Bishops on Poland's accession to the European Union, 21 March 2002; The Christian responsibility for the Homeland. Appeal by the Polish bishops for responsibility for the future of Poland and Europe in light of Poland's accession to the European Union structures, 18 March 2004.

45 Statement by the Episcopate of Poland regarding the fundamental values in the EU Treaty, 21 October 2003; Position of the Episcopate of Poland on the EU Treaty, 14 March 2007.

46 Statement by the Polish Episcopal Conference Family Council regarding the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, 2 October 2014.

47 Communication from the Presidium of the Polish Episcopal Conference regarding refugees, 8 September 2015.

48 Pastoral letter from the Episcopate of Poland regarding the persecution of Christians, 8 November 2015.

49 The Christian shape of patriotism. Document of the Polish Episcopal Conference, produced by the Council for Society problems, 14 March 2017.

the Council did not file any appeals directly to those in power. Its statements, of which there were only a few during the period under consideration, presented the positions of the churches working together in the Council. In 2011, immediately before the commencement of Poland's presidency of the Council of the European Union, the Polish Ecumenical Council reiterated the vision of the European integration defined in the Ecumenical Chart. In this perspective, united Europe should draw on the spiritual heritage of Christianity, respect human rights as well as the following values: peace, justice, freedom, tolerance, participation, and solidarity. The Council noted the need of collaboration beyond the EU borders, protection of the environment, protection of non-working Sundays, voluntary work, and presentation of Poland as a multicultural, multinational and multid denominational country. In 2012 and 2013, the Council issued its appeals concerning environmental protection, whereas in 2016 they called for helping refugees and their home countries⁵⁰.

It is also reasonable to note the activities of organizations of religiously motivated lay people (such as the Catholic Action, *Ordo Iuris*, pro-life organizations). During the period of study, their interest in matters relating to Poland's foreign policy, expressed through statements and appeals, focused on the moral threats involved in EU legislation and ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, as well as the persecution of Christians in various countries.

Impact through institutions

Article 25(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland on one hand facilitates the influence of religion on politics, as it mentions the state's cooperation with churches and religious associations, but on the other hand restricts that influence by mentioning their autonomy and mutual independence. A similar position is presented in the acts of law on the State's relationship with churches and religious associations. So-called joint committees, i.e. groups of representatives of the Government and of particular churches, are the place where the churches can try to influence foreign policy, in accordance with the Constitutional provision regarding cooperation. At the moment, there are five separate committees, with their members representing the following religious entities: the Polish Episcopal Conference, the Polish Ecumenical Council, the Evangelical Alliance, the Evangelical Church of the Augsburg Confession in Poland, and the Holy Council of Bishops of the Polish Orthodox Church. Meetings usually take place once a year. During the period of study, the committee would hardly ever mention any

50 The Polish Ecumenical Council, *Shaping Europe Together - activities of the Polish Ecumenical Council during Poland's presidency in the EU*; Appeal from the Churches in Poland for the protection of creation, 2012; Appeal from the Churches in Poland for the protection of creation, 2013-01-16; Message from the Churches in Poland regarding refugees, 30 June 2016, available at: <https://ekumenia.pl/czytelnia/> (access date: 2020-08-18).

matters in the field of foreign policy, even though the formula of the meetings permitted these issues to be discussed. In 2008, the Polish Episcopal Conference discussed the matter of ratification of the Bioethics Convention of the Council of Europe with representatives of the Government⁵¹, while in 2011 the talks with the Polish Ecumenical Council concerned Poland's presidency in the Council of the EU and the position of the Polish Government on the Centre Against Expulsions, set up by the German government⁵². It should be noted that no representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are sitting on any of the joint committees on behalf of the Government.

The impact of religion through institutions further happens via the election system. Firstly, as political parties win the elections, they get an opportunity to implement religious ideas or postulates; secondly, the religious affiliations of voters can be a determining factor in choosing among the political parties with specific agendas. As regards the former type of influence, Christian values were a point of reference during the period of study for several parties, some of which would only refer to the Christian axiology (like the Law and Justice party, the Civic Platform, the League of Polish Families), while others referred to various ideological traditions, including the Christian set of values (e.g. the Polish Peasants' Party, the Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland)⁵³. Among the members of the first group, there are certain political parties having a significant presence of the religious factor in Poland's foreign policy on their agendas. Law and Justice (PiS), currently with the majority of seats in the Parliament, declared in its 2005 agenda entitled "Catholic Poland in Christian Europe" that they would make efforts to include a reference to God and to Europe's Christian heritage in the European Constitution, oppose the EU measures which are in conflict with the Christian axiology, while MEP candidates affiliated to PiS made an undertaking to guard the 'Christian identity of our continent in the EU structures'⁵⁴. Interestingly, there is a highly noticeable evolution taking place in the presence of the religious factor in the agenda of PiS concerning foreign policy, as only minor mentions of Christian values are present in their later agendas, dated 2014 and 2019, respectively, in the sections dedicated to foreign policy⁵⁵. The comment about the evolution of the presence of the religious factor is only applicable to the agenda documents

51 The Government and the Church satisfied with the reopening of their proceedings. Communication from the Episcopate-Government Joint Committee, 13 February 2008.

52 Meeting of the Joint Committee of the Government and Council of the Polish Episcopal Conference, available at: <https://ekumenia.pl/aktualnosc/posiedzenie-komisji-wspolnej-rzadu-i-pre/> (access date: 2020-08-20); Stefan Dudra, *Polski Autokefaliczny Kościół Prawosławny w obszarze polityki wyznaniowej oraz polityki narodowościowej Polski Ludowej i III Rzeczypospolitej*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa, 2019, p. 95.

53 Krzysztof Kowalczyk, Stanowiska polskich partii politycznych wobec religii i Kościoła. Propozycja typologii, *Studia Politicae Universitatis Silesiensis*, Vol. 15, 2015, p. 187.

54 Law and Justice, *Catholic Poland in Christian Europe*, Warsaw, 2015, pp. 40-48, available at: http://christianitas.org/site_media/content/broszura_katolicka.pdf (access date: 2020-08-21).

55 Law and Justice Agenda 2019, *The Polish model of the welfare state*, available at: http://pis.org.pl/files/Program_PIS_2019.pdf (access date: 2020-08-21).

of PiS, as no such evolution can be noticed in the documents of the PiS Government (such as the Strategy for Poland's Foreign Policy 2017-2021). At the moment, a reference to religion is not a part of any of the parliamentary parties' official agendas on foreign policy, except the National Movement which is proposing Poland's exit from the EU in the name of defending Poland's Christian identity⁵⁶.

As regards the second type of impact, i.e. the people's political choices being determined by their religious beliefs, research shows that there is a correlation between religious affiliation and political preferences. In the 2005 election, the correlation between the voters' religious affiliation and political choices was strongest for the League of Polish Families (LPR), a party which was expressly referring to Christian values, and it is slightly lesser in the case of PiS. In the 2015 election, PiS came ahead of other parties (the LPR did not take part in that election) in terms of the strength of that correlation⁵⁷. The situation with the 2019 election was similar.⁵⁸ At the same time, it should be noted that according to the existing research, a party's foreign policy is not a decisive factor motivating voters to vote for that party. Only 2% of all the respondents voted for PiS for reason of that party's foreign policy⁵⁹. A conclusion that can be drawn from that fact is that the voters' religious affiliation was not decisive for the choice of the Polish state's foreign policy during the period of study.

Religion on the agenda of foreign policies

In March 2002, the European Convent in charge of drafting a Constitutional Treaty for Europe commenced its work. The wording of the Treaty started with a Preamble, which was the subject of a tumultuous discussion at the Convent and in the particular Member States. The Catholic Church postulated a claim to include a mention of God in the Preamble of the Treaty, as a 'source of human dignity and fundamental rights'⁶⁰. That claim was rejected by the Convent; hence, it was later proposed in a less straightforward form, as an expectation of introducing an express provision concerning the Christian roots of Europe to the text. The Member States with a strong attachment to the lay tradition and restrictive separation of Church and State (France, Belgium) strongly opposed the adoption

56 Agenda of the National Movement, *Sovereign Nation in the 21st century*, 2016, available at: <https://ruchnarodowy.net/wp-content/uploads/Program-Ruchu-Narodowego.pdf> (access date: 2020-08-21).

57 Marta Żerkowska-Balas, Igor Lyubashenko, Agnieszka Kwiatkowska, Determinanty preferencji wyborczych: Polska w latach 1997-2015, *Studia Socjologiczne*, No. 4 (223), 2016, pp. 81-82.

58 Stan Polityki.pl, *Deeply religious Polish citizens' voting preferences in the European Parliament election*, available at: <https://stan.dev/imado.pl/na-kogo-glosuja-gleboko-wierzacy-polacy-w-wyborach-do-pe/> (access date: 2020-08-21).

59 CBOS, *Komunikat z badań. Motywy głosowania na partie polityczne* (Research project communication. Reasons for voting for the political parties), No. 63/2018, p. 2.

60 John Paul II, Przesłanie z okazji 1200. rocznicy koronacji Karola Wielkiego, 14 grudnia 2000 (Message on the occasion of the 1200th anniversary of Charlemagne's coronation, 14 December 2000), in: John Paul II, *Europa zjednoczona w Chrystusie. Antologia*, Biały Kruk, Kraków, 2002, p. 388.

of either version of that mention. On 9 September 2003, the Council of Ministers adopted the position of the Government of the Republic of Poland for the Intergovernmental Conference on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for the EU, encompassing a claim to include a reference to the tradition of Christianity in the Preamble to the Constitutional Treaty. In his speech presenting the Government's information about the matter to the Sejm (the lower house of Parliament), Minister Cimoszewicz would explain the Government's position as follows: "It is an important postulate of the Government to include a reference to the Christian traditions in the Preamble to the Treaty. Such a provision would correspond to the historical truth and the expectations of many citizens. The EU is primarily a community of values, giving individual nations and communities a shared feeling of being established in the European tradition. Lack of such an express reference to the Christian traditions could cause misunderstandings and disappointment"⁶¹.

The dispute about the Preamble had the understanding of religious freedom at its core. The states which opposed the mention of Christianity would rather support the priority of a negative dimension of religious freedom, i.e. declaring that public reminders of the existence of religion and mentioning any of them by its name is by itself an act of intolerance towards people representing different ways of thinking, or at least a violation of the principle of ideological neutrality. The counterparty supported the priority of the positive dimension of religious freedom, i.e. the right to express one's faith in public, specifically in the field of law⁶². The Government of Poland, by supporting the latter position, probably had different motivations, as may be implied by the above quoted argument by Minister Cimoszewicz. It should be noted that the Polish Government was not completely defeated in the fight for the Preamble, as there was a reference to religion in its final version, albeit without naming the actual religion.

The Polish Government was engaged in activities aimed at protecting people from violence on the grounds of religion or beliefs, and helping the victims of such violence. The Government of the Republic of Poland pursued its aid in collaboration with non-governmental organizations, particularly those affiliated to the Catholic Church, and they would often involve Catholic missionaries in the cooperation and use the financial support from USAID. The scope of aid covered shipments of medical equipment to hospitals in Syria, purchases of prostheses for children from the Syria-Turkey border area, projects concerning erection of houses for Yazidis, vocational activation centers in the Nineveh Valley, and minor projects targeted at local communities in the Middle East⁶³. Michał Woś, minister

61 Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Information from the Government regarding preparation to the Intergovernmental Conference on the Treaty to establish a Constitution for Europe, 17 September 2003, available at: <http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/kronika.nsf/0/6339389D609B4877C125793A003EAA98/%24File/kronika68.pdf> (access date: 2020-08-22).

62 Piotr Mazurkiewicz, Wspólne wartości w Traktacie ustanawiającym Konstytucję dla Europy, in: Piotr Mazurkiewicz, Sławomir Sowiński (ed.), *Religia-tożsamość-Europa*, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich. Wydawnictwo, Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków, 2005, pp. 216-217.

63 KAI, Ik, kg, tom, *Poland supports Christians persecuted for their faith in the Middle East*, 22 August 2019, available at: <https://ekai>.

at the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, stated that Poland was internationally appreciated for that help⁶⁴. He proudly said that among all the religious groups affected by violence or persecution, the Polish Government was only helping Christians and Yazidis. Referring to the example of the Hungarian government, which is mainly interested in Christians on the grounds of Hungary's Christian heritage, he stated that Christians had top priority for the Polish Government, although certain aid for other groups was also considered⁶⁵.

An important undertaking by Poland was a presentation on the United Nations forum of the initiative to establish an International Day Commemorating the Victims of Acts of Violence Based on Religion or Belief. Ewelina Ochab, a lawyer, commenced the effort to emphasize the problem of violating religious freedom rights, particularly the issue of persecution of Christians, in 2017. The Polish Government decided to mention the issue to the United Nations, backed by the United States of America, Canada, Brazil, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Nigeria and Pakistan. On 28 May 2019, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously passed a resolution establishing 22 August as the International Day Commemorating the Victims of Acts of Violence Based on Religion or Belief. Jacek Czaputowicz, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, as he justified the motion concerning that Day, referred to the category of human rights. He said that the right of freedom of thought, conscience and religion, commonly referred to as freedom of religion and belief, is a common right of every human being and a foundation of many other rights. He also commented on the increasing intolerance and an unprecedented growth in the number of violent acts against members of religious minorities. He emphasized the hardship experienced by victims of religious persecution, who would often be abandoned without any help or support. In the explanatory memorandum, the Minister also mentioned the issue of reinforcement of the dialogue among religions, promoting such values as religious tolerance, and respecting diversity. It should be noted that this resolution was the first one developed exclusively by Poland for many years. Poland managed to achieve unanimous support for that initiative. It was a part of the accomplishment of one of the top priorities of Polish foreign policy, i.e. promoting freedom of religion or belief in international forums. It should be noted that the strengthening of religious freedom is also a top priority of Poland's membership of the United Nations Human Rights Council during the 2020-2022 term⁶⁶.

pl/polska-wspiera-chrzescijan-przesladowanych-za-wiare-na-bliskim-wschodzie/ (access date: 2020-08-12).

64 PolskieRadio24.pl, Michał Woś: *believing one's own religion is a fundamental human right*, 22 August 2019, available at: <https://polskieradio24.pl/5/1222/Artykul/2358427,Michal-Wos-wyznawanie-wlasnej-religii-jest-fundamentalnym-prawem-czlowieka> (access date: 2020-08-12).

65 Agnieszka Zagner, "Poland supports victims of religious persecution. But mainly Christians", 22 August 2019, <https://www.polietyka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/swiat/1921186,1,polska-wspiera-ofiary-przesladowan-religijnych-ale-glownie-chrzescijan.read> (access date: 2020-08-12).

66 Office of the Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Poland initiated the establishment of the International Day Commemorating the Victims of Acts of Violence Based on Religion or Belief, 28 May 2019, available at: <https://www.gov.pl/web/dy>

The initiative was presented negatively by the media, as it allegedly concerned Christians only. Szymon Szykowski vel Sęk, vice-minister of diplomacy, replied that the Day was commemorating all victims of religious persecution, whatever their origin. Yet he added that Christians were the largest group prosecuted for their religion⁶⁷.

By introducing matters on the agenda that encompassed a religious aspect, different governments were guided by various criteria. Left-wing governments in power during the final period of the process of Poland's accession to the EU were definitely seeking support from the Catholic Church and from voters with a religious orientation. Right-wing governments, on the other hand, as they introduced religious matters on the agenda of their foreign policy, combined axiological issues with pragmatic aspects. They were acting in compliance with their preset values, yet they also perceived it as a way to verify their credibility among voters and the Catholic Church, whose positive attitude they were seeking, as well as their foreign partners, particularly the United States under President Trump's administration.

Religious diplomacy

Only one of the projects implemented within the framework of Polish foreign policy seems to meet the criteria specified in the prevailing definition of religious diplomacy, specifically Poland's membership in the International Religious Freedom Alliance. The Alliance was formed upon the initiative of the United States in September 2019, it has 27 member states at the moment, and its primary goal is to confront religious prosecution and to promote religious freedom worldwide. The Alliance came into existence as a result of President Donald Trump's administration giving religious freedom a very high priority among the priorities of the United States' foreign policy. In this way, the Trump administration implemented a major shift in the way the United States support human rights within the framework of their foreign policy. President Obama's administration emphasized human rights in the context of women and sexual minorities in their foreign policy. The Trump administration declared that religious freedom was a gift from God and the first and foremost of all human rights. This method of implementing foreign policy encountered a lot of criticism, where Trump was accused of a narrow interpretation of religious freedom, according to Judeo-Christian beliefs, and of paying attention to Christian communities only while disregarding persecuted Muslims and representatives of other religions⁶⁸.

By joining the International Religious Freedom Alliance, Poland was not only

plomacja/polska-inicjatorem-ustanowienia-miedzynarodowego-dnia-upamietniajacego-ofiary-aktow-przemocy-ze-wzgledu-na-religie-lub-wyznanie (access date: 2020-08-12).

67 Agnieszka Zagner, *Poland supports victims...*

68 Jeffrey Haynes, *Trump and the Politics of International Religious Freedom*, *Religions*, No. 8, Vol. 11, 2020, pp. 14-16.

following the top priorities of its foreign policy and not only building its international reputation, but also pursuing its pragmatic interest, considering the pro-American character of Poland's general policy during that period, i.e. setting a tighter link to the United States, considered to be the primary guarantor of Poland's safety by the Polish Government. The United States treat the Alliance pragmatically as well, i.e. as a tool to influence certain states, particularly China, and as a measure to ensure their own national safety⁶⁹.

For the same reasons as those applicable to the initiative discussed above, religious diplomacy could include Poland's undertaking to organize a Ministerial Conference to Advance Religious Freedom, yet this project ultimately did not come into existence. The first conference of this type was held in July 2018 in Washington, DC, upon the initiative of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. The objective of these regular events is to provide a discussion forum for government representatives, non-governmental organizations and religious leaders striving to achieve a positive change by guaranteeing religious freedom. The Conference organized by Poland was initially scheduled for 14-16 July 2020 in Warsaw, but it was rescheduled because of the Covid-19 pandemic⁷⁰.

It seems that the Polish Government had several opportunities to achieve measurable advantage by using religious issues in their foreign policy. This involves the cooperation with the Catholic Church on the pursuit of Poland's interests in its relationship with the Ukraine and Russia. The Catholic Church was regularly commencing dialogue with the churches existing in the Ukraine. Here, we can quote the joint declaration of the Greek Catholic Church of Ukraine and the Catholic Church of Poland, adopted on 29 June 2013, to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the Volhynia massacre, or the letter from the Greek Catholic bishops of Ukraine and the Roman Catholic bishops of Poland to celebrate the act of mutual forgiveness and reconciliation, signed during 19-26 June 2005, as well as many other examples of letters begging for forgiveness and reconciliation, which were exchanged by Church hierarchy officials. An interesting initiative by the Catholic Church was the invitation of Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and Russia and his signing, together with the Head of the Polish Episcopal Conference, of a joint message to the nations of Poland and Russia on 17 August 2012. There is no indication of these events having been used by the Polish Government to pursue the interests of Poland, even on the level of building communication channels between Poland and the above-mentioned states. We have to admit here that the dialogue between the Polish and Ukrainian Church hierarchy officials was coordinated with the initiatives of the Presidents of Poland and Ukraine, aimed at

69 Ibidem, p. 14.

70 Office of the Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New date of the International Conference for the Advance of Freedom of Religion and Belief, due to the current pandemic situation, 17 July 2020, available at: <https://www.gov.pl/web/dyplomacja/zmiana-terminu-miedzynarodowej-konferencji-na-rzecz-wolnosci-religii-lub-przekonan-w-zwiazku-z-aktualna-sytuacja-pandemiczna> (access date: 2020-08-14).

a reconciliation between the Polish and the Ukrainian people.

Other minor foreign policy initiatives involving the religious factor (such as helping the Church to organize the World Youth Day in 2016, or unsuccessful cooperation with the Church on building humanitarian corridors to help refugees in 2016) cannot be identified as religious diplomacy, as they were not aimed at pursuing a pragmatically defined national interest. They were rather expressions of the government's beliefs, moral undertakings, aimed at building the Government's and Poland's reputation, or their goals were not precisely defined (e.g. Minister Czaputowicz honored Naveed Walter, director of Human Rights Focus Pakistan with the Pro Dignitate Humana award, for his commitment to the protection of religious minorities' rights).

Conclusions

The analytical studies covered by this paper provided grounds for drawing a map of the essential points of contact between religion and foreign policy of Poland during the recent 10+ years. The relationships between religion and Polish foreign policy could be observed in all the dimensions mentioned by the theoretical approaches, i.e. in the dimension of influence of religious ideas, religious entities and institutions, in the field of presence of religious elements on the agenda of foreign policy, and with reference to religious diplomacy. As regards the influence of religious ideas, it was actually limited to the impact of the general Christian values, Christian ideas which were not usually defined in excessive detail, or to Christianity as such. The activity of religious entities in the field of exerting a direct impact on politics seems to have been moderate. These entities would strongly prefer to exert their influence from the level of meta-politics. The impact of religion via institutions does not seem to be significant, either. Although there are dedicated institutions in Poland that would enable religion to affect foreign policy, neither would the religious entities undertake many initiatives during the period of study nor would the government encourage or expect any such initiatives. The electoral system existing at the beginning of the period of study was a mechanism through which religion would find its way into the field of foreign policy, yet at the moment this mechanism is not very significant, as the political parties no longer emphasize religious elements with reference to foreign policy in their agendas, while voters perceived the parties' foreign policy proposals to be a marginal reason for choosing specific parties. The presence of elements associated with religion on the agenda of the foreign policy at the beginning of the period of study was related to Poland's accession to the EU. For a long time afterwards, next governments did not undertake any initiatives having religion at their core. Religious elements have only appeared on the agenda of foreign policy when Law and Justice formed its government. Hence, we cannot claim that the presence of religion on the agenda of Poland's foreign policy is

permanent. Governmental activities recognized as religious diplomacy were also the domain of the Law and Justice rule. There were only few of them and their primary goal was to accomplish closer relations to the United States of America as the guarantor of Polish safety. They could be possible while the power in the USA was taken by Presidential Administration which is highly interested in using the religious factor in its policies.

More thorough research would be required to answer the question about the determining factors of the situation presented above. In general terms, we may claim that it is primarily caused by the acceptance of the lay character of the Polish state by the political elites. Therefore, the elites restrict themselves in incorporating any religious components into their foreign policy. Another factor which is probably relevant here is the separation of religion and state, which is particularly welcomed by religious entities. Although, as the paper demonstrated, they could take part in religious diplomacy, they abstain from doing that, and instead they are targeting their activity mainly at the spiritual realm, while refusing to be treated instrumentally by politicians.

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РЕЛИГИЈА И СПОЉНА ПОЛИТИКА ПОЉСКЕ У 21. ВЕКУ

Сажетак

Циљ овог рада јесте да исцрта мапу кључних проблема у односу религије и спољне политике Пољске у периоду 2001 – 2020. године. Анализе су показале да се овај однос може посматрати кроз неколико теоријских приступа, рецимо кроз утицај верских идеја, верских актера и институција, као и кроз улогу верске дипломатије. Утицај верских идеја се генерално своди на хришћанство. Верски актери настоје да утичу на спољну политику пре свега кроз мета-политику, а не директно. Када су у питању верске институције, изборни систем представља прилику да се религија уметне у спољну политику, али само у иницијалном периоду. Присуство религије у пољској спољној политици није стално и лимитирано је од стране неколико иницијатива. Слично томе, верска дипломатија изгледа да нема начине да на озбиљнији начин утиче на пољску политичку културу и није прихваћена од стране верских актера.

Кључне речи: Пољска, религија, хришћанство, верски актери, спољна политика, политичка агенда, верска дипломатија

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